United States v. Smith
| Decision Date | 27 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-cr-3495 JCH,18-cr-3495 JCH |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Douglas D. SMITH, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
Novaline Wilson, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.
Aric G. Elsenheimer, Federal Public Defender Albuquerque Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant.
On April 3, 2020, Defendant Douglas Smith filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Federal Jurisdiction (ECF No. 47). The Court held a hearing on the motion on August 25, 2020. The Court, having considered the motion, briefs, evidence, relevant law, and otherwise being fully advised, concludes that Defendant's motion should be denied.
A federal grand jury charged Defendant Smith, a non-Indian, with unlawfully killing Jane Doe, an Indian, with malice aforethought on or about May 5, 2018, in Indian Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1111. See Indictment, ECF No. 24. The parties agree that the alleged crime occurred on Defendant's property at 826 N. Riverside Drive in Española, Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, mainly in Section 2, Township 20N, Range 8E, NMPM (hereinafter "the Property"). Compare Gov.’s Resp. 1, ECF No. 53, with Def.’s Mot. 2-4, 6, ECF No. 47. The parties also agree that the land was transferred to non-Indians Alfred Lucero, Antonia F. de Lucero, and Pleasant Henry Hill, Jr., under the provisions of the Pueblo Lands Act, 43 Stat. 636, via a patent issued on March 29, 1937. Compare Def.’s Mot. 6, ECF No. 47; Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 47-1 at 3, with Gov.’s Resp. 1, ECF No. 53. The Property is located within the exterior boundaries of the Pueblo of Santa Clara. See Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 47-1 at 3; Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 47-2.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacks federal jurisdiction because the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act (the "PLA") extinguished federal jurisdiction over the land in question and the Indian Pueblo Land Act Amendments of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-133, 119 Stat. 2573, (the "2005 Amendment") was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority. Def.’s Mot. 1, ECF No. 47. The Government in response contends that the PLA did not extinguish federal jurisdiction because extinguishment must be plain and unambiguous from Congress, and the Executive, not Congress, issued the specific land patent quieting title to the Property. See Gov.’s Resp. 2-4, ECF No. 53. The United States further asserts that the 2005 Amendment was a constitutionally proper exercise of congressional plenary authority over Indian tribes and pueblos, so the 2005 Amendment ensures federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes that occur within the exterior boundaries of the pueblos, regardless of who holds title to the land parcel. Id. at 2.
"The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within the court's jurisdiction." United States v. Bustillos , 31 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 1994). "The facts supporting jurisdiction must be affirmatively alleged, and if challenged, the burden is on the party claiming that the court has subject matter jurisdiction." Id. Accordingly, in a criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 or 1153, the United States has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the land on which the crime is alleged to have occurred is Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151. See Bustillos , 31 F.3d at 933. Once the district court has made the jurisdictional determination that "a particular tract of land or geographic area is Indian Country," United States v. Roberts , 185 F.3d 1125, 1139 (10th Cir. 1999), the United States then has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged crime occurred on that particular tract of land or geographic area, see United States v. Frank , 901 F.2d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1990). While determining congressional intent is a matter of statutory construction, when statutory construction turns on an historical record, it involves a mixed question of law and fact. Osage Nation v. Irby , 597 F.3d 1117, 1122 (10th Cir. 2010).
The King of Spain granted title to the Pueblo Indians in 1689 to the lands on which they resided, and the United States agreed in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to protect the rights of Indians recognized by prior sovereigns. United States v. Arrieta , 436 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006). In 1877, the Supreme Court held that Pueblo Indians were not "Indian tribes" within the meaning of the Indian Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, which prohibited any loss or transfer of title to Indian lands except by treaty or convention. Arrieta , 436 F.3d at 1249. Consequently, Pueblo Indians could transfer land without congressional approval. Id. Approximately 3,000 transfers of Pueblo land subsequently occurred to non-Indians, because it was thought that Pueblo Indians could convey good title to their lands. See id. ; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana , 472 U.S. 237, 241-42, 105 S.Ct. 2587, 86 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985).
The validity of these title transfers subsequently came into question, however. Arrieta , 436 F.3d at 1249. After a ruling by the Territorial Supreme Court in 1907 that the Pueblos were not "Indians" within the meaning of a criminal statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to any "Indian," Congress passed the New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910 that "expressly required that the new State's Constitution prohibit ‘the introduction of liquors into Indian country, which term shall also include all lands now owned or occupied by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico.’ " Mountain States , 472 U.S. at 242, 105 S.Ct. 2587. Section 2 of the 1910 Enabling Act additionally provided:
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated and ungranted public lands lying within the boundaries thereof and to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States ; ...
36 Stat. 558-59 (bold emphasis added).
The Supreme Court later determined, in ruling that Congress could expressly prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquors into Pueblo lands under its power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, that Pueblos are dependent Indian communities entitled to aid and protection by the federal government and subject to congressional control. See United States v. Sandoval , 231 U.S. 28, 45-49, 34 S.Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 107 (1913). See also Mountain States , 472 U.S. at 242-43, 105 S.Ct. 2587 (discussing Sandoval ). This ruling left open the issue of the validity of prior title transfers of Pueblo lands. See Mountain States , 472 U.S. at 243, 105 S.Ct. 2587.
"To settle the status of Pueblo lands, Congress enacted the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924 (‘PLA’)," which "established the Pueblo Lands Board (‘Board’) to resolve conflicting claims to Pueblo lands." Arrieta , 436 F.3d at 1249 (citing Pueblo Lands Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636). The Board was composed of the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, and a third person appointed by the President. Mountain States , 472 U.S. at 244, 105 S.Ct. 2587. After investigation, the Board was to file a report, setting forth metes and bounds, as to each pueblo and the Attorney General was to file a suit to quiet title to the lands described in the report "as Indian lands the Indian title to which is determined by said report not to have been extinguished." PLA, §§ 2 & 3, 43 Stat. at 636-37. Unanimity was required by the Board as to all decisions in which it determined "Indian title has been extinguished." § 2, 43 Stat. at 636. "The Act also directed the Board to award the Pueblos compensation for the value of any rights that were extinguished if they ‘could have been at any time recovered for said Indians by the United States by seasonable prosecution.’ " Mountain States , 472 U.S. at 245, 105 S.Ct. 2587 (quoting 43 Stat. 636, § 6).
The Tenth Circuit explained what occurred next:
The Board issued patents to quiet title to land in favor of non-Indians who adversely possessed land and paid taxes on the land from 1889 to 1924 or who had color of title to the land from 1902 to 1924. Id. § 4, 43 Stat. at 637; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. , 472 U.S. at 244-45, 105 S.Ct. 2587. The Pueblos’ rights to such land were extinguished. PLA § 4, 43 Stat. at 637; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. , 472 U.S. at 244, 105 S.Ct. 2587. The Pueblo retained title to all lands not patented to non-Indians. Consequently, pockets of privately owned, non-Indian land lie amidst Pueblo lands.
Arrieta , 436 F.3d at 1249-50 (bold emphasis added).
In 1948, Congress enacted Section 1152 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which provided that "the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States ... extend to the Indian Country," subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Congress defined "Indian Country" to include "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation," 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), "all dependent Indian communities" within the United States’ borders, id. § 1151(b), and "all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished," id. § 1151(c).1
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