United States v. Scott, 71-1438.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: 460 F.2d 45
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Clarence SCOTT, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 71-1438.,71-1438.
• Decision Date: 22 May 1972

460 F.2d 45 (1972)

UNITED STATES of America
v.
Clarence SCOTT, Appellant.

No. 71-1438.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued April 11, 1972.

Decided May 22, 1972.

460 F.2d 46

Donald D. Rossetti, Martin, Finnegan & Rossetti, Monroeville, Pa., for appellant.

Henry G. Barr, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.

Before HASTIE, VAN DUSEN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Clarence Scott appeals from a May 3, 1971, judgment and conviction entered after a jury verdict of guilty on Counts 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of a six-count indictment; the jury found Scott not guilty of the offense charged in Count 4.¹ The indictment charged that Scott used the mails in furtherance of a scheme and artifice to defraud various companies and obtain cash and merchandise through the fraudulent use of these companies' credit cards for which he had applied under several fictitious names. Each of the six counts of the indictment charged that Scott, for the purpose of executing this fraudulent scheme, caused to be mailed a specific credit card application and caused to be mailed in return a specific credit card, in violation of 18 U.S. C. §§ 1341 and 1342.

After careful consideration of the record, the following contentions advanced by defendant's court-appointed counsel are rejected:

1. The admission of testimony and evidence of prior criminal conduct and activity not included in the offenses charged was error entitling defendant to a new trial. See United States v. Todaro, 448 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Larsen, 441 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1971).

2. The denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on

460 F.2d 47

Count 4 was reversible error entitling defendant to a new trial. Cf. United States v. Larsen, supra at 514

3. The district court's instructions to the jury, limiting the jury's use of evidence of prior criminal conduct, were inadequate and constituted reversible error.

The defendant has also raised additional arguments in numerous pro se documents addressed to this court.² He argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the counsel of his choice because of the district court's denial of his motion to have his court-appointed attorney discharged and for a continuance in order to secure counsel of his choice. We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's motion in the circumstances of this case. See United States ex rel. Baskerville v. Deegan, 428 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928, 91 S.Ct. 193, 27 L.Ed.2d 188 (1970); United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F. 2d 611 (2d Cir. 1967); cf. United States

460 F.2d 48

ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946, 90 S.Ct. 964, 25 L.Ed.2d 127 (1970). Defendant has also argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel because of the inadequate preparation and performance of his counsel. The district court rejected this argument (326 F.Supp. at 279) and the...