United States v. Shaw
| Decision Date | 06 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-1692 |
| Parties | United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terrance J. Shaw, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Argued December 3, 2021
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 07-CR-10004-001 - Joe Billy McDade Judge.
Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges.
Terrance Shaw violated multiple conditions of his supervised release. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment-well above the range recommended by the Sentencing Commission's policy statements. The court did not mention the sentencing factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the statute that governs revocation of supervised release, as grounds for the upward variance. The court instead explained that it was sending Shaw to prison to "help" him and give him a chance to access rehabilitative programs. Congress has directed sentencing courts to recognize that "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). Courts are thus precluded from imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender's rehabilitation. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325-26 (2011). Because the record suggests that the district court lengthened a term of imprisonment to rehabilitate Shaw, we vacate Shaw's sentence and remand for further proceedings.
Shaw served 10 years in prison after he pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and possessing a firearm as a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Upon his release in January 2020, Shaw began a six-year term of supervision.
Shaw's supervision was rocky from the start. During the first two months, Shaw tested positive for marijuana, methamphetamine, and amphetamine, and was arrested for driving on a revoked license. The district court reprimanded him with 60 days of home confinement and ordered him to participate in cognitive behavioral therapy. Two months later, Shaw's probation officer reported that Shaw had violated the terms of home confinement and submitted a fake paystub. Because the COVID-19 pandemic was now in full swing, the officer recommended no action. But six months after that, Shaw received another citation for driving on a revoked license. A month after that, Shaw was caught again driving without a license-this time, while traveling outside the judicial district without permission.
As a sanction for his repeated violations, the district court ordered Shaw to spend five weekends in county jail. During his first weekend in jail, Shaw got into an argument with jail staff. He then threatened to kill himself so that staff would have to pay damages to his kids, threatened to flood his cell, and told staff he would return next week with "a gift" (which staff interpreted as a threat). When staff told Shaw that they would stop allowing him to serve his supervision requirements at the jail, and that he would need to seek a supervision modification from the district court, Shaw cursed at them.
Shaw's probation officer then petitioned for revocation. The officer cited Shaw's behavior in jail, plus Shaw's failure to attend court-mandated therapy. The officer also filed a memorandum describing Shaw's supervision history and failure to adjust to life outside prison. Among other things, the memorandum noted that Shaw had obtained an apprenticeship with a laborer's union shortly after his release, but the union terminated his employment because he failed to complete classes, attend meetings, and submit his training hours. The memorandum further described what the officer saw as Shaw's attempted manipulation of the court during the revocation proceedings. Most significantly, in an attempt to obtain a continuance, Shaw claimed at his initial appearance that his son had nowhere to go because of his arrest. His son actually lived with a family member.
Shaw admitted to the charged violations with only minor quibbles about some of the facts. (For example, he denied the exact phrasing of some of his threats to jail staff.) He also admitted that the government could prove he had been malingering when he threatened suicide at the jail. The district court accepted, without objection, the probation officer's calculation that these violations subjected Shaw to a statutory maximum of 5 years' imprisonment, with an advisory range of 8-14 months' imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines' relevant policy statement.
The government asked the court to impose two years' imprisonment. It highlighted what it argued were examples of Shaw's repeated dishonesty, and it argued that an above-guidelines sentence was necessary to reflect Shaw's violation of the court's trust.
Shaw asked for time served. His counsel started the argument on Shaw's behalf by noting that Shaw had signed up for online college courses. But the court interrupted counsel, criticized Shaw for his inability to hold down a job, and questioned Shaw at length about what he hoped to accomplish with an associate degree. Shaw explained that he wanted to someday start his own business-a statement the court dismissed as a "pipe dream." The court pointed out that despite getting a high-paying union job during the height of the pandemic, Shaw had lost the job because he failed to perform "trivial" tasks like reporting his training hours.
Shaw's counsel and the court then engaged in a back and forth about what Shaw needed to end his cycle of violations. Counsel argued that Shaw was having trouble adjusting to life after prison, and that Shaw's self-defeating behavior was evidence that he needed psychological help and therapy-not more prison time. Counsel asked the court to impose supervision conditions related to rehabilitation, such as a psychological evaluation and further therapy. But the court expressed skepticism about allowing Shaw "to again participate in all the programs he has rejected." And it asked counsel to explain how, if Shaw did not return to prison, the court could ensure his compliance with rehabilitative efforts.
During Shaw's allocation, Shaw, like counsel, expressed his belief that he needed rehabilitation. He asked for one more chance on supervision to achieve rehabilitation through mental-health treatment, drug treatment, and cognitive therapy. In response, the court asked him what assurances he could make that he would live up to the court's expectations.
The court then announced its sentence. The court recognized the possibility, advocated by counsel, that Shaw might have experienced a negative adjustment from prison or something akin to posttraumatic stress disorder. But the court also explained that it had familiarized itself with Shaw's violations and how he failed to take advantage of the opportunities that probation had provided-opportunities the court categorized as "the best our probation office can give him."
The district judge contrasted Shaw's background against his own. Both the judge and Shaw are African American, and both had parents who died while they were young. But the judge explained that he had grown up picking cotton in Jim Crow-era Texas, yet he had done whatever he could to get an education and leave that environment. He said that he expected the same from Shaw and believed that Shaw had the same potential. Nonetheless, the judge continued, Shaw had squandered the good fortune he had received in the last year when he was accepted into a union and started earning middle-class wages. The judge explained that reading Shaw's file reminded him of people he knew while growing up who were irresponsible and unreliable.
The judge explained that counsel's arguments had tempered his feelings about Shaw, and he thought Shaw was "worth trying to save." But Shaw first had to pay the consequence for his "sin" of failing to accept his good fortune. "[W]hether we call it God or what, when fortune gives you a chance, a second chance, you've gotta take it."
The judge concluded:
Shaw had already survived 13 years in prison, the judge continued, so this time he could "really focus on how [he] can get the benefit of prison, how [he] can come out of prison being a better person." The judge acknowledged that Shaw did not receive the time-served sentence Shaw had requested, but the judge said he was "doing what I think is the best way I can help you."
The district court did not mention the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Further, apart from the court's statements about Shaw's ability to access rehabilitative programs in prison, and its explanation that it was doing what it thought was best to help Shaw, the court provided no explanation for the length of Shaw's prison term or why an upward variance from the advisory range was necessary.
On appeal, Shaw asserts three arguments: (1) the district court violated the rule from Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011), by sentencing him to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitation; (2) the court failed to consider the relevant sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (3) the court impermissibly relied on...
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