United States v. Sampson
| Citation | 58 F.Supp.3d 136 |
| Decision Date | 10 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Cr. No. 01–10384–MLW. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Gary Lee SAMPSON. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Frank M. Gaziano, John A. Wortmann, Jr., Mark T. Quinlivan, Zachary R. Hafer, United States Attorney's Office, George W. Vien, Boston, MA, for United States of America.
David A. Ruhnke, Ruhnke & Barrett, Montclair, NJ, Miriam Conrad, Elizabeth L. Prevett, J. Martin Richey, Federal Public Defender Office, Boston, MA, Susan Katherine Marcus, Susan K. Marcus, Esq., San Francisco, CA, William E. McDaniels, Jennifer G. Wicht, Thomas P. Windom, Washington, DC, for Gary Lee Sampson.
In December, 2003, a jury unanimously found that defendant Gary Sampson should be sentenced to death for the two carjackings resulting in death to which he had pled guilty. Under the Federal Death Penalty Act, if even one juror had found that the death penalty was not justified, Sampson could not be executed. After denying Sampson's motion for a new sentencing hearing, in January, 2004, the court sentenced Sampson to be executed. The First Circuit denied Sampson's appeal and the Supreme Court declined to review his case.
Sampson subsequently timely exercised his right to seek a new sentencing hearing in this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. He alleged, among other things, that his constitutional right to an impartial jury had been violated. After substantial briefing and three evidentiary hearings, this court found that Sampson's contention was correct. See United States v. Sampson, 820 F.Supp.2d 151 (D.Mass.2011) (Memorandum and Order on Jury Claim). In essence, the court concluded that during the jury selection process a juror had persistently committed perjury concerning important questions relating to her ability to be impartial in deciding whether Sampson should be executed, and if she had answered those questions honestly and accurately, she would have been excused for cause. Therefore, the court found that pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), Sampson's death sentence must be vacated and a second hearing to determine his sentence must be conducted.
Sampson asserts that, as the Third and Fourth Circuits have found, an order in a § 2255 proceeding requiring a new hearing to determine whether the death penalty is justified is not a final order and, therefore, is not appealable until after that hearing is concluded. See United States v. Hammer, 564 F.3d 628, 632–36 (3rd Cir.2009) ; United States v. Stitt, 459 F.3d 483, 484–86 (4th Cir.2006). The government disagrees and intends to seek immediate review by the First Circuit of the jury claim decision as a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The government also asks that this court certify questions concerning its decision for possible immediate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which authorizes interlocutory appeals of orders in civil cases in limited circumstances. Sampson contends that the instant § 2255 proceeding is not a civil case eligible for interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) and, in any event, that the standards for certification under § 1292(b) have not been met.
As explained in this Memorandum, this court is not required to decide whether this § 2255 proceeding is a civil case within the meaning of § 1292(b) and has not done so. However, in the unique circumstances of this case, the court finds that if § 1292(b) applies, its requirements are satisfied and that the court should exercise its discretion to allow the First Circuit to consider the full range of issues that the government wishes to present.
Among other things, a second hearing to determine whether Sampson should live or die will be lengthy, expensive, and anguishing for the families of Sampson's victims. It is, therefore, appropriate to give the First Circuit the opportunity to decide whether the decision that a second sentencing hearing is legally required is now appealable; if it is, whether the First Circuit wishes to exercise its discretion to decide the merits of the government's claims now; and, if it does, whether this court correctly stated the McDonough test in finding that Sampson's death sentence must be vacated and a second sentencing hearing must be conducted.
Accordingly, the two questions defined in § IV of this Memorandum and Order are being certified for possible interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and proceedings before this court are being stayed until the First Circuit resolves the government's appeal.
In October, 2001, Sampson was charged with two counts of carjacking resulting in the deaths of Philip McCloskey and Jonathan Rizzo. The government exercised its discretion to seek the death penalty. Sampson pled guilty to the charges against him. Nevertheless, he was entitled to have a jury decide whether he should be sentenced to death.
In 2003, hundreds of potential jurors answered, in writing and under oath, seventy-seven questions designed to elicit information about whether they could be impartial and decide whether Sampson should be executed based solely on the evidence presented in court. About 140 potential jurors not disqualified based on their written responses were individually questioned over fifteen days by the court and the parties for this purpose. Twelve jurors, including one who has been publicly identified as “C,” were empaneled, with six alternates. Two of the original jurors were excused during trial when it was discovered that they had not answered voir dire questions truthfully.
