United States v. Segelman
| Decision Date | 21 April 1949 |
| Docket Number | Cr. No. 12645. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. SEGELMAN. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Owen M. Burns, U. S. Atty. and Edward C. Boyle, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.
Premo J. Columbus, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on motion of the defendant for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., and motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The defendant was tried and convicted on six counts of an indictment in which he was charged as follows:
Count One — The defendant knowingly and wilfully received certain stolen securities, to wit, a $5,000 United States Treasury Bond, which said security had theretofore been stolen, which was moving as, and was a part of, and constituted interstate commerce, the said defendant well knowing said security to have been stolen.
Count Two — This was a similar offense and the same type of bond but was stolen from a different person, and which was transported in interstate commerce.
Count Three — This was a similar offense with the exception that the security related to a $1,000 bond of a different series, and which was stolen from a different person and transported in interstate commerce.
Count Four — The defendant did unlawfully and knowingly sell the security referred to in Count Three, well knowing said security to have been stolen and which was moving as, and was a part of, and constituted interstate commerce.
Count Five — This was a similar offense as that set forth in Count Three, which related to a $1,000 bond, and which was stolen from the same person, and was transported in interstate commerce.
Count Six — The defendant did unlawfully and knowingly sell the security referred to in Count Five, well knowing said security to have been stolen and which was moving as, and was a part of, and constituted interstate commerce.
The motion in arrest of judgment is confined to Count One of said indictment.
The Court believes that under all the testimony the jury was justified in reaching the conclusion that the bond in question, which was a stolen security, had been received by the defendant at McKeesport, Allegheny County, in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
Futhermore, a thief can, after stealing, have in his possession stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen and thus commit a further and different offense and be punished for both. Carroll v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 167 F.2d 878.
The motion in arrest of judgment is, therefore, refused.
In connection with the motion for new trial, the reasons set forth are generally the same as in all such motions with the exception of interrogation which defendant counsel desired to make of the chief government witness relative to him having been indicted for and convicted of perjury. At the time of trial, the chief government witness Mehlman had been convicted in the Criminal Courts of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, of the crime of perjury, but government counsel objected to inquiry being made relative to said conviction for the reason that the witness Mehlman then had a motion pending before the Criminal Court of Allegheny County for a new trial and/or arrest of judgment which had not been disposed of or considered at the time of the trial of the instant case. The Court sustained the objection for the reason that the judgment of the Criminal Court had not been finally adjudicated by the court before whom the matter was tried, and an opportunity did not then exist for the chief government witness to have processed his right of appeal to the appellate courts in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
As to all matters other than the examination of the chief government witness relative to his conviction of the crime of perjury, I do not believe that any substantial error exists in the record and, therefore, the rights of the defendant were not substantially prejudiced or affected in the trial of said...
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