United States v. Simplot
Decision Date | 03 April 1961 |
Docket Number | No. Cr-40-61.,Cr-40-61. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. J. R. SIMPLOT, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
William Jack Adams, Asst. U. S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.
Paul H. Ray, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, Utah, Lloyd E. Haight, Jess Hawley, Jr., Hawley & Hawley, Boise, Idaho, for defendant.
The defendant has moved to dismiss the following indictment for perjury on the ground that it is fatally defective for uncertainty:
In support of the motion it is urged that the indictment does not disclose with sufficient definiteness the materiality of the allegedly false testimony, what portion of the testimony referred to was false, or the words or substance of any testimony that is claimed to have been false.
The first two assignments of alleged uncertainty readily can be resolved against the contentions of the defendant by noting that materiality in an indictment may be,2 and is in this case, generally alleged, and if any testimony is sufficiently charged as being false the charge as to all of the testimony referred to is adequate.3
The third assignment of uncertainty, however, may not be so summarily rejected. Counsel for the defendant points out that it cannot be told from the indictment whether the defendant is charged with testifying falsely with respect to the occurrence of a conversation between the defendant and Archer, what was said therein, the place of the conversation, the time of the conversation, or with respect to all of these circumstances. As noted above, this in and of itself would not be fatal to the charge. But beyond this it appears doubtful that, with respect to any matter mentioned, there is an allegation that the defendant testified falsely. It has been held that an indictment substantially in the words of the statute, as is this one, but followed by a specification of the testimony, need not expressly aver that such testimony was false where this appears through necessary implication.4 But where, as here, only the subject matter of the testimony is indicated and not its words, or substance, or at the very least its general tenor or direction, there is nothing to which to tie the conclusion of falsity, unless it may be said that an indictment for perjury in the words of the statute without any specification at all would be sufficient to state a public offense.
The Government relied in its oral argument upon the opinion in United States v. Debrow, 1953, 346 U.S. 374, 74 S.Ct. 113, 114, 98 L.Ed. 92, for the contention that no specificity beyond the terms of the statute is essential to a valid indictment. It calls attention to the fact that in the opinion last mentioned the portions of the indictment therein quoted are in the words of the statute, that the further particulars which apparently the indictment contained are eliminated from the quotation and that the material quoted in the opinion is preceded by the statement "Each indictment read in material part as follows: * * *." However, I would read the latter statement as meaning that the portion of the indictment quoted was the only part material to the points raised in that particular appeal, and not that the omitted specifications would not be material had they been left out of the indictment as it was returned by the Grand Jury. Support for this interpretation is found in the opinion of the Circuit Court, 5 Cir., 1953, 203 F.2d 699, wherein it is indicated that in addition to the portion of the indictment quoted by the Supreme Court as material to the problem involved, there was a recitation of the allegedly false testimony which would be fully adequate as against the objection urged by the defendant here.5 Thus there was no occasion in the Debrow case to consider the question now before me.
United States v. Remington, 2 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 246, 248, certiorari denied 343 U.S. 907, 72 S.Ct. 580, 96 L.Ed. 1325, is cited by the Government in support of its position that the indictment is sufficient. The indictment in that case, however, is not apposite to the one with which we are concerned here. In Remington, for example, the indictment set out the specific answer which was claimed to have been false, i. e. that Remington had never been a member of the Communist Party, and then alleged that "the aforesaid testimony of the defendant, as he then and there well knew and believed, was untrue in that the defendant had been a member of the Communist Party." Of course, if the indictment before me had alleged what the claimed untrue statement was, as in the Remington case, I should have no question; and if in Remington only an indication of the fact that the claimed false statement related in some way to Communism or membership of the defendant in that Party, I feel confident that the indictment there would not have been deemed sufficient.
I am of the opinion that an indictment for perjury substantially in the terms of the statute without specification to some extent of the testimony claimed to have been false does not contain a plain, concise, and definite statement of the offense charged as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,6 and does not, acceptably to the Constitution, inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.7 It is not sufficient to charge an offense in the words of the statute creating it, unless such words themselves, without uncertainty, set forth all essential...
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