United States v. Sanchez-Gomez

Citation798 F.3d 1204
Decision Date25 August 2015
Docket Number13–50571.,13–50566,13–50562,Nos. 13–50561,s. 13–50561
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Rene SANCHEZ–GOMEZ, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Moises Patricio–Guzman, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jasmin Isabel Morales, aka Jasmin Morales, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Mark William Ring, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Reuben Camper Cahn, Sherleen J. Charlick, Ellis M. Johnston III (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for DefendantsAppellants.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter, Assistant United States Attorney, Kyle Hoffman (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, CA, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Barbara Lynn Major, Jan M. Adler, Magistrate Judges, Janis L. Sammartino, Michael M. Anello, District Judges, Presiding. D.C. Nos. 3:13–mj–03928–BLM–LAB–1, 3:13–mj–03882–JMA–LAB–1, 3:13–cr–04126–JLS–1, 3:13–cr–03876–MMA–1.

Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER and JACQUELINE H. NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and JACK ZOUHARY, District Judge.*

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

The judges of the Southern District of California have deferred to the recommendation of the United States Marshals to place pretrial detainees in full shackle restraints for most appearances before a judge, including arraignments, unless a judge specifically requests the restraints be removed in a particular case. The deferral policy was adopted after some security incidents, coupled with understaffing, created strains in the ability of the Marshals Service to provide adequate security for the newly opened San Diego courthouse. Several defendants have unsuccessfully challenged the policy in the district court and now appeal.

Our circuit's leading case requires adequate justification for a generalized policy authorizing the pretrial use of shackles. United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.2007). On this record, the Southern District has failed to provide adequate justification for its restrictive shackling policy. We therefore vacate and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On March 12, 2013, the U.S. Marshal for the Southern District of California sent a letter to the Chief Judge of the District requesting that the district consider adopting a policy of producing defendants in full restraints for most non-jury proceedings. Full restraints consist of leg shackles and handcuffs connected to a belly band by a chain approximately 15 inches long. They are also referred to as “five point restraints.”

Subsequently, on July 8, 2013, the Marshals Service gave a presentation to all district judges on the need for the policy. The Chief Judge then responded with a letter to the Marshals on October 11, 2013, announcing that the district judges had decided to defer to the Marshals' recommendation. The letter stated that defendants would be produced in full restraints for all non-jury proceedings, with the exception of guilty pleas and sentencing hearings, and subject to the rule that any judge may ask the Marshals to remove the restraints in a particular case.

The new policy took effect on October 21, 2013, with all defendants appearing in full restraints for non-jury proceedings, subject to the exceptions stated in the October 11 letter. It appears that some individual judges have opted out of the policy.

The Chief Judge's letter made it clear that the policy emanated from the presentation by the Marshals Service highlighting security problems within the district. There is no dispute that the Southern District has a higher volume of criminal defendants than most other districts, that violence among pretrial detainees appears to have increased, and that there have been two incidents of in-court attacks on a fellow prisoner. The Marshals' staffing has not materially increased since 2012, although the Marshals have had to service three courthouses since a new courthouse opened for business that year.

When the new shackling policy was put into place, the criminal defendants began to request to be unshackled, and several appealed denials by the magistrate judge. The Federal Defenders then filed a challenge to the policy on behalf of three defendants whom they represented, Rene Sanchez–Gomez, Moises Patricio–Guzman and Jasmin Isabel Morales, and, in their consolidated cases, the district judge denied the challenge. The judge in a fourth case, that of Mark William Ring, ruled similarly, and all four cases are consolidated in this appeal. We have previously ruled that we have appellate jurisdiction in similar circumstances. See Howard, 480 F.3d at 1011. Although these appellants are no longer detained, the case is not moot. See id. at 1009–10. Any constitutional harm caused by shackling a defendant at non-jury proceedings is likely to be repeated yet will not last long enough to be judicially reviewed; thus, the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” applies. See id.

