United States v. Semel, 9810.

Decision Date31 May 1965
Docket NumberNo. 9810.,9810.
Citation347 F.2d 228
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bernard J. SEMEL, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Joseph J. Lyman, Washington, D. C. (Josiah Lyman, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellant.

Plato Cacheris, First Asst. U. S. Atty. (C. V. Spratley, Jr., U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before BOREMAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, District Judge.

Certiorari Denied October 11, 1965. See 86 S.Ct. 90.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Bernard J. Semel, from an order of the district court denying his motions to vacate a judgment of conviction for lack of jurisdiction and to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea.

The defendant was charged by an information containing eighteen counts with violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 836 by having feloniously caused to be transported from Maryland into Virginia certain fireworks, knowing that they were to be delivered and sold in violation of the laws of Virginia.1

On September 22, 1964, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to count 10 of the information. After considerable questioning of the defendant, the court satisfied itself that the plea was voluntarily made and accepted it, and thereafter, on motion of the United States, the remaining seventeen counts were dismissed. Sentencing was postponed until a later date.

On December 8, 1964, Semel received a sentence of six months imprisonment, five months of which was suspended. On December 14, 1964, the defendant filed motions to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate his sentence. Both motions were denied.

The record in this case reveals a guilty plea, voluntarily made with the assistance of retained counsel seven months after the defendant had been arraigned. At a sentencing hearing three months after the plea had been accepted, the defendant candidly admitted all the essential elements of the crime with which he had been charged. By the provisions of Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the withdrawal of a guilty plea after the imposition of sentence is permissible when, in the discretion of the trial judge, such a withdrawal is necessary "to correct manifest injustice." It is to be expected, however, that such a procedure will be appropriate only in extraordinary cases. United States v. Roland, 318 F.2d 406, 409 (4 Cir. 1963). In the circumstances of this case, the district judge clearly did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Klingstein v. United States, 217 F.2d...

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  • U.S. v. Roberts
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • December 21, 1977
    ...fully to disclose its offer.26 See, e. g., Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1970).27 See, e. g., United States v. Semel, 347 F.2d 228 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840, 86 S.Ct. 90, 15 L.Ed.2d 82 (1965); United States v. Roland, 318 F.2d 406, 409 (4th Cir. 1963).28 ......
  • U.S.A v. Mobley
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • August 25, 2010
    ...915, 918 (7th Cir.1978) (“[D]efendant's asserted venue protection ... is subject to waiver by his guilty plea.”); United States v. Semel, 347 F.2d 228, 229 (4th Cir.1965).3 As the factual basis requirement of Rule 11(b)(3) for a plea cannot be waived, and as objections even as to clearly-de......
  • State v. Smith, Case No. 2010-CA-00335
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • June 27, 2011
    ...49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324, paragraph one of the syllabus). In Smith, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court, citing United States v. Semel (C.A.4, 1965), 347 F.2d 228, addressed the concept of "manifest injustice," stating that "[t]his term [manifest injustice] has been variously defined, b......
  • State Of Ohio v. Lathan
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • September 23, 2010
    ...Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324, paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶22} In Smith, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court, citing United States v. Semel (C.A. 4, 1965), 347 F.2d 228, addressed the concept of "manifest injustice," stating that "[t]his term [manifest injustice] has been variously defined......
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