United States v. Seneca Nation of New York Indians

• Decision Date: 08 July 1921
• Citation: 274 F. 946
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. SENECA NATION OF NEW YORK INDIANS et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

274 F. 946

UNITED STATES v. SENECA NATION OF NEW YORK INDIANS et al.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

July 8, 1921

Stephen T. Lockwood, U.S. Atty., of Buffalo, N.Y. (John T. Walsh Asst. U.S. Atty., of Buffalo, N.Y., of counsel), for the United States.

George P. Decker, of Rochester, N.Y., for the Senecas.

HAZEL District Judge.

This is a suit in equity by the United States and a Cayuga Indian named Alexander John, and Lorinda his wife, a Seneca Indian who are wards of the United States, against the Seneca Nation of New York Indians and John K. Button acting surrogate of the Surrogate's Court of Cattaraugus Indian Reservation, and Hattie Snow and Martha Seneca, who are also Seneca tribal Indians, to secure to John and wife their respective rights by partition of certain lands within the bounds of the Cattaraugus Reservation and reserved to the Seneca Nation by treaty.

The bill avers that about 39 acres of land, undivided, are held in severalty by Alexander John and Lorinda, his wife, and defendant Snow as tenants in common-- lands that had previously been distributed or awarded to Jesse Turkey, also a Seneca Indian, by the Seneca Nation tribe, and who in his lifetime continuously owned and possessed such lands for more than 40 years before his death-- and that division to him was in accordance with law and according to the laws, usages, rules, and customs of the Seneca Nation of Indians. Turkey died on April 15, 1921, leaving no widow, child, or lineal descendant him surviving. When he died he had no relative, except the plaintiff Alexander John, who, as the bill avers, is the only surviving child of a Seneca Indian who was the brother of the mother of Turkey, and hence his only living heir and next of kin; that he died leaving a will devising his lands as follows: One-third thereof to the defendant Martha Seneca, and the remainder to Alexander John and Lorinda, his wife, and to their heirs and assigns forever. The bill then avers that the defendant Hattie Snow conspired with Martha Seneca and one Gordon (a Seneca Indian), who was surrogate of the Cattaraugus reservation, to deprive Alexander John and wife of their interest under the said will and testament by collusive methods, namely, by filing a petition with Gordon as surrogate for probate of the will, and procuring him to deny probate, though he was without power to legally act in the premises, and later to procure the issuance of letters of administration upon the estate of Hattie Snow; that such letters of administration were in fact issued by the defendant Button, who succeeded Gordon to the office of surrogate, or claimed to act in that capacity, and that Hattie Snow thereupon, under an 'illegal and inequitable internal law or pretended internal law, rule, or regulation of said Seneca Nation of Indians'-- laws or rules in contravention of the Constitution of the United States-- claims to be vested with the fee of the real estate and property of Turkey, to which Alexander John and wife are lawfully entitled; that the Seneca population on both reservations is about 2,000, with a few Cayuga Indians domiciled with them.

It is next averred that the defendants threaten to evict and dispossess John and wife from the lands and premises rightfully occupied by them under the aforesaid last will and testament, and having no adequate remedy at law the defendants should be enjoined from dispossessing them until the determination of this action. The writ of subpoena and temporary injunction order were served on the defendants by the marshal of this court on the Cattaraugus Reservation, and all the defendants, without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this court, now suggest through their counsel that this court is without jurisdiction over them as tribal Indians and as a nation, or over their domain, and the writ should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendants earnestly insist that the Indian tribes of the Seneca Nation are entitled to a de jure and de facto system of government on their domain in respect of their affairs under the law of nations of right, independent of the United States, and that the Six Nations are not amenable to judicial process without their consent.

It is true that in the early period in this country the federal courts dealt with tribal Indians as quasi nations by treaty, and it was stated at various times in judicial decisions that the land of the New York Indians was not held subject to any state or federal power; that they (the Mohawk Indians) are not amenable to our courts of justice (Jackson v. Hudson, 3 Johns. (N.Y.) 375, 3 Am.Dec. 500), and that protection and aid was promised them before the Revolutionary War and afterwards by the United States, without any limitation in their property or political rights; that it was agreed that land mentioned in the Seneca Treaty should belong to them absolutely in fee, and that the United States would not disturb them in their occupancy and possession, as appears by the Ft. Stanwix Treaty of 1784, and Ft. Harmer in 1789, and later in 1794 reaffirmed in part by the Canandaigua Treaty and by the treaties of 1838-1842. It is insisted that, regardless of previous acts of Congress and the decision of the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 377, 6 Sup.Ct. 1709, 30 L.Ed. 228, holding that, instead of controlling tribal Indians by treaties Congress has the right to govern them since they are inhabitants within the geographical limits of the United States (Act March 3, 1871 (16 Stat. 566)); that Congress has not yet legislated, nor has the Supreme Court of the United States as yet, in a Six Nations case, decided, that the national obligations assumed under treaty regulations and the protection guaranteed to the Senecas were annulled or rendered ineffectual.

Reliance is had on treaties that in terms and circumstances are materially different from treaties with other western and southern nations or tribes, and, on judicial decisions interpreting them. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 8 L.Ed. 483. Counsel assert that the Six Nation Indians have never agreed to submit to the United States laws, but, on the contrary, have constantly maintained their unlimited sovereignty in internal affairs; that they themselves interpret their treaties, and always have resisted usurpation of tribal rights; in short, that they have governed themselves, organizing a Peacemakers' and a Surrogates' Court, from whose decisions appeals may be taken to the Indian Councilors of the nation duly elected under the governmental organization, as they had a right specifically under section 46 of the Indian Law of the state of New York, and hence that this court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The right of the United States, however, to enact criminal statutes for the protection of Indians domiciled on reservations and for the protection of persons with whom they have dealings is no longer open to question and requires no citation of authority (Criminal Code, Sec. 328 (Comp. St Sec. 10502)); but whether this court, in the absence of legislation by Congress, has the power to enjoin the disposal of lands to Indians belonging to the tribe, or to partition lands in...