United States v. Shabazz

• Decision Date: 24 November 2020
• Docket Number: Crim. Action No. 17-43 (JDB)
• Citation: 502 F.Supp.3d 194
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Rahman SHABAZZ, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

502 F.Supp.3d 194

UNITED STATES of America

v.Rahman SHABAZZ, Defendant.

Crim. Action No. 17-43 (JDB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 24, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN D. BATES, United States District Judge

Defendant Rahman Shabazz moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) in light of his desire to care for his elderly mother and the COVID-19 pandemic. He asks the Court to reduce his sentence and order his immediate release, or in the alternative, to allow him to serve the remainder of his sentence on home confinement. See Mot. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) for Order Reducing Sentence and Granting Immediate Release or, in the Alternative, Modifying J. to Allow Remainder of Sentence to be Served on Home Confinement ("Release Mot.") [ECF No. 17] at 1. Shabazz is fifty-four years old and currently incarcerated at Yazoo City Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI Yazoo"), a low-security facility in Yazoo City, Mississippi, where he has served about thirty-six months of a sixty-seven-month sentence for racketeering and conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine. See id. at 1–2; Presentence Investigation Report ("PSIR") [ECF No. 8] at 1, 4. His projected release date is September 6, 2022, but he now argues that "the combination of [his] filial duty to care for his elderly mother and the COVID-19 pandemic" constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that warrant his immediate release. Release Mot. at 1–2.¹

The government opposes the motion, arguing that (1) Shabazz has not exhausted administrative remedies for his COVID-19 claim, (2) his desire to care for his mother does not qualify as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for release under § 3582(c), (3) Shabazz remains a danger to community, and (4) the Court lacks authority to order home confinement (except by reducing Shabazz's sentence). See Gov't's Opp'n to Def.’s Mot. for Compassionate Release or Home Confinement ("Gov't's Opp'n") [ECF No. 22] at 1–2. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with the government and will deny Shabazz's motion for release.

Under the First Step Act of 2018, a court may, upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") or a defendant, reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment if, "after considering the factors set forth in [ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ] to the extent that they are applicable," the court concludes that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" and that "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) ; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (setting forth the Commission's policy statement, which requires—among other things—that the defendant's release not pose "a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community"). "As the moving party, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)." United States v. Demirtas, 2020 WL 3489475, at *1 (D.D.C. June 25, 2020) (Moss, J.). And a court may consider a defendant's motion for such a reduction only "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring [such] a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

To start, the parties agree that Shabazz has satisfied § 3582(c)(1) ’s exhaustion requirement for his claim that he should be released to care for his mother. See Release Mot. at 2–3; Gov't's Opp'n at 10–11. Indeed, on April 23, 2020, Shabazz requested release through FCI Yazoo's Administrative Remedy Program on the grounds that he wanted to care for his mother, and more than thirty days have since elapsed. See Release Mot. Ex. A [ECF No. 17-1]. But the government argues that Shabazz did not mention the COVID-19 pandemic in his administrative request, and thus his claim that he should be released in light of COVID-19 should be dismissed. See Gov't's Opp'n at 11. The Court agrees. The regulations implementing § 3582(c)(1)(A) clearly state that an inmate's request (which forms the basis of the later release motion) "shall at a minimum contain," among other things, "[t]he extraordinary or compelling circumstances that the inmate believes warrant consideration." 28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a). As in the past, this Court will "side with the weight of precedent, which requires ‘the inmate to present the same factual basis for the compassionate-release request to the warden.’ " United States v. Douglas, 2020 WL 5816244, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (Bates, J.) (quoting United States v. Mogavero, 2020 WL 1853754, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2020) ). To do otherwise would let inmates present one reason for relief to BOP and another to the Court, denying BOP the chance to consider the request. Id. Thus, to the extent that Shabazz's motion relies on COVID-19, the Court will deny that claim without prejudice.²

The Court now turns to the merits of Shabazz's argument that he should be released to care for his eighty-year old mother, who lives alone in New York, and suffers from slowly progressing dementia, hypertension, and other health problems that make it "impossible for her to continue living by herself." See Letter from Dr. Donald C. Wallerson, Release Mot. Ex. B [ECF No. 17-2]. Shabazz claims he is the "only resource available" to support her full-time because his sister lives in North Carolina and no other family or friends can assist. See Release Mot. at 4; Letter from Deborah Rodgers, Release Mot. Ex. C [ECF No. 17-3]. Although the Court is sympathetic to Shabazz's desire to care for his mother, this does not qualify as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for release.

Commentary to the Sentencing Commission's policy statement describes four "circumstances" that constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c), including the following "Family Circumstances": (1) "[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children" or (2) "[t]he incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. These circumstances are "strictly circumscribed" and "do not encompass providing care to elderly parents." United States v. Goldberg, 2020 WL 1853298, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2020) (Howell, C.J.). Thus, "[w]hile certainly admirable, a desire to help care for one's elderly parents does not qualify as an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ for release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, nor, therefore, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)." Id. To be sure, the four listed circumstances also include "Other Reasons"—"extraordinary and compelling reason[s] other than, or in combination with" the elucidated reasons (medical condition, age, and family circumstances). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(D). But these other reasons must be "determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons." Moreover, the fact that the policy statement does address family circumstances yet omits any mention of elderly or sick parents suggests that care for a parent is not covered.

Shabazz argues that because U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 has not been modified since the passage of the First Step Act, it applies only to compassionate release motions brought by BOP and there is no applicable policy statement for release motions (like this one) brought directly by a defendant. See Release Mot. at 8–11; Def.’s Notice of Suppl. Authority [ECF No. 19] at 1 (citing United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 2020) ). Thus, Shabazz contends, "in the absence of an applicable policy statement, Guideline 1B1.13 ‘cannot constrain district courts’ discretion to consider whether any reasons are extraordinary or compelling’ and therefore warrant compassionate release." Def.’s Notice of Suppl. Authority at 1 (quoting Brooker, 976 F.3d at 236 ). Judges in this District have split on whether the fact that § 3582(c) requires that any sentence reduction be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission" means that courts are limited to the reasons described in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, or whether courts have discretion to find that other reasons are extraordinary and compelling, too. Compare Goldberg, 2020 WL 1853298, at *4 ("[G]iven the plain text of § 3582(c)(1)(A), which requires a finding that any sentence reduction is ‘consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,’ the limitations in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 apply and are binding.") with United States v. Price, 496 F.Supp.3d 83, 86–87 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2020) (Huvelle, J.) ("[T]his Court finds the many opinions that endorse an expansive reading of a sentencing court's power, given the changes instituted by the First Step Act and the fact that the policy statement has not been amended since its enactment, to be more persuasive.").

This Court need not decide the issue because even if courts are free to consider any reason that a defendant raises for compassionate release, Shabazz has failed to establish that his need to care for his mother is extraordinary and compelling. Most courts to consider similar motions have denied them. After all, "[m]any, if not all inmates, have aging and sick parents. Such circumstance is not extraordinary." United States v. Ingram, 2019 WL 3162305, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2019) (denying compassionate release to care for ill mother); see also, e.g., United States v. Dotson, 2020 WL 6294921, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 27, 2020) (collecting cases); United States v. Brown, 2020 WL 3440941, at *3 (S.D. Miss. June 23, 2020) ("Several cases throughout the country have found that the need to care for elderly parents is not an ‘extraordinary’ circumstance under the First Step Act."). To...