United States v. Sampson

Citation82 F.Supp.3d 502
Decision Date08 November 2014
Docket NumberCr. No. 01–10384–MLW.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Gary Lee SAMPSON.

George W. Vien, Donnelly, Conroy & Gelhaar, LLP, Mark T. Quinlivan, Dustin Chao, Zachary R. Hafer, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, Michael S. Warbel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Danalynn Recer, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, Miriam Conrad, Elizabeth L. Prevett, J. Martin Richey, Federal Public Defender Office, Boston, MA, William E. McDaniels, Jennifer G. Wicht, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for Gary Lee Sampson.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING COMPETENCY EVALUATION, FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12.2, and MOTION TO DISQUALIFY PROSECUTORS

WOLF, District Judge.

I. SUMMARY 505
II. BACKGROUND 506
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 512
A. The Court's Equitable Authority in § 2255 Proceedings 512
B. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) 513
C. Constitutional Issues Implicated by Sampson's New Sentencing 513
D. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2 513
IV. ISSUES RELATING TO SAMPSON'S RULE 12.2 NOTICE 514
A. Sufficiency of Sampson's Rule 12.2 Notice 514
B. Updated Notice and the Fire-walled Attorneys 515
C. The Parties' Examinations of Sampson 516
1. Sampson's Examinations 516
2. The Schedule Concerning the Parties' Examinations 518
V. THE COMPETENCY EVALUATION 518
VI. SAMPSON'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 522
VII. ORDER 524
I. SUMMARY

This court's decision to grant defendant Gary Sampson's petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and vacate his death sentence because of juror misconduct was affirmed by the First Circuit. As a result, a new sentencing hearing must be conducted to determine Sampson's sentence and conclude this § 2255 proceedings before this court.

In preparation for that hearing, a series of related issues have emerged concerning Sampson's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2, the report of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Examiner concerning Sampson's competency to stand trial, and the propriety of the government's trial team having access to the information concerning Sampson's mental condition presented at his 2003 trial and previously in this § 2255 proceeding. Some of these issues can be resolved as matters of statutory construction. With regard to other issues, the court's decisions are guided by the following principles. The court's power under § 2255 is equitable in nature. Where, as here, there has been a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, the court has broad power to craft an appropriate remedy. That remedy should, as much as possible, be tailored to the injury Sampson suffered and seek to restore him to the circumstances that existed before the violation, while not unnecessarily infringing on competing interests.

For the reasons explained in detail in this Memorandum, the court has decided the disputed issues as follows. Sampson's October 20, 2014 Rule 12.2(b)(2) notice that he may introduce at the new sentencing hearing expert evidence concerning his mental condition is legally sufficient. At or after the November 12, 2014 hearing, the court will establish a schedule for Sampson's experts to examine and test his mental condition, and for Sampson to inform “fire-walled” attorneys for the government of the professions of those experts, and the tests they have performed and may conduct. The court will also establish a schedule for the government's experts' examination and testing of Sampson under the guidance of the fire-walled attorneys and pursuant to the Rule 12.2 protocol ordered by the court in 2003.

In addition, the court concludes that there is not now reasonable cause to believe that Sampson is not competent to stand trial. Therefore, a hearing to determine his competency is not now necessary. The court agrees with the parties that the BOP Examiner's report finding that Sampson is now competent to stand trial is subject to Rule 12.2. If, however, it is not as a matter of law, it is most appropriate to treat it as subject to the rule as an exercise of the court's § 2255 equitable authority. Therefore, the report will remain sealed and will not now be provided to the parties. If and when Sampson confirms his intention to introduce expert evidence of his mental condition, the court will decide whether to provide the Examiner's report to the parties and, if so, whether the government should receive it in redacted form. If the parties receive the Examiner's report, after considering the actual expert evidence Sampson intends to introduce, the court will decide if the government should be allowed to introduce evidence from the report or derived from it in rebuttal.

The court also concludes that it is not fair, feasible, or in the interest of justice to require that the government's trial team and experts on mental condition operate in ignorance of the evidence concerning Sampson's mental condition that he presented at his trial in 2003 and in this § 2255 proceeding. Rather, it is most appropriate that equally informed adversaries educate the jury, which will have to decide whether Sampson should be sentenced to death. Therefore, Sampson's motion to disqualify the government's trial counsel is being denied. However, if it would be unfair to permit particular evidence concerning Sampson's mental condition previously presented by him to be introduced to the jury by the government, the court will exercise its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), which authorizes the court to exclude evidence if the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value, or its § 2255 equitable power, to exclude it.

Orders implementing these decisions will issue after the November 12, 2014 hearing.

II. BACKGROUND

In 2001, defendant Gary Sampson was charged with two counts of carjacking resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3). These charges permitted the government to seek Sampson's execution under the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq. The Attorney General filed notice of his intention to seek the death penalty in 2002.

