United States v. Simmermaker
Decision Date | 15 November 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 19-CR-55-CJW-MAR,19-CR-55-CJW-MAR |
Citation | 423 F.Supp.3d 626 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Michelle Rae SIMMERMAKER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Emily K. Nydle, US Attorney's Office, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiff.
This matter is before the Court on a Report and Recommendation ("R & R") (Doc. 43) of the Honorable Mark A. Roberts, United States Magistrate Judge. On August 5, 2019, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress. (Doc. 28). On August 12, 2019, the government timely filed a resistance. (Doc. 31). On September 12, 2019, Judge Roberts held a hearing on the motion. (Doc. 35). On September 26, 2019, both parties timely filed supplemental briefs pursuant to Judge Roberts' order. (Docs. 41 & 42).
On October 25, 2019, Judge Roberts issued his R & R, recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part defendant's Motion to Suppress. (Docs. 28 & 43). Specifically, Judge Roberts found that although defendant was in custody, her statements made on the porch of the residence were voluntary and not the result of police interrogation. (Doc. 43, at 12-18). Defendant's statements were therefore not obtained in violation of her Miranda rights and are admissible at trial. (Id. , at 18). Judge Roberts found, however, that the search of defendant's Brinks box was unreasonable and any evidence resulting from the search should be suppressed. (Id. , at 27). The deadline for filing objections to the R & R was November 8, 2019. (Id. , at 28). On November 8, 2019, both parties filed objections to the R & R (Docs. 46, 47, & 48).
For the following reasons, the Court adopts in part and rejects in part Judge Roberts' R & R (Doc. 43) and denies defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 28).
The court reviews the magistrate judge's report and recommendation pursuant to the statutory standards found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) :
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006) ; see FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) ( identical requirements). While examining these statutory standards, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.
Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 154, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Thus, a district court may review de novo any issue in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation at any time. Id. If a party files an objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, the district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required "to give any more consideration to the magistrate's report than the court considers appropriate." Thomas , 474 U.S. at 150, 106 S.Ct. 466.
De novo review, of course, is nondeferential and generally allows a reviewing court to make an "independent review" of the entire matter. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell , 499 U.S. 225, 238, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) ( ); see Doe v. Chao , 540 U.S. 614, 620–19, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004) ( ). The de novo review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, however, only means a district court " ‘give[s] fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made.’ "
United States v. Raddatz , 447 U.S. 667, 675, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) ( ). Thus, although de novo review generally entails review of an entire matter, in the context of § 636 a district court's required de novo review is limited to "de novo determination[s]" of only "those portions" or "specified proposed findings" to which objections have been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; see Thomas , 474 U.S. at 154, 106 S.Ct. 466 . Consequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated de novo review would only be required if objections were "specific enough to trigger de novo review." Branch v. Martin , 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989). Despite this "specificity" requirement to trigger de novo review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has "emphasized the necessity ... of retention by the district court of substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate." Belk v. Purkett , 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). As a result, the Eighth Circuit has concluded that general objections require "full de novo review" if the record is concise. Id. (). Even if the reviewing court must construe objections liberally to require de novo review, it is clear to this Court that there is a distinction between making an objection and making no objection at all. See Coop. Fin. Ass'n, Inc. v. Garst , 917 F. Supp. 1356, 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ().
In the absence of any objection, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated a district court should review a magistrate judge's report and recommendation under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See Grinder v. Gammon , 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) ( ); Taylor v. Farrier , 910 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1990) ; Branch , 886 F.2d at 1046 ( ).
The court is unaware of any case that has described the clearly erroneous standard of review in the context of a district court's review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which no objection has been filed. In other contexts, however, the Supreme Court has stated the "foremost" principle under this standard of review "is that ‘[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ " Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573–74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948) ). Thus, the clearly erroneous standard of review is deferential, see Dixon v. Crete Med. Clinic, P.C. , 498 F.3d 837, 847 (8th Cir. 2007) ( ), but a district court may still reject the magistrate judge's report and recommendation when the district court is "left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed," U.S. Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. at 395, 68 S.Ct. 525.
Even though some "lesser review" than de novo is not "positively require[d]" by statute, Thomas , 474 U.S. at 150, 106 S.Ct. 466, Eighth Circuit precedent leads this Court to believe that a clearly erroneous standard of review should generally be used as the baseline standard to review all findings in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that are not objected to or when the parties fail to file any timely objections, see Grinder , 73 F.3d at 795 ; Taylor , 910 F.2d at 520 ; Branch , 886 F.2d at 1046 ; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) advisory committee's note ("When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation."). In the context of the review of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the Court believes one further caveat is necessary: a district court always remains free to render its own decision under de novo review, regardless of whether it feels a mistake has been committed. See Thomas , 474 U.S. at 153–54, 106 S.Ct. 466. Thus, although a clearly erroneous standard of review is deferential and the minimum standard appropriate in this context, it is not mandatory, and the district court may choose to apply a less deferential standard.
After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Judge Roberts accurately and thoroughly set forth the relevant facts in his R & R. (Doc. 43, at 2-7). Further, neither of the parties have objected to Judge Roberts' summary of the facts here. Therefore, the Court adopts Judge Roberts' factual findings as set forth below without...
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United States v. Bird, 3:20-30026-RAL
...F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1043 (D. Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). Thus, the standard of review is "deferential." United States v. Simmermaker, 423 F. Supp. 3d 626, 631 (N.D. Iowa 2019) (citing Dixon v. Crete Med. Clinic, P.C., 498 F.3d 837, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2007)). Red Bird asserts that Judge More......