United States v. Seefried
| Decision Date | 29 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cr-287 (TNM) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HUNTER SEEFRIED, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Did the electoral certification on January 6, 2021, involve the “administration of justice”? The answer determines whether significant sentencing enhancements may apply to convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) for obstruction of an official proceeding. In the Court's view, the answer is no. Text, context, and precedent show that the “administration of justice” most naturally refers to a judicial or related proceeding that determines rights or obligations. The electoral certification was not such a proceeding.
This Court found Hunter Seefried guilty of obstructing an official proceeding-the electoral certification-under § 1512(c) along with four other counts. See Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 9; see also Tr. of Bench Trial Verdict, ECF No. 109. Hunter Seefried was a 22-year-old forklift technician when he came to Washington on January 6. See PSR ¶ 76; see also Def.'s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 15, ECF No. 114. He watched as other protestors used a police riot shield and a wooden beam to shatter the Capitol's large windows. See PSR ¶ 19. He then cleared glass from a window and clambered through it, followed by other protestors. See Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Once inside the Capitol building, Seefried joined other protestors in confronting U.S. Capitol police and even chasing an officer through the Senate corridors. See id. ¶ 21.
Seefried's fellow rioters searched for Members of Congress and the location of the certification proceeding. See id. ¶ 22.
Section 1512(c)(2) provides that “whoever corruptly obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so” faces a fine or up to 20 years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The Government has charged many defendants in the January 6 cases with violating this statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 21-cr-37, Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 59; United States v. Reffitt, No. 21-cr-32, Second Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 34; United States v. Rubenacker, No. 21-cr-193, Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 33.
The “official proceeding” at issue in these cases is the certification of electoral votes. During this proceeding, the “certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of the electoral votes . . . [are] opened, presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States.” 3 U.S.C. § 15. Then, tellers “make a list of the votes as they [] appear” and “the result . . . [is] delivered to the President of the Senate,” who announces the outcome of the election. Id. Finally, a list of the votes is entered in the House and Senate journals. See id. This Court has held-along with most other judges in this district-that the certification qualifies as an “official proceeding” under § 1512(c). See, e.g., United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, 2022 WL 4300000, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2022).
But does the electoral certification also involve the “administration of justice”? That is a thornier question. For defendants convicted under § 1512(c), the Government has argued that sentencing enhancements for obstructing or interfering with “the administration of justice” should apply. U.S.S.G. §§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B), (b)(2). One provision triggers an eight-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person, or property damage, in order to obstruct the administration of justice.” id. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). And another prompts a three-level enhancement “[i]f the offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice.” id. § 2J1.2(b)(2).
For Seefried, this is not an academic question. If these enhancements apply, his sentencing guideline level is 25, with a recommended sentence of 57-71 months; if they do not, his level is 14, with a recommended sentence of 15-21 months. The Court finds that the enhancements in §§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) do not apply because the electoral certification does not involve the “administration of justice.”
In interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, the Court applies the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation and looks to the plain meaning of its terms. Many circuits agree. See, e.g., United States v. Savin, 349 F.3d 27, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432, 434 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bahhur, 200 F.3d 917, 927 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Collins, 754 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2022).
To discern the text's plain meaning, courts look to dictionary definitions and analyze the word or phrase in context. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d 475, 485-87 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The relevant context for a sentencing guideline may include the commentary. See, e.g., Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th at 1137-39. Finally, the Court looks to precedent to analyze how other courts have interpreted this phrase or similar phrases.
First, text. Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase “administration of justice” as “[t]he maintenance of right within a political community by means of the physical force of the state” and “the state's application of the sanction of force to the rule of right.” Administration of Justice, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, “due administration of justice” is defined as “[t]he proper functioning and integrity of a court or other tribunal and the proceedings before it in accordance with the rights guaranteed to the parties.” Id. Although the Guideline only contains the phrase “administration of justice,” not “due administration of justice,” the Government has given the Court no reason to believe these are not closely associated phrases. These definitions suggest that the “administration of justice” involves a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal that applies the force of the state to determine legal rights.
The certification does not share the characteristics of these definitions. The best evidence for what actually occurs during the certification is the statute proscribing its procedures. See 3 U.S.C. § 15. During the proceeding, “certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of the electoral votes . . . [are] opened, presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States.” Id. Then, tellers “make a list of the votes as they . . . appear” and deliver the result to the President of the Senate after Members resolve any objections. id. Finally, the votes are entered in the House and Senate journals. See id.
The certification is thus largely a ceremonial proceeding where Members and staff open, read, list, and announce the electoral votes. See id. It takes place within the deliberative branch of government-Congress-not the branches that typically exercise judgment (the judiciary), or force (the executive). See generally The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Congress applies no “physical force” or “sanction of force” during the certification. And the proceeding involves no possibility of punishment by the state, as a judicial, investigatory, or enforcement proceeding might to “maint[ain] [] right within a political community.” Nor does the certification involve the “proper functioning and integrity of a court or other tribunal . . . in accordance with the rights guaranteed to the parties.” These definitions evoke traditional judicial or quasi-judicial bodies that decide or maintain the legal rights of the parties before them. In contrast, the certification confirms, announces, and officially records whom the people have chosen to be President and Vice President. See 3 U.S.C. § 15. In other words, it commemorates and completes the peaceful transfer of executive authority.
Consider another relevant definition. Black's Law Dictionary defines “obstructing the administration of justice” and “interfering with the administration of justice” as “[t]he skewing of the disposition of legal proceedings, as by fabricating or destroying evidence, witnesstampering, or threatening or intimidating a judge.” Perverting the Course of Justice, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (cross-referencing these phrases). This definition is probative because § 2J1.2 uses the terms “obstruct” and “interference” when discussing what a defendant might impermissibly do to the “administration of justice.”
This definition further corroborates that the “administration of justice” involves something like a legal proceeding, such as a trial or grand jury hearing. Obstruction or interference with such a proceeding occurs through action that could “skew . . . the disposition.” The definition suggests that possible actions include falsifying or destroying evidence, tampering with witnesses, or threatening a judge. The certification does not resemble a trial or similar judicial proceeding where evidence could be falsified or destroyed, witnesses could be tampered with, or a judge could be intimidated so as to interfere with the disposition of parties' legal rights.
Indeed the Government could have charged Seefried with violating § 1503, a different provision in the same statute that defines “obstruction of justice” as an act that “corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (emphasis added). But to the Court's knowledge, none of the January 6 defendants have been charged under § 1503. Though the Court hesitates to derive...
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