DISCUSSION
I. General Legal Principles

The Supreme Court has formulated rules for when shackling an individual defendant is permitted in the context of jury proceedings, but has not considered a policy, such as the Southern District's, which applies only in proceedings before a judge. The Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding shackling, Deck v. Missouri, identified three fundamental legal principles adversely affected by the use of shackling. 544 U.S. 622, 630–31, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). These principles are: (1) the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, a presumption that is undermined by shackling before a jury; (2) the right to counsel, which shackles can hinder by interfering with a defendant's ability to communicate with his lawyer and by humiliating and distracting a defendant, potentially impairing his ability to participate in his own defense; and (3) the need for a dignified and decorous judicial process, which may be affronted by the routine use of shackles. Id.

Deck dealt with shackling in the presence of a jury, and the government stresses that fact in defending this shackling policy. The government relies upon the following passage:

The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of a special need.
This rule has deep roots in the common law.... Blackstone and other English authorities recognized that the rule did not apply at “the time of arraignment,” or like proceedings before the judge. Blackstone, supra, at 317; see also Trial of Christopher Layer, 16 How. St. Tr. 94, 99 (K.B. 1722). It was meant to protect defendants appearing at trial before a jury. See King v. Waite, 1 Leach 28, 36, 168 Eng. Rep. 117, 120 (K.B. 1743) ([B]eing put upon his trial, the Court immediately ordered [the defendant's] fetters to be knocked off”).

Id. at 626, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (emphases added).

This passage in Deck , however, does not support the government's position that there are no limits on the use of shackles before a judge. We agree that a policy that permits routine use of shackles is not “forbidden” in non-jury proceedings under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; it does not follow, however, that under our precedent shackles may always be used routinely before a judge without any justification or showing of necessity. We have ruled that such a generalized shackling policy must rest on an “adequate justification of its necessity.” Howard, 480 F.3d at 1008. We therefore consider whether the Southern District's policy meets that standard.

II. Our Circuit's Decision In Howard

Much of the dispute between the parties in this case appears to center on our decision in Howard, the only case involving pretrial shackling. In Howard we considered a policy authorizing use of leg shackles during appearances before a magistrate judge in the Roybal Courthouse in Los Angeles. We did not reach the question of whether due process requires an individualized determination in a jury proceeding, because we were dealing with non-jury proceedings. We did recognize that the adoption of a general shackling policy in a non-jury setting must be justified. After examining both the extent of the policy and the asserted need for the policy, we held that the policy was adopted “with an adequate justification of its necessity.” Id. at 1008.

The government contends that Howard authorizes the general policy at issue here, a policy of using full restraints during most appearances before a judge. Howard does not do that. This policy is more restrictive of defendants' movement, applies more broadly, and was adopted with less judicial consideration of its justification than the policy in Howard.

The policy in Howard authorized only leg shackles, while this policy authorizes full five point shackles. The policy in Howard applied only at first appearances, while the policy in the Southern District applies to a wide range of non-jury proceedings. The policy in Howard applied only before magistrate judges; this policy applies to proceedings before both magistrate and district judges. Because the shackling in this case is more burdensome and used more frequently than in Howard, it carries a greater risk of impeding the ability of defendants to participate in their defense and communicate with their counsel. The shackles at issue here are also a greater affront to the dignity and decorum of the proceedings, because the shackles themselves are more conspicuous and are used at many different stages of a criminal case. This shackling policy thus carries a greater risk of interfering with a defendant's constitutional rights.

Accordingly, we believe the Southern District must demonstrate a stronger justification for this policy's...

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3 cases
  • United States v. Sanchez-Gomez
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 14 Mayo 2018
    ...claims were not moot, and went on to strike down the restraint policy as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 798 F.3d 1204 (C.A.9 2015). Those rulings were reaffirmed on rehearing en banc. 859 F.3d 649. The en banc court understood the "main dispute" before it to be a c......
  • Martin-Perez v. Major, Case No.: 3:18-cv-00996-H-JLB
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
    • 8 Junio 2018
    ..."legitimate security concerns" associated with a particular federal courthouse. 480 F.3d 1005, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2007). Similarly, the Sanchez-Gomez I court assessed the circumstances surrounding this district's physical-restraint policy but concluded that, unlike in Howard, the record did ......
  • Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Borodkin
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 25 Agosto 2015

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