On May 5, 2003, Sampson filed a notice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(b)(2), that he might introduce at the penalty phase of this capital case expert evidence relating to a mental condition bearing on the issue of punishment.

See May 5, 2003 Rule 12.2 Notice (the 2003 Notice”) (Docket No. 150); United States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166, 241 (D.Mass.2004).

The 2003 Notice generated issues under the then-new Rule 12.2 that were decided by the court, in some instances with the agreement of the parties, and memorialized in a series of orders. See Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d at 241–48. To protect Sampson's Fifth Amendment interests, the court ordered that the government utilize for Rule 12.2 purposes “fire-walled” attorneys, who would not participate in the trial of the case or communicate with the prosecutors who would try the case. Id. at 243–45. Sampson was required to inform the fire-walled attorneys of the kinds of mental health professionals who had evaluated him and the tests they had performed. Id. at 242–43 ; June 17, 2003 Order at ¶ 1 (Docket No. 208). However, the government's request for “the nature of the proffered mental conditions” was denied because that information was “essentially the same as the ‘results and reports' for which early disclosure is barred” by Rule 12.2(c)(2). Id. at 243.

In addition, in view of Sampson's Sixth Amendment interest in the effective assistance of counsel, the government was ordered to provide Sampson's attorneys with at least five-days' advance notice of the professions of the government experts who would examine Sampson with respect to his mental condition and of the tests they planned to perform. Id. at 245–46. This requirement was intended to provide Sampson's attorneys an opportunity either to advise him to participate in the proposed examination or to ask the court to prohibit it. The court also ordered that the examination of Sampson by the government's experts be tape-recorded unless the fire-walled attorneys successfully moved for reconsideration with regard to a particular test. Id. at 246–47. The court denied Sampson's request to have defense counsel present at the government's examination. Id. at 247–48.

In violation of the court's Order, a government expert administered a test without giving Sampson the required five-days' notice. This led to the replacement of the two government experts informed of the results of that test.

Jury selection began on September 18, 2003. On October 21, 2003, Sampson confirmed his intention to offer evidence concerning his mental condition. See Oct. 23, 2003 Order (Docket No. 469). Therefore, on October 23, 2003, the court authorized the fire-walled attorneys to provide the prosecutors the results and reports of the examinations of Sampson by the government's experts. Id., ¶ 1. The government was ordered, pursuant to Rule 12.2(c)(2), to disclose that information to Sampson by 2:30 p.m. on October 31, 2003. Id., ¶ 2; Oct. 31, 2003 Order at ¶ 3 (Docket No. 503). Sampson was directed, pursuant to Rule 12.2(c)(3), to disclose to the government later that day the results and reports of any examination of his mental condition about which Sampson intended to introduce expert evidence. See Oct. 23, 2003 Order, ¶ 3.

Sampson had pled guilty on September 9, 2003. The penalty phase of his trial began on November 5, 2003. Sampson presented at trial, in open court, expert testimony and related evidence concerning his mental condition. The government presented such evidence in rebuttal.

On December 23, 2003, the jury unanimously found that Sampson should be executed. In doing so, the jury also unanimously found that Sampson was not mentally ill when his crimes were committed. See 2003 Verdict Forms (Docket Nos. 654, 654–2); see also United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 49–50 (1st Cir.2007).

On January 26, 2004, the court denied Sampson's motion for a new trial pursuant to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • United States v. Sampson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 28 Octubre 2015
    ..."'the broad leeway traditionally afforded district courts in the exercise of their §2255 authority.'" United States v. Sampson, 82 F. Supp. 3d 502, 512 (D. Mass. 2014) (quoting United States v. Torres-Otero, 232 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2000)). Thecourt concludes that it is inappropriate to ex......
  • United States v. Sampson, Cr. No. 01-10384-MLW
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 28 Octubre 2015
    ..."'the broad leeway traditionally afforded district courts in the exercise of their §2255 authority.'" United States v. Sampson, 82 F. Supp. 3d 502, 512 (D. Mass. 2014) (quoting United States v. Torres-Otero, 232 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2000)). The court concludes that it is inappropriate to e......
  • United States v. Sampson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 8 Septiembre 2015
    ...those were substantial disputes concerning the evaluation of Sampson's current competency to stand trial. See United States v. Sampson , 82 F.Supp.3d 502, 519–23 (D.Mass.2014). I had received, ex parte , the Bureau of Prisons Examiner's report. In reading it in early October 2014, I saw tha......
  • Dugan v. Dep't of Justice
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 12 Marzo 2015
    ...Information System (“NADDIS”), which is indexed by an individual's name, social security number, “and/or date of birth.” Id. ¶ 20. A 82 F.Supp.3d 502NADDIS query conducted in June 2009 and again in February 2011 utilizing plaintiff's name, social security number, and date of birth located “......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT