United States v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company

• Decision Date: 09 November 1959
• Docket Number: No. 10,10
• Citation: 4 L.Ed.2d 25,80 S.Ct. 12,361 U.S. 78
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner, v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

361 U.S. 78

80 S.Ct. 12

4 L.Ed.2d 25

UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner,

v SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.

No. 10.

Argued Oct. 19, 1959.

Decided Nov. 9, 1959.

Mr. John F. Davis, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Eppa Hunton, IV, Richmond, Va., for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit for statutory penalties, instituted by the United States, charging respondent with the operation of four trains in violation of the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531, as amended, 32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1, 6, 9, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 6, 9. That Act requires every 'train' moving in interstate traffic¹ to have power brakes on not less than 50% of the cars (§§ 1, 9)—a requirement which the Interstate Commerce Commission by regulation has increased to 85%. 49 CFR § 132.1. The penalties are $100 for each violation.² § 6.

The District Court rendered judgment for respondent and the Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 258 F.2d 262. We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari because of the seeming conflict between that ruling and our prior decisions. 358 U.S. 926, 79 S.Ct. 319, 3 L.Ed.2d 301.

Respondent has a 'classification or assembly yard' in Hopewell, Virginia. Trains to and from Hopewell use it for breaking up incoming trains and for assembling cars into outgoing trains. A track extends from this 'classification' yard for about two miles through the city. In this stretch the tracks make an interchange connection with another railroad and cross, at grade, five streets, two private roads and four tracks of another railroad. Nine spur tracks branch off these tracks to industrial sidings. About two miles from the 'classification' yard are plants of the Allied Chemical & Dye Company and Continental Can Company.

The complaint charged four violations: First, moving a locomotive and 26 cars as a single unit, without stops, from the track of Allied Chemical to the 'classification' yard. Second, moving a locomotive and 28 cars as a single unit, without stops, from the 'classification' yard to the track of Allied Chemical. Third, moving a locomotive and 29 cars as a single unit, without stops, from a track near Allied Chemical for about a mile to the interchange track where the locomotive was detached, coupled to 20 additional cars, and then recoupled to the 29 cars. The 49 cars were then hauled, without stops, for about a mile to the 'classification' yard. Fourth, moving a locomotive and 23 cars as a single unit, without stops, from the 'classification' yard to the track of Continental Can.³

The meaning of the word 'train' as used in the Act has been before the Court four times. In United States v. Erie R. Co., 237 U.S. 402, 35 S.Ct. 621, 59 L.Ed. 1019, it was recognized that while 'switching operations' were not 'train' movements within the meaning of the Act, the movement of cars from one yard to another yard of the same carrier was covered. It was emphasized that this movement, like other main-line movements, took the cars over switches and other tracks where the traffic was exposed to the hazards against which the Act was designed to afford protection. The same result was reached in United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 237 U.S. 410, 35 S.Ct. 634, 635, 59 L.Ed. 1023, where the movements were of transfer trains, shifting cars from one yard in Kansas City to another on the opposite side of the Missouri River. It was again emphasized that this was 'not shifting cars about in a yard or on isolated tracks devoted to switching operations,' but moving traffic over a line where there were great hazards in the operation. Id., 237 U.S. 412, 35 S.Ct. 635, Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 534, 39 S.Ct. 355, 63 L.Ed. 757, involved movements of cars for about three-quarters of a mile from one company's terminal to that of another, the cars passing over city streets, at grade, and along and over other tracks. The Court, in holding that these movements were covered by the Act, emphasized that this was not 'a sorting, or selecting, or classifying' of cars 'involving coupling and uncoupling, and the movement of one or a few at a time for short distances,' but an operation involving the typical hazards which gave rise to the need for the Act. Id., 249 U.S. 538, 39 S.Ct. 356. United States v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 254 U.S. 251, 41 S.Ct. 101, 65 L.Ed. 249, involved so-called transfer trains running between points, four miles apart, within one yard. The railroad contended that the Act did not apply because the movement was within a yard and because no through or local trains moved over these tracks. The tracks did cross streets and other tracks at grade; and the trains were run without stops the four miles. It was held that these movements were covered by the Act. 'A moving locomotive with cars attached is without the provision of the act only when it is not a train; as where the operation is that of switching, classifying and assembling cars within railroad yards for the purpose of making up trains.' Id., 254 U.S. 254—255, 41 S.Ct. 102.

We think this case, judged by the principles announced in the earlier four, was erroneously decided.

The end of each trip was characteristic of the usual freight run: cars were either received from a consignor or delivered to the consignee. This was not 'sorting, or selecting, or classifying' cars 'involving coupling and uncoupling, and the movement of one or a few at a time for short distances' (Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. v. United States, supra, 249 U.S. 538, 39 S.Ct. 356) nor any other type of movement that is comparable to 'switching.' In three of the movements there was a run of two miles without stops. In one, there was one stop to pick up additional cars; but a mile run preceded that stop and another mile of uninterrupted travel followed it. The prior decisions make clear that it is immaterial that the run was not on the main line but in a yard. The fact that switching preceded or followed these movements is likewise irrelevant to the statu- tory test. It...