United States v. Seal, 12–4055.

Citation709 F.3d 257
Decision Date26 February 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–4055.,12–4055.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. UNDER SEAL, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ARGUED:Ann Briks Walsh, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jeffrey Mikell Johnson, Office of the United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Matthew J. Modica, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge AGEE wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILKINSON and Judge KEENAN joined.

OPINION

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

The juvenile defendant-appellant (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of the district court which imposed, as a condition of his juvenile delinquent supervision, that Appellant register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. Appellant argues that SORNA's registration requirements contravene the confidentiality provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq., and violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. As a consequence, Appellant contends the district court erred in requiring him to register under SORNA. Because we conclude that Congress, in enacting SORNA, intentionally carved out a class of juveniles from the FJDA's confidentiality provisions, and that SORNA's registration requirements are not punitive as applied to Appellant, the district court did not err by imposing the sex offender registration condition.

I.

In 2007, Appellant began residing in Japan with his mother, an active member of the United States Navy, his stepfather, and two half-sisters, ages ten and six at the time. On February 21, 2008, Appellant's mother reported to the United States Naval Criminal Investigation Service (“NCIS”) that Appellant had been having inappropriate sexual contact with his two half-sisters. NCIS conducted an investigation, which confirmed, through sexual assault medical examinations, that both girls had been anally penetrated and the youngest vaginally penetrated by Appellant.

On December 4, 2008, Appellant was charged in a one-count Information filed under seal in the District of South Carolina.1 In general terms, the Information alleged that Appellant, a juvenile who was under the age of eighteen, had committed an act of juvenile delinquency, aggravated sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 5032 and 3261(a). Appellant admitted true to the allegations in the Information on September 16, 2009.

After a presentence investigation report was completed, a dispositional hearing was held on October 8, 2009, in which the district court adjudicated Appellant delinquent. Appellant was sentenced to incarceration until July 1, 2010, and placed on a term of juvenile delinquent supervision not to exceed his twenty-first birthday, subject to a number of special conditions. As a special condition, the district court ordered Appellant to comply with the mandatory reporting requirements of SORNA.

Due to Appellant's objection to the registration requirements under SORNA at sentencing, the district court required the parties to provide the court with memoranda on the issue. On December 7, 2011, the district court issued an Order overruling Appellant's objection to the sex offender registration condition.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

SORNA, which is part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., was enacted “to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators.” 42 U.S.C. § 16901. SORNA “establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders.” Id.

SORNA defines “sex offender” as “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). The statute also specifies:

The term “convicted” or a variant thereof, used with respect to a sex offense, includes adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense adjudicated was comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse (as described in section 2241 of Title 18), or was an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense.

42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (emphasis added). As described under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c), any person who “knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who has not attained the age of 12 years” may be convicted of aggravated sexual abuse.

For purposes of the case at bar, we note that Appellant meets the two statutory prerequisites for “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1). He was “14 years of age or older at the time of the offense,” and he pled true to the Information for committing an act of juvenile delinquency for what would have been a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)—aggravated sexual abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8); (J.A. 8.) Under the specific terms of SORNA, Appellant qualifies as a sex offender.

Pursuant to SORNA's comprehensive national registration system, sex offenders must “register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a). The offender must “appear in person, allow the jurisdiction to take a current photograph, and verify the information in each registry.” 42 U.S.C. § 16916. Each jurisdiction must make public the contents of its sex offender registry, including each registrant's name, address, photograph, criminal history, and status of parole, probation, or supervised release. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16914(b), 16918(a).

In contesting his SORNA registration requirements, Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that SORNA's registration requirements contravene the confidentiality provisions of the FJDA. He also contends that SORNA's registration requirements, as applied to him, violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. We review each issue de novo. United States v. Abuagla, 336 F.3d 277, 278 (4th Cir.2003) (questions of statutory interpretation); United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166, 176 (4th Cir.2009) (constitutional challenges).

III.
A.

We first consider whether the district court's imposition of SORNA's registration requirements contravenes the confidentiality provisions of the FJDA, which governs the detention and disposition of juveniles charged with delinquency in the federal system. The primary purpose of the FJDA is to “remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation.” United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 858 (4th Cir.2005).

The FJDA includes a number of provisions to ensure that information about juvenile delinquency proceedings remains closed to public release. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a) provides that [t]hroughout and upon the completion of the juvenile delinquency proceeding, the records shall be safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons.” 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a). [I]nformation about the juvenile record may not be released when the request for information is related to an application for employment, license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege,” except in limited circumstances relating to court proceedings, medical treatment, law enforcement investigation, or national security. Id. The FJDA specifies that the identity and image of the juvenile may not be disclosed even where proceedings are opened or documents are released: “neither the name nor picture of any juvenile shall be made public in connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 5038(e).

As a consequence of the FJDA statutory restrictions, Appellant argues that the application of SORNA's registration requirements contravenes the FJDA. Specifically, he contends that the FJDA mandates the non-disclosure of juvenile delinquency proceeding records, which is in direct contradiction to the mandatory reporting requirements of SORNA.

SORNA's registration provision makes public information that would otherwise remain confidential under the FJDA. The FJDA provides that [u]nless a juvenile who is taken into custody is prosecuted as an adult neither the name nor picture of any juvenile shall be made public in connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 5038(e) (emphasis added). As previously noted, the FJDA further provides that “information about the juvenile record may not be released when the request for information is related to an application for employment, license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege.” 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a). In direct contrast, SORNA requires that a sex offender registry include the name, address, physical description, criminal history and status of parole, probation, or supervised release, current photograph, and other identifying information. 42 U.S.C. § 16914. SORNA further requires that “each jurisdiction shall make available on the Internet, in a manner that is readily accessible to all jurisdictions and to the public, all information about each sex offender in the registry.” 42 U.S.C. § 16918(a). Because it is clear that the government's public release of juvenile records authorized by SORNA would be prohibited under the FJDA, but for the passage of SORNA, we agree with Appellant that the two statutes conflict.

Where two statutes conflict, “a specific statute closely applicable to the substance of the controversy at hand controls over a more generalized provision.” Farmer v. Emp't Sec. Comm'n of N.C., 4 F.3d 1274, 1284 (4th Cir.1993). We conclude that...

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