United States v. Shamsid-Deen
| Decision Date | 31 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:18-CR-71 (MTT) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Idris SHAMSID-DEEN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
William Keyes, United States Attorneys Office, Macon, GA, for United States of America.
The Defendant was indicted on December 11, 2018 for possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence ("MCDV"). Doc. 1. The Defendant previously filed two motions to dismiss the indictment. Docs. 23; 35. Those motions raised several grounds, including that the jury trial waiver in the underlying MCDV conviction was defective. The Court denied those motions because the indictment is clearly sufficient to state an offense, and to the extent the Defendant's motion requested pretrial judgment as a matter of law, Eleventh Circuit precedent prohibits that. Doc. 61 (citing United States v. Salman , 378 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004) ). The Defendant now moves a third time to dismiss the indictment and asks the Court to conclude as a matter of law that the jury trial waiver was defective. The Defendant makes two arguments: first that his affirmative defense is actually a jurisdictional challenge, and second that the Court may rule as a matter of law that the Government lacks sufficient evidence to prove its case. Neither argument has merit.
First, the Defendant argues the Court has authority under Rule 12 of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure to consider challenges to its jurisdiction at any time. Doc. 63 at 8. The Court agrees and considers the Defendant's jurisdictional challenge.
Doc. 41 at 1. The Court already ruled that the indictment is sufficient to state an offense. Doc. 61 at 2-3. Nonetheless, the Defendant argues that the state conviction referenced in the indictment does not qualify as a MCDV, as defined by the statute, because the Plaintiff neither had a jury trial nor "knowingly and intelligently waived the right to have the case tried by a jury" for that conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(B)(iii).
In its prior order refusing to dismiss the indictment based on the alleged absence of a jury trial waiver, the Court noted that "both parties recognize that the Defendant's contention that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to a jury trial in his MCDV case is an affirmative defense." Doc. 61 at 2. The Court cited the "longstanding principle that an indictment need not allege the non-applicability of an affirmative defense." Id.
The Defendant attempts to get around that longstanding principle by arguing that if the Court finds he prevails on his affirmative defense, then the indictment will not allege a federal offense, and thus the Court will lack jurisdiction, so the Court can consider his affirmative defense on a Rule 12 motion as a jurisdictional issue. That argument fails. It is true that if the indictment alleged conduct which, on the face of the indictment , is not a federal offense, then the Court would lack jurisdiction. For example, if the Government's indictment alleged that Shamsid-Deen "had possessed a firearm, having been convicted of jaywalking," then the indictment would fail to state an offense because jaywalking is categorically not a MCDV. That was the situation in United States v. St. Hubert , 909 F.3d 335, 343 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1394, 203 L.Ed.2d 625 (2019), which the Defendant cites at length. In that case, the indictment for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) alleged the predicate offenses of Hobbs Act Robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery. St. Hubert argued that those two predicate offenses categorically were not crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3). The Eleventh Circuit held that because St. Hubert challenged whether the indictment stated an offense—a question resolved only on the face of the indictment—the issue was jurisdictional and had not been waived by St. Hubert's guilty plea.1 The Court found that the Hobbs Act offenses qualified as crimes of violence and affirmed his conviction. The motion to dismiss in that case concerned the facial sufficiency of the indictment, and it did not require the court to do factfinding or to rule as a matter of law on an affirmative defense.
The Defendant does not argue that his state conviction categorically does not qualify as a MCDV. Instead he argues, based on an affirmative defense and facts not alleged in the indictment, that this particular conviction does not qualify as a MCDV, because his jury trial waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
But again, the indictment is sufficient; the charged offense is clearly one over which the Court has jurisdiction; and there is no suggestion in St. Hubert that a Rule 12 motion allows the Court, in the guise of a jurisdictional inquiry, to look beyond the face of the indictment and rule on an affirmative defense.
The Defendant makes a second argument: that "the Court has the authority to dismiss the indictment, with prejudice, because as a matter of law, the government's evidence is insufficient to establish that Shamsid-Deen has a qualifying predicate conviction – a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ – to establish a violation of § 922(g)(9)." Doc. 63 at 1.
Doc. 63 at 3; see also United States v. Critzer , 951 F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir. 1992). The Defendant's latest motion again asks the Court to find, "as a matter of law, [that] the undisputed evidence is insufficient to establish that Mr. Shamsid-Deen has a qualifying predicate." Id. at 12. And again, that clearly runs afoul of the Eleventh Circuit's prohibition against "a pre-trial determination of sufficiency of the evidence." Salman, at 1268.
The Defendant argues that " Rule 12(b)(1) provides a limited exception to the typical rule that the sufficiency of the indictment is based only on what it contains." Doc. 63 at 13. When the facts are undisputed, the Defendant argues, the Court may address the question as a matter of law. Id. at 13-15.
The district court in Salman did just that. It dismissed an indictment charging possession of ammunition by an alien unlawfully in the United States because the Court determined, based on undisputed facts, that the Defendant "was not ‘illegally or unlawfully in the United States’ at the time he allegedly possessed the subject firearms and ammunition." United States v. Salman , 266 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1374 (M.D. Fla. 2003). While acknowledging there is "no summary judgment procedure in criminal cases," the court ruled that "when the material facts are undisputed and the infirmity in the prosecution is essentially one of law, resolution of the matter by means of motion to dismiss is appropriate." Id. at 1373 (quotation marks and citations omitted). But the Eleventh Circuit reversed and "reject[ed] [the] view" that " Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 provides a basis for granting a pre-trial motion to dismiss a criminal indictment." United States v. Salman , 378 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004). It further noted that other circuits have distinguished between Rule 12 motions to dismiss based on insufficient evidence and motions to dismiss based on questions of law. But the Eleventh Circuit "do[es] not distinguish between the two classes because we find that there is currently no authority within the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for granting a motion to dismiss predicated on the insufficiency of the evidence, whether it be based in fact or law." Salman , 378 F.3d at 1269.2
In sum, even if the facts were undisputed and the conclusion to draw from those facts were clear, the Court still could not grant the Defendant the relief he wants.
The Defendant insists that other circuits have described the issue here—whether a particular misdemeanor conviction qualifies as an MCDV under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(33) —as a question of law to be decided before trial. Doc. 63 at 16 (citing United States v. Artis , 132 F. App'x 483, 484 (4th Cir. 2005) ; United States v. Stanko , 491 F.3d 408, 412-13 (8th Cir. 2007) ; United States v. Bethurum , 343 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2003) ; United States v. Akins , 276 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2002) ; United States v. Smith , 171 F.3d 617, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1999...
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