United States v. Sierra
| Decision Date | 06 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 5:19-CR-50110-KES |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JESSE SIERRA, a/k/a Jesse Sierro, and DUSTIN SIERRA, a/k/a Dustin Sierro, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND NEW TRIAL, DENYING DUSTIN'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL, AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART JESSE'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL
Defendants Jesse Sierra and Dustin Sierra, were found guilty of one count of kidnapping and one count of interstate domestic violence. Docket 325. Jesse was also found guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse by force, one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and one count of assault by strangulation of a dating partner. Id. Dustin moves for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, a new trial under Rule 33, and arrest of judgment under Rule 34. Docket 336. Jesse moves for the same, and Dustin moves to join in Jesse's motion. Dockets 337, 338. The government opposes these motions and moves the court to require defendants to supplement their motions with citations to the trial record. Docket 339. Dustin ordered a transcript of the second day of trial, and he filed a supplement with citations to this transcript. Dockets 340, 345.
In a superseding indictment,[1]a grand jury charged both defendants with Kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1153, and 2; Interstate Domestic Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261(a)(2) and 2; Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6), 1153, and 2; and Assault by Strangulation of a Dating Partner in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(8), 1153, and 2. Docket 201 at 1-3. Jesse was also charged with two counts of aggravated sexual abuse by force in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)(1) and 1153 one count specifically alleging a violation of § 2246(2)(A), and the other a violation of § 2246(2)(B). Id. at 2. A jury trial was held from October 24 - 28, 2022. Docket 318.
At the close of the government's case in chief, defendants each moved orally for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. The United States opposed the motions. The court denied Jesse's motion in full, and it denied Dustin's motion as to the kidnapping and interstate domestic violence counts. It granted Dustin's motion as to the assault resulting in bodily injury and assault by strangulation of a dating partner counts. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the remaining counts. Docket 325.
Under Rule 34, “[u]pon the defendant's motion or on its own, the court must arrest judgment if the court does not have jurisdiction of the charged offense.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 34(a). “[A] judgment can be arrested only on the basis of error appearing on the ‘face of the record' and not on the basis of proof offered at trial.” United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 281 (1970). The record “include[s] ‘no more than the indictment, the plea, the verdict . . . and the sentence.' ” Id. at 281 n.10 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1952)). “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3231 . . . [t]hat's the beginning and the end of the ‘jurisdictional' inquiry.” United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 1999)). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, “The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction . . . of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”
Dustin is correct that the charge of kidnapping required an interstate commerce allegation for the court to have jurisdiction.[2]Docket 336 at 5; see 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) (). This is exactly what is alleged in Count 1 of the superseding indictment: “Dustin Sierra . . . did unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct, and carry away [EW] for ransom or reward or otherwise and, in committing and in furtherance of the commission of the offense, did willfully transport [EW] in interstate and foreign commerce[.]” Docket 201 at 1-2. The court thus had jurisdiction over this charge.
Dustin next argues that the court does not have jurisdiction over either the kidnapping charge or the interstate domestic violence charge because an indictment for aiding and abetting “must be accompanied by [an] indictment for [a] substantive offense[,]” and “[n]o substantive offense is alleged . . . under either count 1 or count 4 because both defendants are charged with aiding and abetting.” Docket 336 at 5. The aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, “does not create a separate offense, it simply makes those who aid and abet in a crime punishable as principals.” United States v. McKnight, 799 F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 1986). Thus, whenever a violation of § 2 is alleged, “some other substantive crime must be described as well[,]”and aiding and abetting “is an alternative charge in every count, whether explicit or implicit[.]” Id.; United States v. Pearson, 667 F.2d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he words ‘aided and abetted each by the other' in [the] indictment were wholly extraneous and had no effect on the crime charged[.]”).
As described above, count 1 alleges the substantive crime of kidnapping. Count 4 alleges the substantive crime of interstate domestic violence. Compare § 2261(a)(2), with Docket 201 at 2-3. Both counts also explicitly allege that defendants “aid[ed] and abet[ted] each other.” But such explicit language is “wholly extraneous” and “had no effect on the crime charged.” Pearson, 667 F.2d at 14; McKnight, 799 F.2d at 445. Thus, the explicit inclusion of this language did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Gregory v. United States, 230 F.3d 1363, at *1 (Table) (8th Cir. 2000) (). Indeed, rather than deprive a court of jurisdiction, such language “reveals a basis for joinder on its face,” allowing two defendants to be properly charged in the same indictment under Rule 8(b). United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 529 (8th Cir. 1986). Dustin's motion to arrest judgment is denied.
Jesse argues that the court does not have jurisdiction over Count 3, which charged aggravated sexual abuse by force, because “the Government was required to show that the crime alleged occurred in Indian Country[,]” and “[t]he only evidence of oral sex” occurred in Crawford, Nebraska, which is not in Indian Country. Docket 337 at 27; See 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(B). But under Rule 34, the court does not consider the evidence at trial, only what is alleged in the indictment. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 281. Here, the indictment alleges that that act occurred “near Oglala and elsewhere, in Indian country, in the District of South Dakota.” Docket 201 at 2. Thus, the court had jurisdiction, and Jesse's motion to arrest judgment is denied.
Jesse moves for a new trial on three grounds: (1) that the government suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) that the court erred in limiting his proposed “theory of the defense” instruction; and (3) that EW's lack of credibility, coupled with a lack of other evidence, preponderates heavily against the verdict.[3]See Docket 337. A. Legal Standard
Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court can vacate a judgment and grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). “As a general rule, the decision whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial lies within the discretion of the district court.” United States v. McMahan, 744 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)). In ruling on a motion for new trial, the court may weigh evidence and evaluate witness credibility. United States v. Smart, 501 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Hilliard, 392 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2004)).
The court's authority to grant a new trial, however, should be used cautiously and sparingly. United States v. Cole, 537 F.3d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Rule 33 is [an] unusual remedy that is reserved for ‘exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.' ” United States v. Anwar, 880 F.3d 958, 970 (8th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th Cir. 2002)). “Unless the district court ultimately determines that a miscarriage of justice will occur, the jury's verdict must be allowed to stand.” Campos, 306 F.3d at 579. B. Allegations of Brady Violations
Jesse alleges that the government violated Brady by never disclosing EW's mental health and counseling records and by not disclosing her admission that she liked “rough” sex until trial. See Docket 337 at 10. To make out a Brady violation, a defendant must show (1) the evidence is “favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;” (2) the government suppressed that evidence; and (3) the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment. United States v. Tyndall, 521 F.3d 877 881 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Morales v. Ault, 476 F.3d 545, 554 ...
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