United States v. Shapleigh

• Decision Date: 27 January 1893
• Docket Number: 121.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. SHAPLEIGH.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

54 F. 126

UNITED STATES v. SHAPLEIGH.

No. 121.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

January 27, 1893

Statement by SANBORN, Circuit Judge:

Section 5438 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that:

Section 5438. Every person who makes or causes to be made, or who presents or causes to be presented, for payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, may claim upon or against the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or approval of such claim, makes, uses or causes to be made or used, any false bill, receipt voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, * * * shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than five years, or fined not less that one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars.'

Section 3490 provides that:

'Sec. 3490. Any person not in the military or naval forces of the United States, or in the militia called into or actually employed in the service of the United States, who shall do or commit any of the acts prohibited by any of the provisions of section fifty-four hundred and thirty-eight, title 'Crimes,' shall forfeit any pay to the United States the sum of two thousand dollars, and, in addition, double the amount of damages which the United States may have sustained by reason of the doing or committing of such act, together with the costs of suit; and such forfeiture and damages shall be sued for in the same suit.'

On the 4th day of February, 1891, the plaintiff in error filed a petition in the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri, in which it alleged that the defendant in error, who was not a person in the military or naval forces of the United States, or in the militia, had committed 156 violations of the provisions of section 5438, whereby the plaintiff had sustained damage in the sum of $56,885.67, and demanded judgment against him for double this amount of damages and $312,000 in penalties, amounting in the aggregate to $425,771.34. An amended petition was subsequently filed, which contained 146 counts, each of which set forth a violation by the defendant of the provisions of section 5438. This petition set forth the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff from each violation, and demanded a recovery of double damages and $2,000 for each of the 146 violations charged. A demurrer to counts numbered 1 to 45, inclusive, and 86 to 122, inclusive, was sustained on the ground that the causes of action stated in these counts were barred by the statute of limitations. At the close of the plaintiff's case upon the trial the court sustained a demurrer to the evidence in support of, and withdrew from the consideration of the jury, the causes of action set forth in all the remaining counts except those numbered 129, 132, 133, 137, 138, 141, and 142.

Counts numbered 1 to 85, inclusive, were founded on vouchers for merchandise, which the defendant presented for payment to Capt. A. E. Miltimore, assistant quartermaster of the United States army at Jefferson barracks, near St. Louis, Mo. during the years 1883, 1884, 1885, and 1886. These vouchers were receipted by the defendant, and the amounts named in them were paid to him. He was a prominent merchant in St. Louis, and a stockholder in the A. F. Shapleigh Hardware Company, a corporation engaged in mercantile business in that city during these years, and that corporation furnished large quantities of merchandise to the United States, which was paid for upon these vouchers, made in the name of, and receipted by, the defendant. During these years extensive repairs and improvements were made by the United States at the Jefferson barracks, under the direction of Capt. Miltimore, The evidence tended to show that the defendant had great confidence in this captain; that he furnished the United States large quantities of supplies through him, and had been acquainted with him for many years; that at the captain's suggestion he made proposals and signed contracts for performing work and furnishing materials at the barracks, and received payments and receipted vouchers therefor whenever they were presented to him by the captain; that upon his orders he paid over to the captain's clerk the moneys he so received, and left the hiring and discharging of the men, their payment, and the accounts between himself and the government and between himself and the workmen employed, entirely to the captain. He testified that he derived no profit from the contracts for work, or from the work done in his name, but that he signed these contracts and vouchers simply as an accommodation to Capt. Miltimore, and relied upon him to make the proper vouchers, and keep the accounts for this work and material used in the repairs and improvements, and that he did not know that any of the vouchers were not correct. The evidence tended to prove that an account was kept upon the books of the A. F. Shapleigh Hardware Company during these years, in which all the merchandise furnished to the government by that corporation or the defendant, through Capt. Miltimore, and all the cash paid to him or his clerk by either of them was charged to him, and all the moneys received by the defendant on the vouchers was credited to him. The causes of action numbered 86 to 146, were founded upon vouchers for this work and these materials there stated to have been done and furnished in making the improvements and repairs at the barracks, and there was evidence tending to show that some of the services specified in the seven vouchers named in the causes of action submitted to the jury were never, in fact, performed.

To rebut this evidence the defendant introduced in evidence, over the plaintiff's objection, certified copies of the reports of the assistant quartermaster at Jefferson barracks to the United States for the time covered by the seven vouchers, which contained statements of the services performed that exactly corresponded with those contained in the vouchers.

The defendant introduced evidence of his character for integrity and honesty over the plaintiff's objection. The court charged the jury that 'a fictitious claim against the government (for the purposes of this suit) may be defined to be a claim preferred against it for services said to have been rendered to it, or for supplies said to have been furnished to the government, no part of which services or supplies were, in fact, rendered or supplied. ' That 'a claim against the government is a 'false' one, within the meaning of the statute, if it is an untrue claim; for example, if a claim is made for labor or supplies said to have been furnished to the government, and the claim is made for more services than have been actually rendered, or for more supplies than have been furnished, such a claim is a false one within the meaning of the statute. ' That 'a fraudulent claim against the government is a false or fictitious claim, gotten up or contrived by some person or persons with the intent to present it for approval and payment, and thus to defraud the government. ' That to entitle the plaintiff to recover the jury must find that some of the seven claims referred to in the seven counts were either false, fictitious, or fraudulent, and that the defendant knew it when he presented them. That 'whether he had such knowledge or not is a question for you to determine, and you may determine if from all the facts and circumstances in evidence before you. I will say this much: You ought not to infer that he had such knowledge merely from the fact (if it is a fact) that he acted negligently, or without ordinary business prudence, in his dealings with Capt. Miltimore. To warrant you in finding that he knew such claims were either false, fictitious, or fraudulent, you must be satisfied that he was aware of such facts or circumstances as would have created the belief in the mind of an ordinarily intelligent and prudent person that the claims were in some respects false, fictitious, or fraudulent. ' That 'the law presumes the defendant to be innocent of the charge made against him. It is also true, as has been stated, that to entitle the government to a verdict in a case of this sort every fact necessary to a conviction, as heretofore explained, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The doubt here referred to is a doubt arising in your minds from the testimony in the case; and it is such a doubt, also, as reasonable men, having heard all the testimony, may fairly entertain in view of all the testimony. ' The plaintiff excepted to these portions of the charge inclosed in quotation marks, and assigned these and other less important rulings as error. The jury found that the seven vouchers were false, but that the defendant had no knowledge of it, and returned a verdict in his favor, upon which the judgment was rendered to reverse which this writ of error was sued out.

George D. Reynolds, (E. H. Crowder, on the brief,) for the United states.

Given Campbell and Chester H. Krum, for defendant in error.

Before CALDWELL and SANBORN, Circuit Judges, and SHIRAS, District Judge.

SANBORN Circuit Judge, (after stating the facts.)

Where a statute authorizes the state to recover, in a civil suit penalties prescribed for the commission of a felony, must the government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to recover the penalties in such a suit? This is the most important question presented by this record. The burden of proof in judicial...