United States v. Scafo, 329

Decision Date20 December 1972
Docket NumberNo. 329,Docket 72-1891.,329
Citation470 F.2d 748
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph SCAFO, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Thomas R. Pattison, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Robert A. Morse, U. S. Atty. for Eastern District of New York, and L. Kevin Sheridan, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

David M. Markowitz, New York City, (Conrad F. Ferrigno, New York City, on the brief), for appellant.

Before LUMBARD, FEINBERG and OAKES, Circuit Judges.

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:

Joseph Scafo appeals from his conviction for stealing goods in foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 659. His principal claim of error is the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for failure of the Government to be ready for trial within the time required by the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp.1972).

On Sunday, August 10, 1969, two cartons containing watches and pearls were taken from a locked wire mesh cage for high value shipments in the American Airlines Cargo Terminal at John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens.1 Defendant Joseph Scafo, a Fleet Service Clerk at American Airlines, was arrested for the theft on August 18, 1969. He was indicted nearly two years later on July 28, 1971. Scafo was convicted after a three day jury trial in the Eastern District (John F. Dooling, Jr., J.) commencing January 21, 1972. He was sentenced to three years of imprisonment, all but four months of which were suspended, and to three years of probation.

At his arraignment on August 12, 1971, Scafo moved orally before Judge Judd to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. Judge Judd denied the motion without prejudice to renewal on formal written papers. By Notice of Motion dated August 13, 1971, the defense again moved for dismissal. After a hearing on August 20, 1971, Judge Judd denied this motion.

At the trial Anthony DiDonna, a cargo handler for American Airlines, testified that while he was at work on Sunday morning, August 10, 1969, he observed Leonard Turano, a supervisor with American Airlines, remove several packages from the high value cage and place them on the floor; he then saw Joey Scafo take the packages outside. The prosecution also called Leonard Turano. He testified that on the Sunday morning in question Scafo had tried to enlist him in a scheme to "hit the cage," but that he (Turano) had ignored this request. Just before lunch, Turano entered the Cargo Terminal from outside where he had been working and saw Scafo at the cage; "mortified" and "shocked," Turano walked away. However, changing his mind a few minutes later, Turano came back and saw that the cage was closed and that there were two packages on the floor. As Scafo picked them up, one dropped, and Turano picked it up and gave it to Scafo. The next day Scafo gave Turano $850.2

Scafo testified in his own defense and denied any knowledge of or complicity in the theft.

Scafo claims that the admission of certain hearsay testimony by Anthony DiDonna was error. DiDonna testified that, after lunch on Sunday, Turano asked him whether he had seen anyone at the cage that morning. When DiDonna answered, "just you and Joe," Turano responded, "don't say that, you know." Scafo argues that this statement was improperly admitted under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. Leonard Turano during his own testimony repeated substantially the same conversation without objection.

Whether or not this conversation between DiDonna and Turano should have been excluded, we believe no reversible error was committed. In view of the overwhelming evidence of Scafo's guilt, testimony regarding the conversation between DiDonna and Turano was clearly harmless error. If the jury believed DiDonna and Turano, as certainly the jury must have, the conversation added nothing to the strong case the Government presented.

Scafo's major contention is that his pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with this Circuit's "Prompt Disposition" rules should have been granted. The rules were...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT