United States v. Schave
| Decision Date | 16 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-1305 |
| Citation | 55 F.4th 671 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Gene Paul SCHAVE, Defendant - Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Craig Raymond Baune, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Emily Anne Polachek, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Douglas Olson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gene Paul Schave, Seagoville, TX, Pro Se.
Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
Gene Paul Schave was convicted by a jury of his peers for possession of child pornography. Schave challenges the district court's1 denial of his motion to suppress and admission of certain evidence. We affirm.
The Minneapolis Police Department received Cybertips2 connecting child pornography to a residence on Como Avenue in Minneapolis. The tips were generated by the computer search engine Microsoft Bing, which flagged eight images as matching child-exploitation images. Those images were associated with four IP addresses3 assigned to Paul Sutton at the Como residence.
Minneapolis Police Officer Dale Hanson began to investigate. Officer Hanson confirmed that Sutton lived at the Como residence.
But he discovered Schave lived there, too. Officer Hanson learned Sutton had a previous conviction for molesting a child, and Schave had a previous conviction for possession of child pornography. Officer Hanson also noticed a room at the Como residence was available for rent.
Based on his extensive experience investigating internet exploitation of children, Officer Hanson suspected the Como residence was being used to access child pornography. Officer Hanson submitted a search warrant application alongside an affidavit to a Minnesota state court. The state judge then issued a warrant to search the Como residence. Law enforcement executed the warrant and found child pornography on an electronic tablet that was plugged in and placed inside the nightstand next to Schave's bed. Schave was indicted for possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2).
Schave filed a motion to suppress evidence gathered during the search. After a hearing on the motion, the magistrate judge concluded there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Over Schave's objections, the district court adopted the recommendation and denied the motion to suppress.
The government later filed a motion in limine. It sought to introduce evidence under Rule 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Schave's prior conviction for possession of child pornography and past admissions of molesting children. Over Schave's objections, the district court admitted almost all the evidence. A jury ultimately found Schave guilty of possessing child pornography.
Schave timely appealed the denial of his motion to suppress and the admission of evidence under Rule 414.
Schave first challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the warrant was not sufficiently particular and lacked the requisite nexus. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and the ultimate conclusion of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated de novo. United States v. Hay , 46 F.4th 746, 750 (8th Cir. 2022).
We begin with particularity. Schave argues the warrant runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment because it did not particularly describe the place to be searched. Instead of authorizing a search of the Como residence, Schave insists the Fourth Amendment required the issuing judge to limit the warrant to Sutton's room. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment provides "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement is a standard of practical accuracy rather than a hypertechnical one." United States v. Maccani , 49 F.4th 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Summage , 481 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2007) ). We consider "the purpose for which the warrant was issued, the nature of the items to which it is directed, and the total circumstances surrounding the case." United States v. Fiorito , 640 F.3d 338, 346 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Milliman v. Minnesota , 774 F.2d 247, 250 (8th Cir. 1985) ).
Here, the warrant authorized law enforcement to search the Como residence. The primary purpose of the warrant was to search the property for child pornography because there were four IP addresses flagged for child pornography that were connected to the physical address. While the IP addresses were registered to Sutton, Officer Hanson's affidavit explained it is common for one resident to pay for the internet while other residents use it. Given the number of IP addresses and the reality that child pornography is frequently stored in digital format, there was a fair probability that child pornography would be located on multiple devices within the Como residence. Most importantly here, Officer Hanson's affidavit informed the court that two different men who lived at the address were registered sex offenders, including Schave, who had a prior conviction for possessing child pornography.
Schave nonetheless insists the warrant was improper because Officer Hanson should have investigated whether anyone other than Sutton had access to the entire property and internet. Adopting this reasoning despite the quantity and substance of evidence before the state judge in this child pornography case would risk turning the Fourth Amendment into a hypertechnical exercise. Doing so would also verge on demanding perfection before obtaining a warrant—a measure the Fourth Amendment does not demand. See United States v. Pitts , 173 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 1999).
Schave next analogizes rented rooms within the dwelling to apartment units. See Maryland v. Garrison , 480 U.S. 79, 85, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). He reasons the warrant was unconstitutional because it did not limit the search to Sutton's room. To be sure, the necessary degree of specificity under the Fourth Amendment depends on the circumstances. United States v. James , 3 F.4th 1102, 1106 (8th Cir. 2021). And it is true that what once was a single-family home can be converted to contain separate living units. But under these circumstances, we are satisfied the search warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement by authorizing a search of the entire residence.
For similar reasons, we reject Schave's argument that there was not a sufficient nexus between the child pornography and the Como residence. Our precedent requires "a ‘nexus’ between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched, considering ‘the nature of the crime and the reasonable, logical likelihood of finding useful evidence.’ " United States v. Smith , 21 F.4th 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Johnson , 848 F.3d 872, 878 (8th Cir. 2017) ). "The question is whether there was a reasonable probability that evidence of child-pornography crimes would be found on the electronic devices ... inside the house." United States v. Green , 954 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th Cir. 2020). Under these standards, we previously rejected a nexus argument when law enforcement obtained a search warrant after an account requested child pornography, that account was affiliated with an IP address, and that IP address was registered to the address law enforcement searched. Id.
In this case, multiple child pornography images were flagged by a search engine, those images were affiliated with four IP addresses, and those IP addresses were registered to the address that was searched. In addition, the state court was aware that Schave had a previous conviction for possession of child pornography and lived at the address flagged for child pornography. Considering these circumstances, we conclude there was a sufficient nexus between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched.
In sum, the district court did not err by denying Schave's motion to suppress.
Schave also challenges the district court's admission of evidence under Rule 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Weber , 987 F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2021). A district court's interpretation and application of the rules of evidence are reviewed de novo. United States v. Willins , 992 F.3d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 2021).
Rule 414(a) provides: "In a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other child molestation." Fed. R. Evid. 414(a). Here, the charged crime of possession of child pornography falls under Rule 414 ’s definition of "child molestation." Fed. R. Evid. 414(d)(2)(B) ; 18 U.S.C. § 2252. If evidence falls under Rule 414(a), it can be used for any relevant purpose, including propensity to commit the offense and a sexual interest in minors. United States v. Splettstoeszer , 956 F.3d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Bartunek , 969 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 2020). Rule 414 reveals a "strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible." United States v. LeCompte , 131 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 1997).
Schave first argues the district court erred by admitting evidence he previously molested prepubescent girls and evidence related to his prior conviction for possession of child pornography. "Evidence of a prior child molestation is relevant if it was ‘committed in a manner similar to the charged offense.’ " United States v. Emmert , 825 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Never Misses A Shot , 781 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 2015) ).
We have affirmed a district court's admission of Rule 414...
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