United States v. Smith, 6621.

• Decision Date: 12 November 1942
• Docket Number: No. 6621.,6621.
• Citation: 47 F. Supp. 607
• Parties: UNITED STATES ex rel. DIAMOND v. SMITH, Commanding Officer of UNITED STATES ARMY, FORT DEVENS, AYER, MASS. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

47 F. Supp. 607

UNITED STATES ex rel. DIAMOND v. SMITH, Commanding Officer of UNITED STATES ARMY, FORT DEVENS, AYER, MASS. et al.

No. 6621.

District Court, D. Massachusetts.

November 12, 1942.

Albert & Albert, of Boston, Mass. (Alfred A. Albert, of Boston, Mass.) for petitioner.

Edmund J. Brandon, U. S. Atty., and William J. Koen, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Boston, Mass., for respondents.

FORD, District Judge.

This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed October 26, 1942, on behalf of William Louis Diamond. The petition alleges that Diamond is wrongfully detained and imprisoned by the Commanding Officer of the United States Army, at Fort Devens, Ayer, Massachusetts. A summons to show cause was returnable on November 2, 1942. A return was filed (see Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, 284, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830) on behalf of the respondent Commanding Officer alleging that "William L. Diamond is now and has been for some time past a member of the Army of the United States and as such is subject to Army control and military law".

A hearing was held on November 2, 1942, with the petitioner present. The latter, offered the opportunity to submit evidence on his own behalf, declined to do so as the facts involved were agreed upon and are as follows:

Diamond properly registered for service, was placed in Class 1A and appeared at his Local Board No. 137 at Southbridge, Massachusetts, on September 2, 1942, in response to an order to report for induction into the United States Army. From there he was sent to the United States Army Recruiting and Induction Station for the Seventh Recruiting and Induction District at Springfield, Massachusetts, where he was physically examined and accepted for service, but refused to take the oath administered to all men successfully passing the physical examination. (See Army Regulations, No. 615-500, Paragraphs 13 d and e issued by the War Department, September 1, 1942, superseding Mobilization Regulations, No. 1-7, dated October 1, 1940). Diamond was then segregated from others of the same group who were being sworn in, taken into another room and questioned as to his reasons for refusal to take the oath. He stated that as one of Jehovah's Witnesses he could not conscientiously take any oath and that he was opposed to both combatant and non-combatant service in the Army. Diamond was told that the oath would be administered again to him and regardless of whether or not he took it he would be considered inducted into the Army. The oath being read, Diamond refused to take it. He was then, by written order of the officers in charge dated September 2, 1942, placed in the Enlisted Reserve Corps of the United States Army and was ordered to report to Fort Devens for active duty on September 16, 1942. Diamond did not report for active duty on September 16, 1942, whereupon he was taken into custody by authority of the United States and is now being held at Fort Devens.

It is the contention of Diamond that he was not legally inducted into the Army of the United States and, consequently, is not subject to its jurisdiction; that if he is guilty of an offense with respect to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 he should be tried in a civil court.

The sole question this case presents is: Was Diamond properly inducted into the Army? If he was properly inducted, he is subject to the jurisdiction of the Army and military law. If he was not inducted, he is subject only to civil law. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, c. 720, Section 11, 54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 311;¹ United States v. Rappeport, D.C., 36 F.Supp. 915, 918; see Conference Report on the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Cong.Record, Vol. 86, part XI, pp. 12033-12040 (12039); Senator Sheppard's explanation of the Conference Report, Cong. Record, Vol. 86, Part XI, p. 12082. (Cf. the different language of Selective Draft Act of 1917, c. 15, Section 2, 40 Stat. 76, 77, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 202, which, in part, provides: "All persons drafted into the service of the United States * * * shall, from the date of said draft or acceptance, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army"; see Ex parte Thieret, 6 Cir., 268 F. 472, 478, and cf. Article 2 of the Articles of War, c. 227, subchapter II, § 1, 41 Stat. 787, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1473).

Neither the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, c. 720, Section 11, 54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 311, nor the Service Extension Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 626-628, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 351, et seq., provides for the procedure for induction into the Army; and the rules and regulations promulgated under the above mentioned Acts cast little light upon the proper procedure for induction. But Army Regulations No. 615-500, issued by order of the Secretary of War on September 1, 1942, superseding Mobilization Regulations No. 1-7, dated October 1, 1940, set out in Section II paragraphs 13 d and e a procedure for induction. Subdivisions d and e of paragraph 13 read:

"d. Induction. — Upon completion of the physical examination and after certification by a medical officer, selectees found to be physically and mentally fit for general military service will be inducted.

"e. Induction ceremony.

"(1) The induction will be performed by an officer in a short, dignified ceremony in which the men are administered the oath, Article of War 109:

Here follows form of oath

* * * * *

"(4) They will then be informed that they are now members of the Army of the United States and given an explanation of their obligation and privileges. In the event of refusal to take the oath (or affirmation) of allegiance by a declarant alien or citizen he will not be required to receive it, but will be informed that this action does not alter in any respect his obligation to the United States. * * *"

Thus, if this regulation has the force of law (United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291, 301, 10 L.Ed. 968; Davis v. Woodring, 72 App.D.C. 83, 111 F.2d...