United States v. Skouteris, 21-6221
| Docket Number | 21-6221 |
| Decision Date | 19 October 2022 |
| Citation | 51 F.4th 658 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George Ernest SKOUTERIS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ON BRIEF: Josie S. Holland, HOLLAND LAW, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Carroll L. Andre III, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: McKEAGUE, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
George E. Skouteris Jr. is a former college football player. Following his playing days, Skouteris moved from the stadium to the courtroom, practicing as a personal injury lawyer. His client service, however, was more in the form of a turnover than a touchdown. Case in point, he routinely settled cases without client permission, forged client signatures on settlement checks, and then deposited those checks into his own account. Complaints from angry clients mounted, as did interest by state and federal authorities.
At his jury trial for federal bank fraud, Skouteris argued that his days on the gridiron had left him with mental impairments—including possible chronic traumatic encephalopathy
(CTE)—that cast doubt on whether he had the requisite state of mind to commit bank fraud. The jury disagreed and found Skouteris guilty of the charged offense. He was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay nearly $150,000 in restitution. On appeal, Skouteris argues that his football injuries warrant a replay of his jury trial or, in the alternative, his sentencing. We disagree and therefore affirm.
Memphis attorney George E. Skouteris Jr. practiced plaintiff-side, personal injury law for clients injured in automobile accidents. One of those clients was Tiffany Williams. She sought Skouteris's services in the aftermath of a car accident that killed her fiancé and put Williams in the hospital. Skouteris agreed to take on the representation. But from that point on, Williams struggled to get updates from Skouteris about her case. Eventually, she learned that Skouteris had settled the case (for $197,480) without her knowledge. Worse yet, Williams discovered that Skouteris had signed her name to the settlement check and deposited the proceeds into his account at Trust One Bank. With mounting medical bills and other life expenses, Williams pressed Skouteris for the money. But Skouteris gave her only "bits and pieces" of the settlement while assuring her that he was working with lienholders to resolve her pending bills.
After nearly two years of getting the runaround, Williams hired another attorney to recover the remaining settlement money. Her new attorney soon discovered that Skouteris had used Williams's settlement money for other things. The experience distressed Williams emotionally and financially.
Williams's experience with Skouteris, regrettably, was not unique. Skouteris continued his practice of unauthorized settling, forging, and then depositing those monies in his Trust One Bank accounts, at the expense of other clients, too. Some, like Williams, were lucky enough to receive from Skouteris a small piece of the settlement years after the fact. Others never saw any of the settlement proceeds from Skouteris.
Unsurprisingly, Skouteris's clients were not happy. A few filed complaints with Tennessee attorney disciplinary authorities. Another contacted the Shelby County District Attorney's office. Eventually, local authorities arrested Skouteris on state stolen property charges. He was also disbarred. And a federal grand jury indicted him for seven counts of bank fraud. The indictment covered activity from 2007 until 2013, but it did not specifically reference Skouteris's representation of Williams.
The central issue at Skouteris's federal trial was whether he had the requisite intent to commit bank fraud. Jurors heard from a parade of Skouteris's former clients. One was Williams, whose testimony was limited to proving Skouteris's intent under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2). Another was Justin Levick, who testified under the same limitation. Family, friends, and colleagues of Skouteris also took the stand to address Skouteris's mental capacity. Much of that lay testimony suggested that Skouteris was not acting under any sort of diminished cognitive capacity during the relevant time. For example, one colleague told the jury that she "never witnessed" any sign of mental impairment
and remarked how "impressed" she was with Skouteris's ability to recall the details of a particular client's case.
The jury also heard from two psychologists who examined Skouteris—a defense expert and a government expert. The defense expert maintained that Skouteris suffered from a "major depressive disorder
," "alcohol use disorder," and "seizure disorder," the latter of which began to manifest during Skouteris's football career. The expert concluded that these disorders, taken together, would have "significantly limited" Skouteris's "ability to organize his mental efforts during the" period of the alleged offenses, producing the "errors" in his handling of client settlements. The government's expert agreed that Skouteris suffered from depression and alcohol use disorder but concluded that Skouteris was "capable of having the mental ability to form and carry out complex thoughts, schemes, and plans."
At the charging conference, the parties largely agreed on the scope of the jury instructions, including how to explain the state of mind Skouteris needed to be found guilty. The parties also agreed to include an instruction explaining the limited purpose of the FRE 404(b) testimony. Skouteris's attorney, however, sought an additional instruction explaining that evidence of "diminished mental capacity" could provide "reasonable doubt that" Skouteris had the "requisite culpable state of mind." The district court declined to include the instruction.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all seven counts. At sentencing, the district court determined Skouteris's sentencing range was 46 to 57 months. As Skouteris's criminal history was minimal, the nature of Skouteris's offenses largely drove the calculated range. Skouteris's offense level was a product of his base score, coupled with enhancements for: (1) "losses," see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) ; (2) abusing a position of trust or using a special skill, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 ; and (3) committing an offense that resulted in "substantial financial hardship" to at least one victim, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(iii). The genesis of the last enhancement was Williams's losses. From this Guidelines range, the district court considered whether there should be a departure for diminished capacity or a downward variance. After hearing from the government, the defense, and several witnesses, the district court varied downward for a sentence of 30 months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.
Skouteris's conviction also required him to make restitution to the victims of his offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a). That aspect of the sentencing proceedings proved more difficult to resolve. For months, the parties debated both the amount of restitution and to whom it was owed. Ultimately, the parties were unable to agree whether the restitution owed to Williams should be reduced for attorney's fees. The district court declined to reduce the restitution amount owed to Williams. Skouteris was ordered to pay $147,406. Of that, $77,882 was owed to Williams. Skouteris's timely appeal followed.
A. Skouteris first takes aim at the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1). While the indictment and jury instructions seem to mix elements of § 1344(1) () and § 1344(2) (), we focus, as the government did here, on § 1344(1). Cf. United States v. Hall , 979 F.3d 1107, 1116 (6th Cir. 2020) (). . Successfully challenging a jury verdict is no easy feat. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and affirm if any rational juror could have found Skouteris guilty of federal bank fraud. United States v. Latimer , 16 F.4th 222, 225 (6th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we will overturn the verdict only where the jury "behaved irrationally in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that" Skouteris "knowingly execute[d], or attempt[ed] to execute, a scheme or artifice ... to defraud a financial institution." See United States v. Miller , 982 F.3d 412, 440 (6th Cir. 2020) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1).
Although we ultimately opt to frame § 1344(1) under a more precise formula, see infra at 669, we begin by noting our longstanding view that § 1344(1) violations consist of three distinct elements: that a defendant (1) knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme to defraud a financial institution; (2) did so with the intent to defraud; and (3) the financial institution was federally insured. See Hall , 979 F.3d at 1117 ; United States v. Parkes , 668 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Warshak , 631 F.3d 266, 312 (6th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Ross , 502 F.3d 521, 530 (6th Cir. 2007) ; United States v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 590 (6th Cir. 2006) ; United States v. Davis , 397 F.3d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 2005) ; United States v. Everett , 270 F.3d 986, 989 (6th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Hoglund , 178 F.3d 410, 412–13 (6th Cir. 1999). As the jury heard evidence that Trust One Bank, where Skouteris deposited...
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