United States v. Shields
Decision Date | 16 April 1894 |
Docket Number | No. 1,130,1,130 |
Citation | 153 U.S. 88,38 L.Ed. 645,14 S.Ct. 735 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. SHIELDS |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Asst. Atty. Gen. Dodge, for the United States.
C. C. Lancaster, for appellee.
It appears from the record that Robert S. Shields was United States district attorney for the northern district of Ohio from July 1, 1885, to December 31, 1889. During this period he made up his accounts for services rendered by him, and also for mileage for traveling from his home, in Canton, to the place of holding the United States circuit and district courts. Part of these accounts were disallowed by the treasury department, whereupon Shields brought suit against the United States to recover the amount thus disallowed. Upon the hearing of the case the court below rendered judgment in favor of the claim of the appellee, and thereupon the United States requested an additional finding of fact. This request was granted, and it is upon the state of facts thus presented that the United States assigns error in the judgment of the court below.
The additional findings of fact read as follows:
The only question now involved in the case is whether such an officer, whose place of abode is at a distance from the place of which court is held, is entitled to mileage for travel in going to his home every Saturday, and in returning to the place of holding court the following Monday morning, during the continuous session of the court.
The appellee relies in support of his claim for mileage, and in affirmance of the judgment below, on that part of section 824, Rev. St., which provides: 'For traveling from the place of his abode to the place of holding any court of the United States in his district, or to the place of any examina- tion before a judge or commissioner, of a person charged with crime, ten cents a mile for going and ten cents a mile for returning.'
This provision of section 824 has been modified by section 7 of the act of February 22, 1875, Supp. Rev. St. 66, which, in respect to mileage for attorneys, marshals, and clerks, enacts that 'from and after the first day of January, 1875, no such officer or person shall become entitled to any allowance for mileage or travel not actually and necessarily performed under the provisions of existing law.'
This being the provision of law in force as to mileage during the period covered by the claim of the appellee, can it be properly said that going to his home on Saturday afternoon, and returning the Monday morning following, was travel 'actually and necessarily performed?' It certainly cannot be held to be travel necessarily performed in the public service. Mileage allowed to public officials involves the idea that the travel is performed in the public service, or in an official capacity. The appellee lived at Canton, Ohio, 58 miles from Cleveland, where the court was held; and he made the journey to and from his home once a week, for the purpose of spending Sunday with his family. If he is entitled to mileage for each one of these trips made during the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State ex rel. Matson v. O'Hern
... ... days spent in California, Nevada, Idaho, Florida, Washington, ... and other points in the United States ... The ... charges against commissioner Brown likewise involved ... attached to the office, none can be recovered." And in ... United States v. Shields, 153 U.S. 88, 14 S.Ct. 735, ... 736, 38 L.Ed. 645, it was said: "Fees allowed to public ... ...
-
State ex rel. Matson v. O'Hern
...by law. Unless, therefore, compensation is by law attached to the office, none can be recovered.” And in United States v. Shields, 153 U.S. 88, 14 S.Ct. 735, 736, 38 L.Ed. 645, it was said: “Fees allowed to public officers are matters of strict law, depending upon the very provisions of the......
-
Dalton v. Fabius River Drainage Dist.
...nor to any discretionary action on the part of the officials. 43 Am. Juris., p. 360, sec. 359; U.S. v. VanDugee, 185 U.S. 278; U.S. v. Shields, 153 U.S. 88, 91. (3) statutes providing compensation for a public officer must be strictly construed, and the officer cannot legally claim compensa......
-
Johnson v. Black
...duties rests alone upon legislative sanction, which Is the exclusive compensative power of the government. U. S. v. Shields, 153 U. S. 88, 14 Sup. Ct. 735, 38 L Ed. 645; Talbot v. East Machias, 76 Me. 415 White v. Inhabitants of Levant (Me.) 7 Atl. 539; Sikes v. Inhabitants of Hatfield (Mas......