United States v. Slaughter, Cr. No. 1433-48.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1950
• Docket Number: Cr. No. 1433-48.
• Citation: 89 F. Supp. 205
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. SLAUGHTER.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

89 F. Supp. 205

UNITED STATES v. SLAUGHTER.

Cr. No. 1433-48.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

March 14, 1950.

Nugent Dodds, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, for the United States.

William E. Leahy, Benjamin I. Melnicoff and Herbert S. French, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

SCHWEINHAUT, District Judge.

The defendant says that the indictment should be dismissed because it does not state an offense against the United States and because the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act¹ is unconstitutional as being so vague and uncertain that it fails to meet the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment, and fails adequately to inform the defendant of the cause and nature of the charge against him as required by the Sixth Amendment. He says it also offends the First Amendment because it deprives the people of civil liberties thereby protected.

The indictment charges the defendant with violating Sec. 308 of the Act, 2 U.S. C.A. § 267, in that he engaged himself for pay for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage of certain legislation and the defeat of certain legislation, without having registered with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate pursuant to the statute.

The court is of the opinion that this section of the Lobbying Act may stand alone and apart from other provisions and that it is not on its face unconstitutional. The words "engage himself for pay or for any consideration" are readily understandable, especially since "consideration" is a word of art which has had well-defined meaning in the law for many years. So, also, the phrase "for the purpose of attempting to influence" is understandable in common parlance and susceptible of proof in a given case. "Legislation" is very broadly defined in the Act but the indictment specifically enumerates the legislation to which it refers and to which, of course, it is limited.²

The section does not abridge constitutionally guaranteed privileges (freedom of speech, press, petition, etc.) since it leaves everyone free to exercise those rights, calling upon him only to say for whom he is speaking, who pays him, how much, and the scope in general of his activity with regard to legislation. This, the Congress should and, in the court's opinion, does have the right to demand.

Subsequent to the original argument on the motion, the court directed the government to file a bill of particulars. This was done and the defendant has again pressed his motion to dismiss the indictment, as now amplified and restricted by the bill. The statement of particulars consists of answers to a series of questions propounded by the defendant, together with numerous documents labeled Exhibit A, with subnumbers. The defendant asserts that it now clearly appears that the activity indicated by the answer and exhibits is not of such a nature, even conceding constitutionality of the statute, as to require him to register. He points out that Sec. 308 of the Act contains a provision "that it shall not apply to any person who merely appears before a committee of the Congress of the United States in support of or opposition to legislation." He argues that the particularization shows that, as a lawyer, he arranged for his clients to appear before congressional committees, helped them prepare for such appearances, correlated and evaluated their material, advised them with respect thereto, testified himself as a witness, etc. He urges that, by logical and necessary implication, it is obvious that if a witness does not have...