United States v. Sciandra, 81 Cr. 776(MEL).

Decision Date12 January 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81 Cr. 776(MEL).,81 Cr. 776(MEL).
Citation529 F. Supp. 320
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Edward SCIANDRA, Yale Kroloff, Vincent Foti, Sr. and Peter Cardasis, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

John S. Martin, Jr., U. S. Atty., S. D. N. Y., New York City, for United States; Carolyn H. Henneman, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, of counsel.

John Edward Sexton, Steven Alan Reiss, New York City, for defendant Peter Cardasis.

LASKER, District Judge.

Defendant Peter Cardasis ("Cardasis") moves (1) for an in camera inspection of the grand jury minutes and dismissal of the indictment if certain evidence is not found therein; (2) to dismiss Count Three of the indictment which charges him with aiding and abetting defendant Edward Sciandra's ("Sciandra") evasion of Sciandra's taxes; (3) to strike alleged prejudicial surplusage from the indictment pursuant to Fed.R. Cr.Pr. 7(d); and (4) for severance of his trial from the trial of his co-defendants, pursuant to Fed.R.Cr.Pr. 14. The motions are disposed of as follows:

(1) Cardasis argues that his attorney informed the prosecutor of three items of exculpatory evidence, and that under the authority of United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979)1 if the prosecutor thereafter failed to inform the grand jury of such evidence, the indictment must be dismissed. The three items are: (a) that Cardasis did not expect any financial remuneration for his participation in the activities charged; (b) that his actions were known to and approved of by his supervisor; and (c) that certain payments were allegedly legitimate tax deductions.

The government acknowledges having been informed by defense counsel of Cardasis' position on these three matters, (Affidavit of Assistant United States Attorney Carolyn H. Henneman submitted in opposition to the motions) ("Henneman Affidavit"), but also notes that neither Cardasis nor his attorney requested to appear before the Grand Jury, (Henneman Affidavit ¶¶ 2, 3), and, that, in fact, Cardasis refused to appear before the grand jury without a grant of immunity. (Id. ¶ 3). Furthermore, the government points out that Cardasis did not request that the information on which he relies in this motion be presented to the grand jury. (Id. ¶ 2). Moreover, the government argues that none of the evidence relied on by Cardasis "negates guilt," Ciambrone, supra, and that, therefore, the government was under no duty to present it to the grand jury.

The government's arguments are persuasive. The absence of a pecuniary motive does not negate knowing participation in an illegal scheme to defraud, nor does the fact that one's supervisors may have approved the project. And defense counsel's view of the legality of certain payments is not, without more, exculpatory evidence.

Moreover, it is difficult to see how the prosecutor can be held accountable for failing to present evidence that could not have been put before the grand jury without granting immunity to actual or potential criminal defendants. Both Cardasis and his supervisors refused to testify before the grand jury (Henneman Affidavit ¶¶ 3, 6) and Cardasis does not suggest that other evidence as to his own motivation or the knowledge of his supervisors existed.

Cardasis has failed to demonstrate that the government was obliged to present the information in question to the grand jury. No purpose would therefore be served by inspecting the minutes to determine whether it has done so, and the motion is denied.

(2) Count Three charges that Sciandra, aided and abetted by Cardasis, evaded his tax obligations for the year 1980 by "failing to file ... a personal income tax return, and ... by concealing and attempting to conceal ... his true and correct taxable income." (Indictment ¶ 14). Cardasis' argument that he had no fiduciary or other special duty to assure that Sciandra filed a return is beside the point because the statute on which Count Three is based, 26 U.S.C. § 7201, proscribes all willful attempts "by any person" to evade or defeat "any tax" (emphasis added). In addition, Cardasis' contention that the indictment fails to specify the means by which he allegedly aided in Sciandra's concealment is simply incorrect: the indictment charges that Cardasis facilitated Sciandra's evasion by disguising payments to him (Indictment ¶ 2).2 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Three is denied.

(3) Cardasis lists thirty-six instances of what he refers to as surplusage in the indictment, all of which he moves to strike. Language in an indictment may be stricken if it is irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial. United States v. Claytor, 52 F.R.D. 360, 361 (S.D.N.Y.1971), quoting United States v. Klein, 124 F.Supp. 476, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y.1954), aff'd, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 365, 2 L.Ed.2d 354 (1958). With two exceptions, the Court is left to speculate on Cardasis' reasons for finding the words complained of to be irrelevant, inflammatory, and prejudicial. Our speculation has not been fruitful. In each instance, the language appears to be either relevant, or if irrelevant, then innocuous.

With respect to the two instances in which the feared prejudice is specified, the repetitious description of "false, fictitious and fraudulent" invoices or documentation and the allegedly inflammatory description of the transactions as "shams," the government's argument that such descriptions are not only relevant but are, in fact, the gist of the case, is entirely convincing. The motion to strike is therefore denied.

(4) Cardasis moves to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants. First, he contends that he will be a victim of a "spillover" of sentiment about his co-defendants who are alleged to be connected to organized crime....

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6 cases
  • US v. Whitehorn
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • April 11, 1989
    ...at a minimum appropriate, to describe to the jury what it is that defendants were allegedly attempting to do. See United States v. Sciandra, 529 F.Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y.1982). It should also be noted, finally, that defendants are not prejudiced by use of the term "violent," for the jury w......
  • United States v. Beatty
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • May 25, 1984
    ...or inflammatory. The text of that paragraph, in its entirety, makes plain the source of the prohibition. See United States v. Sciandra, 529 F.Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y.1982); United States v. DePalma, 461 F.Supp. 778, 797 The defendant also moves to strike the term "Mail Fraud" from the descr......
  • United States v. Potamitis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • June 7, 1983
    ...___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 735, 74 L.Ed.2d 957 (1983); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188, 194 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. Sciandra, 529 F.Supp. 320, 323 (S.D. N.Y.1982). 10 United States v. Kahaner, 203 F.Supp. 78, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y.1962). 11 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (196......
  • US v. Gressett, 91-40001-04 to 91-40001-06.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • August 8, 1991
    ...essential to the offense charged and are prejudicial. This description is relevant to the government's case. See United States v. Sciandra, 529 F.Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y.1982). Accordingly, the motion shall be Fourth Motion to Strike Surplusage (Doc. # 134) Defendant seeks to strike the fol......
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