The jury heard evidence for about six weeks. It then unanimously found that the death penalty was justified. Accordingly, in January, 2004, the court sentenced Sampson to be executed. See United States v. Sampson, 300 F.Supp.2d 278, 284 (D.Mass.2004) ; United States v. Sampson, 300 F.Supp.2d 275 (D.Mass.2004).
The First Circuit affirmed the death sentence on May 7, 2007. See United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 52 (1st Cir.), reh'g and reh'g on banc denied, 497 F.3d 55 (1st Cir.2007). On May 12, 2008, the Supreme Court denied Sampson's petition for a writ of certiorari. See Sampson v. United States, 553 U.S. 1035, 128 S.Ct. 2424, 171 L.Ed.2d 234 (2008).
On May 11, 2009, Sampson filed a Motion for a New Trial and to Vacate, Set Aside, and Correct Conviction and Death Sentence Made Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and/or Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, seeking relief from his conviction and sentence. A First Amended Motion under § 2255 and Rule 33 was filed on March 29, 2010 (the “Motion”). The 250–page Motion raised eight distinct claims for relief (referred to here and in the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Order on Summary Dismissal as Claims III–X), several of which had multiple subclaims. The Motion included claims that Sampson's counsel had been ineffective in their advice to Sampson about his guilty plea, in their investigation of mitigating evidence, and during the sentencing hearing; a claim that the inaccurate answers of three jurors during voir dire deprived Sampson of his constitutional right to an impartial jury; and a claim that Sampson cannot constitutionally be executed because he is severely mentally impaired, as well as several other claims. The government requested summary dismissal of all of Sampson's claims.
The court received hundreds of pages of briefing and held three days of hearings on the request for summary dismissal in August and September, 2010. In addition, after concluding that Sampson's claim that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury (Claim IV) could not be summarily dismissed, the court held an evidentiary hearing on November 18, 2010, at which three jurors implicated in Sampson's claim testified about their answers during the jury selection process. One of these jurors, C, testified further at evidentiary hearings held on March 18, 2011, and August 8, 2011.
On October 20, 2011, the court issued the Memorandum and Order on Jury Claim. See Sampson, 820 F.Supp.2d 151. The court held that Sampson was entitled to a new hearing to determine whether he should be sentenced to death because repeated perjury by C during jury selection deprived the court of important information that would have prompted it to excuse her for cause and, therefore, Sampson had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to have the question of whether he would live or die decided by twelve impartial jurors—jurors “ ‘capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before [them].’ ” Id. at 159, 188 (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554, 104 S.Ct. 845 ).
In summarizing some of its extensive factual findings, the court wrote that:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Sampson
...subsequently exercised its discretion to authorize an immediate appeal of that decision to the First Circuit. See United States v. Sampson, 58 F. Supp. 3d 136 (D. Mass. 2012). On July 23, 2013, the First Circuit agreed that Sampson's "death sentence must be vacated and a new penalty-phase h......
-
United States v. Sampson
...I exercised my discretion to authorize an immediate appeal of my decision vacating Sampson's death sentence. See United States v. Sampson , 58 F.Supp.3d 136 (D.Mass.2012).On July 12, 2013, the First Circuit affirmed that decision. See United States v. Sampson , 724 F.3d 150 (1st Cir.2013). ......
-
Sampson v. United States
...F.Supp.2d 151 (D. Mass. 2011) ; United States v. Sampson(Sampson III), 820 F.Supp.2d 202 (D. Mass. 2011) ; United States v. Sampson(Sampson IV), 58 F.Supp.3d 136 (D. Mass. 2012) ; Sampson v. United States(Sampson V), 724 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2013).2 Sampson murdered three people over the cour......
-
WM Capital Partners 53, LLC v. Allied Fin., Inc.
...judicial efficiency, reduce the cost of litigation, and eliminate the delays caused by interlocutory appeals." United States v. Sampson, 58 F. Supp. 3d 136, 148 (D. Mass. 2012) (quoting Appeal of Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1986)).III. Discussion In analyzing the merits of......