United States v. Smith, 8007.

Decision Date16 January 1975
Docket NumberNo. 8007.,8007.
Citation330 A.2d 759
PartiesUNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Marjorie SMITH, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

James N. Owens, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Donald E. Robinson, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellant.

W. Theophilus Jones, Washington, D. C., appointed by this court, was on the brief for appellee.

Before KELLY and KERN, Associate Judges, and HOOD, Chief Judge, Retired.

KERN, Associate Judge:

The government appeals from an order dismissing for lack of probable cause two informations charging appellee with solicitation for prostitution in violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2701.1 We find the dismissals improper, and therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case for whatever action is deemed appropriate.

The case came before the trial court for entry of a plea of guilty to one charge pursuant to a plea bargain.2 Upon request of the court, the government placed in the record a statement of the facts upon which the charge was based. As related in that statement, appellee approached a police officer at 3:00 a. m. and inquired whether he wanted to "go out". The officer replied that he did, and asked how much it would cost. Appellee then quoted a price of $25, stated "Let's go," and indicated to the officer that they should proceed to his room. The court refused to accept the plea,3 ruling that since the government had not alleged an explicit offer by appellee to perform a specific sex act, there was lacking an adequate factual basis for accepting appellee's plea of guilty. Recovering from his surprise at this turn of events, appellee's counsel then announced that his client would withdraw her plea, and the case was certified back to Calendar Control Court.

For reasons which are not clear from the record, appellee's counsel reappeared before the trial judge later the same afternoon, apparently without having secured recertification of the case.4 Instead, counsel appears in the meantime to have research searched the law on solicitation and concluded (a) that the court's ruling on the elements of the offense charged was erroneous, and (b) that his client's interest would best be served by a revival of the plea bargain. He therefore sought to reinstate the plea of guilty by his client he had earlier withdrawn. Whereupon the court, repeating the view of the necessity of proof of an offer to perform a specific sex act, dismissed sua sponte both charges for failure of the government to allege facts establishing probable cause.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that proof of a specific offer to perform a sex act is not an element of the offense of solicitation for prostitution.

To establish the offense it is not necessary to prove any particular language or conduct. Ordinarily it is a question of fact whether the acts and words of the defendant, viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, constitute the inviting or enticing prohibited by the Act. . . . [Curran v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 52 A.2d 121, 122 (1949); Golden v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 167 A.2d 796, 797 (1961).]

We have no doubt but that on the facts stated by the prosecutor a court could find appellee guilty of solicitation. It was error, therefore, for the trial court to rule that the government had failed to allege facts sufficient to establish the crime charged.

Quite apart from the merits of the solicitation question, moreover, we conclude that the trial court was without authority to dismiss the information on the ground of lack of probable cause. The Supreme Court has stated on several occasions the broad principle that an information drawn by a prosecutor, if valid on its face, is sufficient to call...

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7 cases
  • Graves v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • October 10, 1986
    ...clear and specific, there was discussion of money, as well as "lucid description of the services [appellant] offered"); United States v. Smith, 330 A.2d 759 (D.C.1975) (appellant asked officer if he wanted to "go out" for $25 and indicated they should go to his room); Wajer v. United States......
  • Ford v. U.S., 83-1105.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • November 5, 1987
    ...Curran v. United States, 52 A.2d 121, 122 (D.C. 1947); Hall v. United States, 34 A.2d 631, 632 (D.C. 1943); see also United States v. Smith, 330 A.2d 759 (D.C. 1975). 11. The fee need not be offered or paid in money; anything of value will suffice. Muse v. United States, 522 A.2d 888 (D.C. ......
  • Mehari v. Dist. of Columbia
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • March 31, 2020
    ...viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances, constituting the inviting or enticing prohibited by the [statute]." United States v. Smith, 330 A.2d 759, 761 (D.C. 1975). Here, based on the undisputed facts and resolving genuine factual disputes in Mehari's favor, Wilkes has failed to pro......
  • Dinkins v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • May 10, 1977
    ...found guilty in a case in which it is the officer rather than the person charged who asks how much it would cost. United States v. Smith, D.C. App., 330 A.2d 759, 761 (1975). Appellant in effect concedes this point by referring to Smith as a case in which the defendant's conduct was suffici......
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