United States v. Sebastian
| Decision Date | 23 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20-cr-10170-DJC |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Defendant Michael Sebastian (“Sebastian”) has moved to dismiss the indictment against him, charging him with three counts of engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places with three minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) and (e) (Counts I-III) and three counts of sex trafficking of children in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c) and § 1596(a)(1) and (2) (Counts IV-VI). D. 23. Having considered the motion, D. 90 the government's opposition, D. 95, and Sebastian's reply, D. 109, the Court DENIES the motion.
If an indictment “describes all of the elements of the charged offense using the words of the relevant criminal statute,” it is usually sufficient for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. United States v. Wells, 766 F.2d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing cases). Defendants wishing to challenge the sufficiency of an indictment shoulder a heavy burden. United States v. McPhail, No. 14-10201-DJC, 2015 WL 2226249, at *2 (D. Mass. May 12, 2015). This is because the Court “should exercise its authority to dismiss cautiously, since to dismiss an indictment ‘directly encroaches upon the fundamental role of the grand jury.'” Unites States v. Thomas, 519 F.Supp.2d 141, 143-44 (D. Me. 2007) (quoting Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 53 F.3d 1349, 1360 (1st Cir. 1995)). An indictment need only “apprise the defendant of the charged offense,” not force “the government [to] present[] enough evidence to support the charge.” United States v. Ngige, 780 F.3d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The following allegations are drawn from the affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint. D. 1-1.
Sebastian is a United States citizen, who at the time of the alleged offenses was an English teacher in Luang Prabang, Laos. Id. ¶¶ 5, 9, 20, 33. While teaching children there, Sebastian allowed students to live with him. Id. ¶ 7. Students who could not afford the rent (“dues”) were required to perform chores and jobs around the house to earn credit towards their dues. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10, 21, 33. These chores and jobs included giving Sebastian massages, during which he would be naked. Id. ¶¶ 7, 12-13, 22, 24, 34. At times, Sebastian required his students to masturbate him during these massages. Id. ¶¶ 7, 13, 15, 24, 27, 34. The students were also required to email Sebastian the date, time, length, and nature of the chores and jobs they performed, to keep track of how much of their dues were worked off. Id. ¶¶ 16-19, 29-32, 35-39. Sebastian's alleged misconduct with his students was reported to United States authorities in July 2019. Id. ¶ 5. Three victims were identified: Minor A, who began living with Sebastian at age thirteen; Minor B, who began living with Sebastian at age fifteen; and Minor C, who began living with Sebastian at age sixteen. Id. ¶¶ 8-10, 20, 33.
Throughout the years Sebastian taught in Laos, he traveled between Southeast Asia and the United States almost every year. Id. ¶ 46. His last flight to the United States was in March 2020. Id. After his arrival in March 2020, Sebastian lived with his mother at her residence in Lynn, Massachusetts until he was charged in the instant matter on July 7, 2020. D. 1; D. 1-1 ¶ 50.
A grand jury returned the indictment on August 27, 2020. D. 23. Counts I-III of the indictment charge Sebastian with three counts of engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) and (e), regarding each minor respectively. Id. at 1-3. Counts IV-VI charge Sebastian with three counts of sex trafficking of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c) and § 1596(a)(1) and (2), regarding each minor respectively. Id. at 4-6. Count Four additionally charges Sebastian with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1), regarding Minor A, as the victim was under fourteen years of age at the time of the alleged crime. Id. at 4. All six counts include a charge of 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which concerns venue and offenses not committed in any district. Id. at 1-6.
With respect to Counts I-III, the relevant statutory provisions require as follows:
(c) Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign Places.- Any United States citizen . . . who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either temporarily or permanently, in a foreign country, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c).
(e) Attempt and Conspiracy.- Whoever attempts or conspires to violate subsection . . . (c) . . . shall be punishable in the same manner as a completed violation of that subsection.
Id. § 2423(e). Finally, “illicit sexual conduct” is defined under this section as:
Id. § 2423(f)(1)-(3).
With respect to Counts IV-VI, the relevant statutory provisions require as follows:
Id. § 1591(a)-(c). Here, the term “commercial sex act” is defined as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” Id. § 1591(e)(3). Lastly, concerning jurisdiction for these counts, Chapter 18 of the United States Code states:
Id. § 1596(a)(1)-(2).
Sebastian has moved to dismiss the indictment. D. 90. The Court heard the parties on the motion, D. 102, and took the matter under advisement.
Sebastian argues that dismissal of the indictment is warranted for three reasons: (1) the charges under § 2423 (Counts I-III) are multiplicitous of the charges under § 1591 (Counts IVVI); (2) neither the Foreign Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause give Congress the authority to reach the alleged conduct here, which occurred entirely within Laos; and (3) to the extent the government intends to prove that Sebastian engaged the alleged victims in a “commercial sex act,” that term does not encompass his alleged actions as a matter of law, and in the alternative, the statutory definition is void for vagueness. D. 90 at 1, 14.
As an initial matter, Sebastian challenges the government's decision to charge him with violations of both 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) and § 1591(a)(1). These counts, he contends, are multiplicitous of each other, because “[t]he two groups of counts allege identical factual conduct, and neither statutory provision contains an element that the other does not.” D. 90 at 6.
The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In other words the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 272 (1st Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A prosecution is multiplicitous when the government charges a defendant twice for what is essentially a single crime.” Id. (citation omitted). To determine whether a given indictment runs afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause, courts look to Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). There...
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