United States v. Scott
| Docket Number | 21-30501 |
| Decision Date | 13 June 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Chad Allen SCOTT, Defendant—Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, USDC No. 2:17-CR-181-1, Jane T. Milazzo, U.S. District Judge
David M. Lieberman, Andrew Laing, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Washington, DC, Jeremy Raymond Sanders, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division Fraud Section, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff—Appellee.
Matthew M. Coman, Esq., Garcia & Artigliere, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant—Appellant.
Before King, Jones, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
A federal jury convicted former law enforcement officer Chad Scott of multiple counts of falsifying government documents, obstruction of justice, perjury, and property conversion. Scott was sentenced to 160 months in prison. He appeals his convictions and sentence. We affirm.
When he was an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), Chad Scott led a taskforce of local law enforcement officers that targeted drug trafficking in the New Orleans Northshore area.1 The core of this "Northshore Group" consisted of Scott, Karl Newman, Rodney Gemar, and Johnny Domingue. The team was successful in disrupting the drug supply chain, particularly by using informants. But at some point the officers themselves began breaking the law.
They started relatively small, stealing modest amounts of money or property from people they arrested. Their crimes escalated over time, though. For example, Scott once collected about $2,000 from seized wallets to fund a trip to Spain. The team also began skimming cash from drug busts. On one occasion, they seized $16,000 but declared only $5,900 to the DEA. On another, they seized $76,000 but declared only $47,000.
Scott also falsified documents in order to seize a truck from Frederick Brown, a dealer-turned-informant. Initially, he considered seizing Brown's limited-edition Ford F-150 before learning it had too many miles. Scott had an idea: he told Brown to buy a new Ford F-150 and hand it over to "show good faith." Brown complied and delivered the new truck to Scott at a gas station in Cypress, Texas on July 25 or 26, 2014.2
Scott drove the truck back to New Orleans, where he told Newman to doctor the paperwork. Newman declared that the truck had been seized at the DEA office in Louisiana, not at a Texas gas station. Scott then wrote in the probable-cause section that the truck was seized on July 28 after he met with Newman and Brown in Metairie, Louisiana.3 The DEA later issued the truck to the Northshore Group as a service vehicle.
Scott also used Brown to suborn perjury. With Brown's help, the DEA arrested Edwin Martinez, who ran a drug-trafficking storefront in Houston. Martinez agreed to name his suppliers, including a heroin wholesaler named Jorge Peralta. After Peralta's arrest, Scott, Newman, and Domingue met Brown at a hotel bar. Scott showed Brown pictures of Peralta, but Brown did not recognize him.
Two months later, Brown was arrested in Louisiana on a separate drug charge. As Peralta's trial approached, Scott visited Brown in jail, pressing Brown on whether he knew Peralta. Brown finally got the drift. He asked to see another photo of Peralta and now stated: "Yeah, that's the little fat Mexican guy." Brown then implored Scott: Scott told Brown to bring his "A game" as a witness at Peralta's trial.4
Scott also pressured Martinez into testifying that Peralta and Brown had seen each other at Martinez's storefront. Although Martinez denied that happened, he agreed to say "whatever [Scott] want[ed]." At Peralta's trial, both Brown and Martinez testified that Peralta and Brown had seen each other. Scott himself testified that Brown mentioned he had seen Peralta at Martinez's shop. Peralta was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine and heroin.
Around this time, things began to go south for the Northshore Group. One member, Johnny Domingue, was arrested by state police for dealing cocaine. Fearing Domingue would turn on them, Gemar, Newman, and Scott scrubbed their office of incriminating evidence, including confiscated cellphones, wallets, and guns. Newman and Gemar threw the phones and some of the guns into a swamp. They turned in two other guns, both seized years earlier, to local police. Scott then used about $4,700 from the wallets to hire a lawyer for Domingue, but Domingue refused the representation.
Later that year, the FBI raided the Northshore Group's office. In Scott's cubicle, agents discovered wallets, driver's licenses, credit cards, 17 cell phones, and other personal effects belonging to individuals Scott had arrested.
Scott was arrested and later indicted on numerous federal charges. The district court split the charges into two trials. The first trial covered counts relating to the seizure of Brown's truck and the alleged subornation of perjury and obstruction of justice in Peralta's trial. The second was a joint trial of Scott and Gemar covering the alleged conversion of property.
In Scott's first trial, the jury deadlocked. On retrial, however, the jury found Scott guilty on two counts of falsification of government records, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 1519; three counts of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2); and two counts of perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. At the second trial, Scott was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to convert property by a federal officer and to remove property to prevent seizure, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and one count of property conversion by a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 654.
Before sentencing, Scott's Presentence Report ("PSR") calculated his sentencing guidelines range at 188-235 months, based on enhancements for Scott's perjury with respect to Peralta's case, as well as for his leadership role and abuse of public trust. Scott objected to the enhancements. The district court overruled Scott's objections but varied downward and sentenced him to 160 months in prison. The court separately explained that, even had it sustained Scott's objection to the perjury enhancement, it would have granted an upward variance and sentenced him to 160 months, given the "significant and far-reaching" damage Scott had "done to the administration of justice in the Eastern District of Louisiana."
Subsequently, it came to light that one of the jurors in the second trial, Juror 27, was a high school friend of Gemar's wife. The juror had gone to a high school dance with Gemar's wife, attended her and Gemar's wedding, and maintained sporadic communication with her on social media. Juror 27 had disclosed none of this during voir dire, however. Claiming juror bias, Gemar moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, but Scott did not join the motion. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, concluding that Gemar failed to show that Juror 27 was actually or impliedly biased.5
Scott now appeals, challenging his convictions and sentence on numerous grounds.
We begin with Scott's sufficiency challenges. We review such challenges de novo where, as here, a defendant "mov[ed] for acquittal in the district court." United States v. Davis, 53 F.4th 833, 842 (5th Cir. 2022). "Our review, however, is highly deferential to the verdict, and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we consider whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We must accept "all credibility choices and reasonable inferences made by the trier of fact which tend to support the verdict." United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1030 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Scott's two document-falsification counts were supported by sufficient evidence.
Federal law prohibits anyone who "knowingly . . . falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document . . . with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter" within a U.S. agency's jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. Scott concedes that he submitted inaccurate forms relating to the seizure of Brown's truck. Nevertheless, he makes two arguments for why the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
First, Scott argues that his misrepresentations on the forms were immaterial to the DEA's administration. We disagree. The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, contains no "materiality" element. See United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2012) (); United States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 2012) . By contrast, other statutes do contain such an element. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (). So, we reject Scott's challenge on that ground.
Second, Scott contends the evidence fails to show that he acted with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the DEA's administration. We again disagree. The prosecution produced evidence that Scott knowingly gave the DEA false information, concealing that he seized Brown's truck outside of his jurisdiction and that he instructed Brown to purchase the truck. An expert testified at trial that, had it known these details, the DEA would not have approved the seizure. Thus, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that Scott made such misrepresentations to obscure his violation of DEA...
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