United States v. Savage
Decision Date | 18 December 2012 |
Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 07-550-06,CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 07-550-03,CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 07-550-05,CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 07-550-04 |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KABONI SAVAGE ROBERT MERRITT STEVEN NORTHINGTON KIDADA SAVAGE |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are Defendant Steven Northington's Motion to Sever (ECF No. 363), Defendant Kaboni Savage's Motion to Sever Counts (ECF No. 383), and Defendant Kidada Savage's Motion to Sever (ECF No. 433). For the following reasons, the Motions will be denied.
On May 9, 2012, a federal grand jury returned a seventeen-count Fourth Superseding Indictment ("Indictment") charging Defendant Kaboni Savage ("Savage") with conspiracy to participate in the affairs of a racketeering ("RICO") enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) (Count 1), twelve counts of murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (Counts 2-7, 10-15), tampering with a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) (Count 8), conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (Count 9), retaliating against a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (Count 16), and using fire to commit a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) (Count 17). (Fourth Superseding Indictment ("Indictment"), ECF No. 480.)2 Savage was charged, along with three co-Defendants, Steven Northington, Robert Merritt, and Kidada Savage, his sister.3 Defendant Lamont Lewis was also charged in the First Superseding Indictment. The charges against Lewis were disposed of by guilty plea. On March 14, 2011, the Government filed notices of intent to seek the death penalty against Savage, Merritt and Northington. (ECF Nos. 196, 197, 198.) The Government does not seek the death penalty against Kidada Savage.
The Indictment alleges that Defendants were members of the Kaboni Savage Organization ("KSO"), an enterprise that operated from late 1997 to April 2010 in this District and elsewhere. (Indictment 1-4.) The KSO packaged, prepared, and distributed controlled substances throughout the greater Philadelphia area; distributed drugs and collected drug proceeds in North Philadelphia; and operated multiple drug distribution centers in North Philadelphia, often referred to as "drug corners." (Id. at 5.) The KSO engaged in a conspiracy to "knowingly and unlawfully conduct and participate . . . in the conduct of the affairs of suchenterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." (Id. at 2.) The KSO's activities included, without limitation, acts of murder; dealing and conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances; arson; witness tampering; witness retaliation; and money laundering. (Id. at 2-4.)
On February 17, 2012, Northington filed a Motion to Sever Trial. (Northington Mot., ECF No. 363.)4 On February 21, 2012, Savage filed a Motion to Sever Counts. (Savage Mot., ECF No. 383.) On March 21, 2012, Kidada filed a Motion to Sever. (Kidada Mot., ECF No. 433.) On April 5, 2012, the Government filed an Omnibus Response ("Response") opposing these Motions. (Gov't's Resp., ECF No. 450.) On June 11 and 12, 2012, we held a hearing on Defendants' pre-trial motions. Oral argument was heard on Kidada's Motion.
"Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 governs joinder of offenses and joinder of defendants." United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2003). It states:
The Third Circuit has held that Rule 8(a) "'applies only to prosecutions involving a single defendant' and that in a multi-defendant case . . . 'the tests for joinder of counts and defendants is merged in Rule 8(b).'" Irizarry, 341 F.3d at 287 (quoting United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 729 n.8 (3d Cir. 1974)).5 Rule 8(b) is "less permissive" than Rule (8)(a). Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 570; see also United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 82 (3d Cir. 2008) ( ). We analyze Defendants' joinder challenges under the less permissive Rule 8(b).6
Id. (citing United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1982)). "[J]oinder . . . of a conspiracy count and substantive counts arising out of the conspiracy [is permitted], since the claim of conspiracy provides a common link, and demonstrates the existence of a common scheme or plan." Id. (quoting Somers, 496 F.2d at 729-30 (internal quotation marks and internal citation omitted) (original emphasis in Somers)). A RICO conspiracy charge provides that link. Id.
Even if joinder is proper under Rule 8(b), a district court may order Rule 14 severance if the potential prejudice outweighs the expense and time of separate trials that essentially retry the same issue. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539; see also United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 847 (3d Cir. 1992) (). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 states, in relevant part:
(a) Relief. If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.
Defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials or because the evidence is different as to each defendant. "Severance should only be granted 'if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.'" United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 335 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Urban, 404 F.3d at 775 (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539)). To prevail on a Rule 14 motion, a defendant has a "heavy burden," United States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1343 (3d Cir. 1994), and must "'pinpoint clear and substantial prejudice resulting in an unfair trial,'" Riley, 621 F.3d at 335 (quoting United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
In the context of multiple defendants, the Third Circuit has noted that prejudice sufficient to warrant severance might occur in the following situations: "(1) a 'complex case' involving 'many defendants' with 'markedly different degrees of culpability,' (2) a case . . . where evidence that is probative of one defendant's guilt is technically admissible only against a co-defendant, and (3) a case where evidence that exculpates one defendant is unavailable in a joint trial." United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 432-33 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539). The question of prejudice hinges upon "whether the jury will be able to 'compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants in view of its volume and limited admissibility.'" United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Somers, 496 F.2d at 730).Where additional charges against a single defendant are "relatively straightforward and discrete," we have "not doubt[ed] that the jury reasonably could [be] expected to compartmentalize the evidence . . . ." United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2005). By contrast, "[w]hen many defendants are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability, the risk of prejudice is heightened." Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539.
"The decision to sever a trial is left to the sound discretion of the District Court." United States v. Ginyard, 65 F. App'x 837, 838 (3d Cir. 2003) (...
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