United States v. Scott
Decision Date | 15 May 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 17-CR-156 |
Citation | 461 F.Supp.3d 851 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jerry SCOTT, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Zachary John Corey, United States Department of Justice (ED-WI) Office of the US Attorney, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.
DECISION AND ORDER
Defendant Jerry Scott moves for "compassionate release" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). That statute permits the court to reduce a term of imprisonment, on the motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), or upon motion of the defendant after he has exhausted administrative rights to appeal a failure of the BOP to bring a motion on his behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of his facility, whichever is earlier, if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant such a reduction.
The government opposes release in this case, on procedural grounds and on the merits. For the reasons that follow, while I conclude that the "exhaustion" required by the statute may in some circumstances be excused or waived, defendant has not demonstrated that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" support a reduction of his sentence.
On September 19, 2017, the government obtained a three-count indictment charging defendant with felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ; possession of methamphetamine and marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) ; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On December 18, 2017, pursuant to an agreement with the government, defendant pleaded guilty to counts one and two. The government agreed to dismiss the § 924(c) count, which would have required a mandatory 5-year consecutive sentence.
The plea agreement set forth the following factual basis:
(R. 16 at 3.)
The pre-sentence report ("PSR") calculated an advisory sentencing guideline range of 57-71 months. Grouping the two counts, the PSR set a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) based on defendant's prior conviction for a controlled substance offense; added 4 levels under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on his possession of the firearm in connection with another felony, i.e., drug trafficking; and then subtracted 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, for a final offense level of 21.1 The PSR further determined a criminal history category of IV, based on two prior burglary convictions, each of which scored 3 criminal history points; a prior conviction of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, which scored 1 point; and defendant's commission of the instant offense while on supervision, which added 2 points.
On April 6, 2018, on the parties’ joint recommendation, I imposed a sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment running concurrently with a state sentence after revocation defendant was then serving. Defendant took no appeal. According to the BOP's inmate locator, his release date is November 8, 2020, but defendant indicates that he is slated for release to a halfway house on July 1, 2020. (R. 38 at 1-2.)
On April 14, 2020, defendant filed a pro se request for compassionate release. I referred the motion to Federal Defender Services, which filed a § 3582(c)(1) motion on defendant's behalf on May 1, 2020. In that motion, defendant requests that his sentence be reduced to time served, followed by three years of supervised release with a condition of six months’ house arrest. He generally relies on the COVID-19 pandemic in seeking this modification. (R. 38 at 1.) I ordered the government to respond, and on May 6, 2020, it filed a response opposing relief procedurally and on the merits. (R. 39.) Defendant filed a reply on May 12 (R. 40), and the matter is ready for decision.
Motions for "compassionate release" are authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), which provides, in pertinent part:
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).2
The statute does not define the term "extraordinary and compelling reasons." Rather, Congress provided that:
The [Sentencing] Commission, in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.
28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
The Commission's policy statement provides:
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The commentary to the policy statement provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under these circumstances:
cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.
(B) Age of the Defendant.—The defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.
(C) Family Circumstances.—
(i) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children.
(ii) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.
(D) Other Reasons.—As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Ledezma-Rodriguez
...have considered—when assessing a defendant's motion. This now "appears to be the majority position." United States v. Scott , No. 17-CR-156, 461 F.Supp.3d 851, 861, (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2020). The Government continues to reject this view. ECF No. 217. Hearing no persuasive arguments to the co......
-
United States v. Clark
...have considered—when assessing a defendant's motion. This now "appears to be the majority position." United States v. Scott , No. 17-CR-156, 461 F.Supp.3d 851, 861, (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2020). It also is safe to say Congress is aware of courts' use of the law during the pandemic. See Cong. Re......
-
United States v. Rollins
...the point needs abundant authority—"extraordinary" means "beyond what is usual, customary, regular, or common." United States v. Scott , 461 F. Supp. 3d 851, 862 (E.D. Wis. 2020) ; cf. Gray v. Zatecky , 865 F.3d 909, 912-13 (7th Cir. 2017) (observing that a situation "that describes most ha......
-
United States v. Jacobs
...have considered—when assessing a defendant's motion. This now "appears to be the majority position." United States v. Scott , No. 17-CR-156, 461 F.Supp.3d 851, 861, (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2020).To be sure, some courts and the Government still maintain that the First Step Act merely allows court......