United States v. Smith, 20250.
Decision Date | 21 December 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 20250.,20250. |
Citation | 437 F.2d 538 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Thomas F. Waldron, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.
Simon L. Leis, Jr., First Asst. U. S. Atty., Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee; William W. Milligan, U. S. Atty., Norbert A. Nadel, Asst. U. S. Atty., Cincinnati, Ohio, on brief.
Before CELEBREZZE and McCREE, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.
In January 1969, Andrew Smith was charged in a complaint with violating the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, and upon arraignment, February 1, 1969, was released on $1,000 bond. On February 26, Smith failed to appear at a scheduled preliminary hearing in Cincinnati before the United States Commissioner, who revoked his bond. On March 19, he was arrested in Boston and, on March 26, was indicted for failing to appear before a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3150. He was tried before a jury, convicted, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. Shortly after his conviction under this indictment, the Mann Act charge was dismissed. Smith now appeals and asks this court to set aside his conviction.
Prior to the trial, in response to a suggestion by the United States Attorney, the District Judge ordered appellant to be examined pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 4244 by Dr. Douglas Goldman, a psychiatrist, to determine his competency to stand trial. Dr. Goldman reported his findings in two letters to the District Judge, who found appellant competent. That determination is not challenged here.
Despite Dr. Goldman's previous participation in the proceedings, at trial the defense called him as an expert witness on the issue whether appellant was sane and possessed the capacity for criminal responsibility at the time he failed to appear. The prosecution called as rebuttal witnesses the United States Commissioner from Cincinnati before whom appellant had appeared four times prior to February 26, and the FBI agent who arrested appellant in Boston.
There are two questions before us. (1) Did Dr. Goldman's testimony present a prima facie defense of lack of criminal responsibility? (2) If so, did the Government present sufficient evidence to present a question of fact on this issue? We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the District Court.
In United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir.1968), this court established a new standard for determining whether a defendant was, at the time of the alleged crime, capable of criminal responsibility.
404 F.2d at 727. See also Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.1967). An examination of the transcript shows that Dr. Goldman gave unequivocal testimony, based on his interview with appellant, that would have supported a jury verdict of not guilty.
We are asked to disregard Dr. Goldman's testimony on the grounds that his examination of appellant had taken place six months before trial, had lasted no more than 90 minutes, and had been directed toward the question of competence to stand trial, not insanity at the time of the alleged offense. But the Government readily stipulated that Dr. Goldman was an expert, and we must assume that his years of training and experience as a psychiatrist enabled him to conduct a probing examination and to make informed judgments of the kind required here. We assume also that an expert can make such judgments on the basis of an interview which might be too brief to permit a layman to form a useful opinion.
The question, then, is whether the testimony of U.S. Commissioner Ebel and FBI Agent Welby, under the circumstances presented here, was of sufficient probative value to raise a question of fact. We hold that it was not.
Neither the Commissioner nor the FBI agent testified to more than appellant's superficial demeanor. Neither of these witnesses was shown to have been trained to make the kind of psychiatric evaluations necessary to answer intelligently the questions enumerated in Smith. Nor was there any evidence to indicate that either of these witnesses, in observing appellant, was concerned with his sanity or competence. Nothing in their testimony even remotely suggested a basis for making a judgment whether appellant was able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. All we have is the testimony of two laymen that appellant, whom each observed no more than three or four hours several months before trial, did not seem particularly abnormal — or, as Agent Welby put it, no more abnormal than "any other person in a police station waiting for something to happen to them". Transcript, at 226. And, of course, the Commissioner only observed appellant in the courtroom as he awaited arraignment or the securing of continuances by counsel.
"The probative value of any opinion on the issue of insanity depends on the facts upon which it is based". Wright v. United States, 102 U.S.App. D.C. 36, 250 F.2d 4, 10 (1957). When a lay witness' direct knowledge of the defendant is brief and superficial and far removed in time from the commission of the crime or the trial, the testimony usually should not be admitted, and it should not defeat a motion for acquittal or for a new trial. Its virtual lack of probative value is heavily outweighed by possible prejudicial effect. See, e.g., Brock v. United States, 387 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1967); Hartford v. United States, 362 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1966); Wright v. United States, supra. This is especially true when the...
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