United States v. Santos

• Decision Date: 26 July 2016
• Docket Number: Case No.: 1:15-cr-20865—LENARD
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JUSTO JONAH SANTOS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JUSTO JONAH SANTOS, Defendant.

Case No.: 1:15-cr-20865—LENARD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

July 26, 2016

ORDER FINDING 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) CONTAINS NO MATERIALITY ELEMENT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Government's Trial Brief (D.E. 28), filed on June 1, 2016; Defendant's proposed jury instructions (D.E. 45), filed on June 8, 2016; the Government's proposed jury instructions (D.E. 61), filed on June 17, 2016; and the Government's response in opposition to Defendant's offense instruction as to Count One of the Superseding Indictment (D.E. 62), filed on June 17, 2016. Having considered these pleadings and the argument of counsel in open court, the Court supplements its oral ruling as follows.

Defendant is charged in a two-count Superseding Indictment. (D.E. 20.) Count One charges Defendant with "knowingly procur[ing] or attempt[ing] to procure, contrary to law, naturalization, and documentary and other evidence of naturalization and of citizenship, for himself, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1425(a)." (Id.) Count Two accuses Defendant of "knowingly us[ing] for any purpose any certificate, certificate of naturalization, and certificate of citizenship, unlawfully issued and made, and copies and duplicates thereof, showing any person to be naturalized and admitted to be a citizen, in that the defendant submitted as proof of his United States citizenship an unlawfully issued certificate of naturalization, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1423." (Id.) The parties have jointly requested that the Court make a pretrial ruling regarding the elements of the offense charged in count one: 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).¹

In its Trial Brief, the Government argues that the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) are:

(1) The defendant procured or attempted to procure naturalization;

(2) The defendant did so in some manner contrary to law; and

(3) The defendant did so knowingly.

(D.E. 28.) The Government relies on a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in support of its argument that § 1425 contains no materiality requirement. See United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2016). In its Trial Brief, the Government informed the Defendant that it will be relying upon 18 U.S.C. §§ 1015(a), 1427(a)(3) and 1101(f)(6) to prove the "contrary to law" element of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a).² The Government argues that it need only prove that theDefendant knowingly procured naturalization in a manner that violated either §§ 1015(a), 1427(a)(3) or 1101(f)(6).

In contrast, the Defendant argues that the elements of § 1425(a) are:

(1) The Defendant made a false statement in connection with his naturalization application;

(2) The Defendant made the statement knowingly. That is, he knew the statement was false at the time he made it;

(3) The Defendant's false statement related to some material mater. That is, the production of truthful information would have led to the discovery of facts relevant to the Defendant's naturalization application; and

(4) The Defendant procured his naturalization as a result of the false statement. That is, the production of truthful information would have raised a fair inference that the Defendant was statutorily ineligible for naturalization.³

(D.E. 45.) The Defendant argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988), the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. PirelaPirela, 809 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2015), the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 2009), and the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992) suggest, if not compel, the conclusion that § 1425 contains a materiality element.

First, neither Kungys nor Pirela Pirela addressed the statute at issue here. Kungys addressed 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).⁴ 485 U.S. at 759. Pirela Pirela interpreted the phrase "procured by means of any false claim or statement" in 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)," finding thatthe "question presented is both novel and narrow."⁵ 809 F.3d at 1199. Neither case directly examined the text or purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1425.⁶ Therefore, it appears that the specific question before this Court - does § 1425 require proof of materiality - is an issue of first impression in this Circuit.

The Defendant further asserts that the First, Seventh, and Ninth circuits have concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1425 - as a stand-alone statute - requires proof of a materiality element. See United States v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789, 808 (1st Cir. 2013);Latchin, 554 F.3d at 709; Puerta, 982 F.2d at 1297. However, Defendant paints with too broad a brush. These courts were limited by the appellate postures of their respective cases. For example, in Puerta, the Government conceded at trial and on appeal that § 1425 contained a materiality element. See 982 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he government agrees with Puerta that § 1425(a) implies a materiality requirement similar to the one used in the [civil] denaturalization context."). Likewise, in Mensah, the district judge had given an instruction which incorporated Justice Brennan's "fair inference" materiality standard; and therefore, the only question before the First Circuit was whether the lower court erred by failing to incorporate Justice Steven's "but-for" materiality standard.⁷ And finally, in Latchin, the Seventh Circuit did not directly address whether § 1425 - by itself - contains a materiality element, but instead determined that 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (the predicate offense alleged in that case) did explicitly contain a materiality element.⁸ Latchin, 554 F.3d at 712.

In its Maslenjak decision, the Sixth Circuit held that "proof of a material false statement is not required to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)." Id. at 682. In reaching its decision, the court construed the plain language of § 1425(a):⁹

The starting point for any question of statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Section 1425(a) makes ita crime to "knowingly procure[ ] or attempt[ ] to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship." A plain reading of the statute suggests that materiality is not an element of the offense. The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute. Accordingly, courts ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face. Obviously, the term "material" is found nowhere in § 1425(a). Without statutory support for an element of materiality, we are hard-pressed to conclude that materiality is an element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).

821 F.3d at 682 (internal citations and marks omitted). The Maslenjak court also reviewed the overarching statutory scheme governing immigration and denaturalization:

Reading an implied element of materiality into 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) is inconsistent with other laws criminalizing false statements in immigration proceedings and regulating the naturalization process. As Maslenjak's case illustrates, 18 U.S.C. § 1425 is but one statute within a broader statutory framework governing denaturalization. Here the district court denaturalized Maslenjak under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e) after she was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). And her conviction under § 1425(a) required proof that Maslenjak had obtained her naturalization "contrary to law," meaning the government had to prove that her conduct violated at least one other law applicable to naturalization. At trial the government argued that Maslenjak's conduct violated at least two other laws, a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a), as well as the INA's prerequisites for naturalization, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3), and its definitional statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6). In other words, the district court denaturalized Maslenjak under one statute but only after the jury had found her guilty of a crime under a second statute, which required as of one its elements proof that Maslenjak's act was "contrary to" at least a third statute. We find an implied element of materiality in 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) to be at odds with the other statutes at issue in Maslenjak's case.

. . . .

Furthermore, the cases on which Maslenjak relies overlook the fact that Congress has created a two-track system for denaturalization. Denaturalization under § 1451(a) is a civil proceeding with its own evidentiary standard and shifting burden of proof; whereas, denaturalization under § 1451(e) is a mandatory ministerial act following a criminal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). There is little justification for reading an implied element of materiality into 18 U.S.C. § 1425 based on the fact that materiality is a required element for civil denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).

Id. at 683. The court addressed the potential relationship between 8 U.S.C. § 1451, a civil denaturalization statute, and § 1425(a) which criminalizes procuring or attempting to procure citizenship contrary to law:

The INA creates what are essentially two alternative paths for denaturalization. Section 1451(a) provides for the revocation or setting aside of a citizen's naturalization where "the order and certificate of naturalization" were "illegally procured or [were] procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." The INA at § 1451(a) expressly requires proof that the citizen procured his naturalization by concealing a "material" fact; the term "material" appears on the face of the statute. The Supreme Court in Kungys concluded that materiality is a required element of the government's case in a denaturalization proceeding under § 1451(a). Under § 1451(a), the government institutes a denaturalization proceeding by filing a petition and "affidavit showing good

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