United States v. Schwimmer

• Decision Date: 27 May 1929
• Docket Number: No. 484,484
• Citation: 73 L.Ed. 889,49 S.Ct. 448,279 U.S. 644
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. SCHWIMMER
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

279 U.S. 644

49 S.Ct. 448

73 L.Ed. 889

UNITED STATES

v SCHWIMMER.

No. 484.

Argued April 12, 1929.

Decided May 27, 1929.

[Syllabus from pages 644-646 intentionally omitted] The Attorney General and Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

Mrs. Olive H. Rabe, of Chicago, Ill., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent filed a petition for naturalization in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The court found her unable, without mental reservation, to take the prescribed oath of allegiance, and not attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and not well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same; and it denied her application. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree, and directed the District Court to grant respondent's petition. Schwimmer v. United States, 27 F.(2d) 742.

The Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, requires:

'He (the applicant for naturalization) shall, before he is admitted to citizenship, declare on oath in open court * * * that he will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same.' U. S. C. tit. 8, § 381 (8 USCA § 381).

'It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court * * * that during that time (at least five years preceding the application) he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. * * *' Section 382 (8 USCA § 382).

Respondent was born in Hungary in 1877 and is a citizen of the country. She came to the United States in August, 1921, to visit and lecture, has resided in Illinois since the latter part of that month, declared her intention to become a citizen the following November, and filed petition for naturalization in September, 1926. On a preliminary form, she stated that she understood the prin- ciples of and fully believed in our form of government, and that she had read, and in becoming a citizen was willing to take, the oath of allegiance. Question 22 was this: 'If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?' She answered: 'I would not take up arms personally.'

She testified that she did not want to remain subject to Hungary, found the United States nearest her ideals of a democratic republic, and that she could whole-heartedly take the oath of allegiance. She said: 'I cannot see that a woman's refusal to take up arms is a contradiction to the oath of allegiance.' For the fulfillment of the duty to support and defend the Constitution and laws, she had in mind other ways and means. She referred to her interest in civic life, to her wide reading and attendance at lectures and meetings, mentioned her knowledge of foreign languages, and that she occasionally glanced through Hungarian, French, German, Dutch, Scandinavian, and Italian publications, and said that she could imagine finding in meetings and publications attacks on the American form of government, and she would conceive it her duty to uphold it against such attacks. She expressed steadfast opposition to any undemocratic form of government, like proletariat, fascist, white terror, or military dictatorships. 'All my past work proves that I have always served democratic ideals and fought-though not with arms-against undemocratic institutions.' She stated that before coming to this country she had defended American ideals, and had defended America in 1924 during an international pacifist congress in Washington.

She also testified: 'If * * * the United States can compel its women citizens to take up arms in the defense of the country-something that no other civilized government has ever attempted-I would not be able to comply with this requirement of American citizenship. In this case I would recognize the right of the government to deal with me as it is dealing with its male citizens who for conscientious reasons refuse to take up arms.'

The district director of naturalization by letter called her attention to a statement made by her in private correspondence: 'I am an uncompromising pacifist. * * * I have no sense of nationalism, only a cosmic consciousness of belonging to the human family.' She answered that the statement in her petition demonstrated that she was an uncompromising pacifist. 'Highly as I prize the privilege of American citizenship, I could not compromise my way into it by giving an untrue answer to question 22, though for all practical purposes I might have done so, as even men of my age-I was 49 years old last September-are not called to take up arms. * * * That 'I have no nationalistic feeling' is evident from the fact that I wish to give up the nationality of my birth and to adopt a country which is based on principles and institutions more in harmony with my ideals. My 'cosmic consciousness of belonging to the human family' is shared by all those who believe that all human beings are the children of God.'

And at the hearing she reiterated her ability and willingness to take the oath of allegiance without reservation and added: 'I am willing to do everything that an American citizen has to do except fighting. If American women would be compelled to do that, I would not do that. I am an uncompromising pacifist. * * * I do not care how many other women fight, because I consider it a question of conscience. I am not willing to bear arms. In every other single way I am ready to follow the law and do everything that the law compels American citizens to do. That is why I can take the oath of allegiance, because, as far as I can find out there is nothing that I could be compelled to do that I cannot do. * * * With reference to spreading propaganda among the women throughout the country about my being an uncompromising pacifist and not willing to fight, I am always ready to tell any one who wants to hear it that I am an uncompromising pacifist and will not fight. In my writings and in my lectures I take up the question of war and pacifism, if I am asked for that.'

Except for eligibility to the Presidency, naturalized citizens stand on the same footing as do native-born citizens. All alike owe allegiance to the government, and the government owes to them the duty of protection. These are reciprocal obligations, and each is a consideration for the other. Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 22, 34 S. Ct. 10 (58 L. Ed. 101). But aliens can acquire such equality only by naturalization according to the uniform rules prescribed by the Congress. They have no natural right to become citizens, but only that which is by statute conferred upon them. Because of the great value of the privileges conferred by naturalization, the statutes prescribing qualifications and governing procedure for admission are to be construed with definite purpose to favor and support the government. And, in order to safeguard against admission of those who are unworthy, or who for any reason fail to measure up to required standards, the law puts the burden upon every applicant to show by satisfactory evidence that he has the specified qualifications. Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 578, 46 S. Ct. 425 (70 L. Ed. 738). And see United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 475, 37 S. Ct. 422 (61 L. Ed. 853).

Every alien claiming citizenship is given the right to submit his petition and evidence in support of it. And, if the requisite facts are established, he is entitled as of right to admission. On applications for naturalization, the court's function is 'to receive testimony, to compare it with the law, and to judge on both law and fact.' Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393, 408 (7 L. Ed. 897). We quite recently declared that: 'Citizenship is a high privilege, and when doubts exist concerning a grant of it, generally at least they should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant.' United States v. Manzi, 276 U. S. 463, 467, 48 S. Ct. 328, 329 (72 L. Ed. 654). And when, upon a fair consideration of the evidence adduced upon an application for citizenship, doubt remains in the mind of the court as to any essential matter of fact, the United States is entitled to...