United States v. Siegelman
| Decision Date | 27 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | CR. NO. 2:05cr119-MEF |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DON EUGENE SIEGELMAN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
(WO)
Now pending before the court is defendant Don Eugene Siegelman's ("Siegelman") motion for discovery. (Doc. # 961). The defendant seeks leave to conduct discovery to support his motion for new trial filed pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 33. See Doc. # 960. Siegelman asserts that the discovery he seeks is necessary "[i]n order to have a full and meaningful opportunity to prove that he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds raised in his motion for a new trial." (Doc. # 961 at 1). The United States opposes the defendant's discovery motion asserting that his "theories for relief lack a firm evidentiary basis and [he] merely seek[s] a court-ordered fishing expedition." (Doc. # 975 at 51).
After reviewing the submissions and hearing argument of the parties, the court ordered the United States to produce for an in camera review all documents that would be responsive to the defendant's discovery requests. The court has carefully and thoroughly reviewed all material provided by the United States. The material does not further the defendant's claims, does not contain exculpatory material, and contains nothing justifyingan evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, for the more detailed reasons that follow, the court concludes that Siegelman's motion for discovery (doc. # 960) is due to be denied.
The court has broad discretion concerning whether to allow discovery on a Rule 33(b) motion for new trial.1 Siegelman argues, and the court agrees, that the standard for discovery in the context of a motion for new trial pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 33(b) is analogous to discovery in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Doc. # 961 at 8.
Discovery is authorized in habeas corpus cases, an analogous post-conviction proceeding. See Blackledge [v. Allison,] 431 U.S. [63] 81-82 [1977] . . . citing Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus. Courts have authority to allow discovery based on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, a "legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve the rational ends of the law" that "courts may rely upon . . . in issuing orders appropriate to assist them in conducting factual inquiries." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). According to the Supreme Court, "where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, ifthe facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is" entitled to a new trial, "it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry." Id.; see also United States v. Wolfson, 413 F.2d 804, 808 (1969) (2d Cir. 1969) (in dictum, suggesting that Harris applies to Rule 33 motions); 26 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 633.21[3], at 633-50 (3d ed. 2006) In fulfilling this duty, a district court has broad discretion to fashion discovery mechanisms suitable to the case before it.
United States v. Velarde, 485 F.3d 553, 560 (10th Cir. 2007).
Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that "[a] party shall be entitled to invoke processes of discovery available under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise." See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997) (). And, no due process problem exists with the federal habeas discovery standard. District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 70 (2009). "A habeas petitioner ... is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course." Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904. The requisite good cause is demonstrated when "specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief." Id. at 908-09 (citation omitted). "Thus, good cause for discovery cannot arise from mere speculation." Arthur v. Allen, 459 F.3d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006). As discussed in Velarde, supra, the court will apply these principles to Siegelman's motion for discovery.
Siegelman also argues that, at a minimum, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing todevelop facts sufficient to prove the allegations contained within his motion for a new trial. See Doc. # 961 at 2. It has long been the law in this circuit that "a motion for new trial may ordinarily be decided upon affidavits without an evidentiary hearing." United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370, 1373 (5th Cir. 1977). The only legitimate purpose of an evidentiary hearing within the context of a Rule 33 motion for new trial is "to resolve conflicting evidence." See Velarde, 485 F.3d at 549. No such conflicts exists.
Siegelman argues that he is entitled to discovery on five discrete issues in support of his motion for a new trial. As stated by the defendant, the five areas of discovery are as follows:
The court addresses each domain of discovery requests seriatim.
1. Brady, Giglio and Napue Requests. In his motion for a new trial, Siegelman complains that the prosecutors improperly shaped and scripted the testimony of Nick Bailey ("Bailey"), threatened witnesses Bailey and Loree Skelton, failed to correct misleading testimony during the trial about how many times Bailey met with the government, and failed to turn over "missing FBI 302s." (Doc. # 960 at 38-46). According to Siegelman, the prosecutors' actions deprived him of his due process rights.
Of course, a prosecutor has a duty to provide a criminal defendant with all evidence materially favorably to the defendant's defense. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This duty extends to evidence relating to the credibility of a witness when the defendant's guilt or innocence may turn on that witness's credibility. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (). The law is clearly established that impeachment evidence falls well within the realm of Brady material which must be produced by the prosecution. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
The court first addresses Siegelman's contention that the government failed to reveal threats it made to witness Loree Skelton. Siegelman's entire argument regarding Skelton is as follows:
While there were, in fact, other witnesses against Scrushy (including witness Skelton, who was also threatened, according to the Grimes10 letter to Attorney General Holder (Scrushy EXHIBIT III-K at 3)), none could provide testimony even remotely comparable to Bailey's as to the key element of the offense charged.11
(Doc. # 960 at 45) (footnotes added). Siegelman relies entirely on the letter from Grimes to support his allegations regarding Skelton. His reliance is misplaced. Grimes' allegations are based on hearsay, speculation, and insinuation which are simply insufficient to support a motion for discovery. See Arthur, 459 F.3d at 1311 ().
The gravamen of Siegelman's arguments center around the testimony of Nick Bailey.12 Siegelman contends that newly discovered evidence suggests that Bailey's testimony was scripted by the government, and that the government used threats and promises to shape Bailey's testimony. Siegelman further argues that newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Bailey met with the prosecutors many more times than Bailey testified about at trial, and that the government failed to correct Bailey's erroneous testimony on this issue. Finally, Siegelman contends that, based on the number of times Bailey met with government agents, there must be more FBI 302s and notes that the government did not turn over to the defense. According to Siegelman, these actions violate Brady, Giglio,Napue, and the Jencks Act.13 Siegelman relies on a declaration by Bailey, a transcript of a Sixty Minutes news show during which Bailey was interviewed while he was incarcerated, and the declarations of others14 to assert that new evidence now exists to support his claims.
The government denies Siegelman's allegations. More importantly, however, Siegelman was well aware that Bailey met with prosecutors and agents a number of times prior to trial to discuss his testimony because, at trial, defense counsel attacked Bailey's credibility and veracity on these matters. Bailey testified in this case for three and a half days. His testimony encompasses over eight hundred (800) pages of trial transcript. During cross-examination, Bailey repeatedly denied that the prosecution scripted his testimony. (Doc. # 892, Tr. Transcript at 379, 555-56, 724, 931, 1163-65). In his declaration filed in support of Scrushy's motion for a new trial, Bailey does not state that he testified falsely. (Doc. # 953, Ex. V-H). He does not claim that government agents or prosecutors threatened or pressured him, and he does not contend that he changed his account of events in any manner previously undisclosed to the defense. (Id.)
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