United States v. Serrano
| Decision Date | 18 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 84-381(JP). |
| Citation | 622 F. Supp. 517 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Miguel A. SERRANO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Lydia Lizarribar, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, P.R., for plaintiff.
Blas Herrero, Jr., Hato Rey, P.R., for defendant.
The defendant, Miguel A. Serrano, is charged in a twelve count indictment with violations of Title 18 U.S.C., Section 657, 1006 and 1343. After discovery was completed and all motions were ruled upon by the Court, Jury Trial commenced on February 5, 1985. The parties had estimated a very lengthy trial due to the nature of the charges and the number of witnesses needed in order to present the charges to the Jury. After the conclusion of the fifth (5th) day of Trial, the parties requested from the Court a short continuance to meet and stipulate some of the evidence in possession of the Government to attempt an expedited trial instead of a 6 to 8 week trial. On the sixth (6th) day of Trial, the parties exchanged documents and, after requesting additional indulgences from the Court, the defendant and the Government advised that a plea agreement was being reached.
A plea agreement under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(A), (B) was later filed and signed by defendant, defendant's counsel and the Assistant U.S. Attorney. The Court proceeded with an exhaustive interrogation of the defendant as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and being satisfied that it was voluntarily given, knowing his rights and what the penalties were, the plea was accepted and a Judgment of Guilty was entered. Sentencing was then set for the month of May, 1985.
The defendant on May 17, 1985 filed a motion for postponement of sentence and withdrawal of his guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d). On May 22, 1985, the Court called the case for sentencing at which time the Court heard the continuance motion and granted a continuance until the parties could appraise the Court as to their position on the Motion for Withdrawal of Plea. A hearing was held on the 22nd of July. At the hearing, both the defense attorney as well as the prosecutor addressed the Court as to the merits, or lack thereof, of the withdrawal motion. The Court referred the defendant for a mental exam since he claimed that, on the day he pleaded guilty, he was not mentally stable to understand what he was doing.
Defendant is a thirty five year old person, father of four children, with three years of college education and twelve years experience as a stock broker. On November 28, 1984, the Grand Jury returned a 12 count indictment charging the defendant for misappropriation of funds, wire fraud and mail fraud. After six days of trial and having met with the Assistant U.S. Attorney, the defendant elected to move the Court for a change of plea. The Court reviewed the Plea Agreement and questioned Mr. Serrano at length and in a very careful manner to assure all that the plea was being made voluntarily.
At the beginning of the change of plea, the Court made several introductory questions to ascertain the mental competency of the defendant. Specifically, the Court asked the defendant as to his mental condition, his intake of drugs, his use of alcohol, etc. Having the defendant denied the use of alcohol, or the intake of drugs, except those for the heart condition, the Court asked both the defense counsel and prosecutor of their doubts as to the mental condition of the defendant. There were none; the Court had none.
During the Trial, Mr. Serrano had shown to be aware of what was happening, he was very helpful to the attorney on his defense and even at one point requested permission from the Court to conduct the voir dire of a witness presented by the prosecutor. All the acts prior to trial, during trial and at the change of plea fully convinced the attorneys trying the case and the Court itself that Mr. Serrano was and is mentally stable.
The Court has reviewed the whole file, the facts raised by the parties and the psychiatric exam performed on the defendant and is of the opinion that no further hearings are needed to solve the present petition.
It is a basic legal principle that once a guilty plea is entered, a defendant possesses no absolute right to withdraw it even prior to the imposition of sentence. United States v. Crosby, 714 F.2d 185, 189-190 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1045, 104 S.Ct. 716, 79 L.Ed.2d 178; United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449 at 454 (1st Cir.1983); Nuñez Cordero v. United States, 533 F.2d 723, 726-727 (1st Cir. 1976). However, in deciding a motion such as the one before the Court, it must be determined whether it would be "fair and just" to deny the motion advanced by the defendant. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(d); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927).
In the motion to vacate his plea, the defendant contends that: (1) On the day of the plea and the days prior to the plea," the defendant had been under great stress"; (2) "he had suffered a heart attack"; (3) "his daughter was very sick"; (4) "he was under medication"; (5) "that he is innocent"; (6) "he was drinking heavily"; (7) "considered taking his own life"; (8) "all of the above, specially the alcohol and the medicine produced a sort of hypnotic state that negates voluntariness on his plea".
The Court will address each point separately:
1. Defendant first asserts that on the day of the plea and prior to the plea, he was "under great stress". There is no doubt in the Court's mind that every accused who comes before this Court is under stress. Stress is present in every accused before this Court and we find no merit in this argument to negate voluntariness.
2. Defendant was hospitalized on December 3, 1984 due to a cardiac episode which led to defendant's emergency hospitalization at the coronary intensive care unit of a hospital until December 7, 1984. The record of the case is devoid that the defendant actually suffered a heart attack; nonetheles, the Court was aware of the heart condition of the defendant during the Rule 11 Hearing. The defendant's voir dire included questions as to the medicines and drugs he was taking at the time. Mr. Serrano explained to the Court the pills he was taking at the time and the reason for which they had been prescribed. The Court is of the opinion that a person with a heart condition can freely and voluntarily plea in a change of plea hearing. Therefore, points two and four are found to be without merit.
3. Defendant alleges that his daughter was very sick,...
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F.D.I.C. v. Shearson-American Exp., Inc.
...denied, 488 U.S. 848, 109 S.Ct. 129, 102 L.Ed.2d 102 (1988); United States v. Serrano, 637 F.Supp. 12 (D.P.R.1985); United States v. Serrano, 622 F.Supp. 517 (D.P.R.1985).2 Earlier in 1987 Prudential had delivered the stock to the United States District Court pursuant to a court order in Un......
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People v. Venzor
...coercion, whatever stress a defendant perceives from litigation alone cannot invalidate his plea."); see also United States v. Serrano, 622 F.Supp. 517, 519 (D.P.R.1985) (rejecting claim plea invalid because defendant was under great stress: " no doubt ... every accused who comes before thi......
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US v. Rivera-Martinez, Crim. No. 87-685 (JAF).
...or depression was sufficient to negate the voluntariness of his change of plea. See U.S. v. Ramos, 810 F.2d at 314; U.S. v. Serrano, 622 F.Supp. 517, 519-20 (D.P.R.1985) (plea withdrawal denied despite defendant's allegations that he was taking medication, had heart condition, was under gre......
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US v. Cotal-Crespo, Crim. No. 93-068 (JP).
...that he understood the Court perfectly. 4 As an example of a much more difficult balancing of factors please see United States v. Serrano, 622 F.Supp. 517 (D.P.R.1985) (defendant alleged that he was under much stress when he pleaded guilty because, among other things, he had suffered a hear......