United States v. Seighman

• Decision Date: 21 July 2020
• Docket Number: 19-3203,Nos. 17-3368,s. 17-3368
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Eric SEIGHMAN, Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

966 F.3d 237

UNITED STATES of America

v.Eric SEIGHMAN, Appellant

Nos. 17-3368

19-3203

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued May 28, 2020

Filed: July 21, 2020

Jacob Schuman [Argued], Brett G. Sweitzer, Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 601 Walnut Street, The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Counsel for Appellant

Adam N. Hallowell [Argued], Laura S. Irwin, Office of United States Attorney, Western District of Pennsylvania, 700 Grant Street, Suite 4000, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, Counsel for Appellee

Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

In United States v. Haymond , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 204 L.Ed.2d 897 (2019), the Supreme Court held that subsection (k) of the supervised release statute ( 18 U.S.C. § 3583 ) violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Appellant Eric Seighman claims subsection (g) of that statute must suffer the same fate. Because there are pivotal differences between the two subsections, we disagree and reject Seighman's challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g).

I

In 2014, Seighman pleaded guilty to a counterfeiting conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, a Class D felony carrying a maximum prison term of 60 months. The District Court sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment with 36 months of supervised release to follow. As a condition of that release, Seighman was prohibited from "unlawfully possess[ing] a controlled substance." App. 30.

Soon after he left prison, Seighman went astray by buying heroin, testing positive for opiates, and failing to comply with drug treatment. Upon petition of the United States Probation Office, the District Court revoked Seighman's supervision and sentenced him to another 24 months' imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release. The District Court also strongly recommended significant and intensive drug treatment for Seighman.

After his second release from prison, Seighman transitioned to Renewal, Inc., a residential reentry center. There he violated his supervised release once again. On August 7, 2019, the day after Seighman's second term of supervised release began, the Probation Office petitioned the District Court to issue a warrant for Seighman because he brought heroin into Renewal. The next week, the Probation Office filed supplemental petitions alleging that Seighman had committed two more violations: leaving Renewal without permission and buying illegal drugs.

The Probation Office calculated Seighman's revocation sentencing range as 21–27 months' imprisonment. But because Seighman's crime of conviction was a Class D felony, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) limited his maximum term of imprisonment to 24 months. The Government concurred with the Probation Office.

Seighman objected to the Probation Office's calculation. He argued that because his counterfeiting conspiracy conviction permitted a maximum of 60 months in prison, he could be sentenced to no more than six months in prison (since he had served 54 months already). On Seighman's view, any sentence of more than six months would require a jury trial under the Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) and Haymond .

The District Court held a sentencing hearing, at which Seighman argued his objection. The prosecutor responded that "revocation and a term of imprisonment are mandatory under [subsection (g) ] because of drug possession." App. 98–99. He also asked the Court to "place on the record if it agrees it would revoke and impose a term of imprisonment even if that was not mandatory under the statute." App. 99. The Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Seighman possessed a controlled substance. It then "agree[d] with the government that supervised release both must and should be revoked" and sentenced Seighman to 24 months' imprisonment. App. 4, 103–04.

The District Court rejected Seighman's objection for three reasons. First, it cited a "swath of court decisions [rejecting] the notion that we should aggregate the sentences, both original and on supervised release, to ensure that the underlying statutory maximum sentence is not breached." App. 105. Second, it noted "the Haymond [C]ourt took pains to limit its decision to [subsection (k) ]." Id. Finally, it explained " Section 3583(e) ... governs supervised release revocation proceedings generally, including [Seighman's], ... [and] does not contain any similar mandatory minimums triggered by judge-found facts." App. 105–06. In sum, the District Court said it was "not willing to go where the Supreme Court refused to." App. 106.

Seighman timely appealed.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over purely legal questions. See United States v. Ware , 694 F.3d 527, 531 (3d Cir. 2012).

In this appeal, Seighman principally argues that the mandatory imprisonment aspect of subsection (g) is unconstitutional. But he never raised that argument in the District Court, so we review for plain error. See United States v. Lopez , 650 F.3d 952, 959 (3d Cir. 2011). Plain error exists when an error is clear at the time it was made and it affected the defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732–33, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). If those conditions are met, we may reverse only if the error affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding. Id . at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770.

III

We begin by briefly summarizing the role of supervised release in the federal criminal justice system. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, whenever a federal court sentences a criminal defendant to a term of imprisonment, it may include "a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). Federal courts do just that in almost all criminal cases. In a multi-year study of federal sentences imposed after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the United States Sentencing Commission reported that over 99 percent of federal sentences for over one year's imprisonment also included a term of supervised release. See Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release , U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (July 2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2010/20100722_ Supervised_Release.pdf. The maximum length of a defendant's supervised release term usually depends on the seriousness of his crime of conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). For example, a defendant who committed a Class D felony cannot be sentenced to a term of supervised release exceeding three years. See id. § 3583(b)(2).

Because supervised release is a system of post-conviction monitoring intended to facilitate the offender's reintegration into society, probation officers have discretion over whether to report an offender's violations of supervised release. If violations are severe or pervasive enough, the probation officer will alert the district court. In those cases, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated his supervised release, the court may revoke it and "require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute" for his crime of conviction. See id. § 3583(e)(3). Generally, the court has discretion whether to sentence the defendant to imprisonment, and the maximum length of a defendant's sentence depends on the seriousness of his crime of conviction. See id. For example, a defendant who committed a Class D felony cannot be sentenced to "more than 2 years in prison" for violating his supervised release. See id.

Having explained federal supervised release generally, we turn to the Supreme Court's decision last year in Haymond . There, the Court declared 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Subsection (k) states:

(k) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the authorized term of supervised release for any offense under section 1201 involving a minor victim, and for any offense under section 1591, 1594(c), 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2250, 2251, 2251A, 2252 , 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, or 2425, is any term of years not less than 5, or life. If a defendant required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act commits any criminal offense under chapter 109A, 110, or 117, or section 1201 or 1591, for which imprisonment for a term longer than 1 year can be imposed, the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment under subsection (e)(3) without regard to the exception contained therein. Such term shall be not less than 5 years.

Id. § 3583(k) (emphasis added).

In Haymond , a jury found Andre Haymond guilty of possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), which authorizes up to ten years in prison. See 139 S. Ct. at 2373. The judge sentenced Haymond to 38 months' imprisonment, followed by 120 months of supervised release. See id . Haymond completed his prison sentence, but shortly thereafter, the government searched his computers and cellphone and found "59 images that appeared to be child pornography." Id. at 2374. A judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond "knowingly downloaded and possessed" thirteen of the images and, because subsection (k) applies to possession of child pornography, imposed the mandatory minimum prison term of five years. Id. at 2374–75. The sentencing judge did so unwillingly, noting that "[w]ere it not for [subsection (k)'s] mandatory minimum, ... he ‘probably would have sentenced in the range of two years or less.’ " Id. at 2375. Under subsection (k), Haymond could have been sentenced to life...