United States v. Smith

Decision Date15 April 2019
Docket NumberCriminal Action No. 10-51-09 (RMC)
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ROBERT SMITH, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant Robert Smith pleaded guilty via a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) agreement to participation in a criminal drug conspiracy and was sentenced to the agreed-upon term of 156 months' incarceration. After his sentencing, the offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for the crime to which he pleaded guilty was lowered by two levels. Mr. Smith moved this Court to lower his sentence, which the Court denied because his sentence was "based on an agreed plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) and not on the Guidelines." That decision has now been reversed by the D.C. Circuit, due to the intervening Supreme Court decision in Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018), which held that a sentence based on a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea is generally "based on" the Guidelines and may be reduced due to a change in the underlying Guidelines. Thus, the case was remanded to this Court to reconsider its decision not to grant Mr. Smith's motion for a reduction in sentence. Having reviewed the submissions by the United States and Mr. Smith, the Court will grant Mr. Smith's motion to reduce his sentence. Mr. Smith's sentence will be modified to 135 months' incarceration, the mid-point of the new Guidelines range, with credit for time served.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense

On March 10, 2010, Mr. Smith and 12 others were indicted for a conspiracy to sell phencyclidine (PCP), heroin, powder cocaine, and cocaine base in Washington, D.C. and Maryland. Indictment [Dkt. 3]. Count One of the Indictment charged Mr. Smith and others with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess With Intent to Distribute PCP, Heroin, Cocaine, and Cocaine Base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and Count Three charged Mr. Smith with Unlawful Possession With Intent to Distribute PCP in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). Id. On September 10, 2010, a Grand Jury returned a Superseding Indictment that charged Mr. Smith with:

Count 1: Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess With Intent to Distribute PCP, Heroin, Cocaine, Cocaine Base, and Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;
Count 2: Conspiracy to Participate in a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); and
Count 24: Unlawful Possession With Intent to Distribute PCP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C).

Superseding Indictment [Dkt. 88].

The indictments arose from an FBI investigation that started in 2009, following the murder of a witness in a D.C. Superior Court case. Between December 1, 2009 and March 10, 2010, the FBI intercepted over 3,000 telephone calls and surveilled defendant Mark Pray and his drug-distributing co-conspirators, including Mr. Smith. See Final Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) [Dkt. 203] ¶¶ 22-23. The Pray Drug Conspiracy was involved in the distribution of large quantities of PCP, heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana. Id. ¶ 22. Members of the conspiracy carried firearms while participating in drug sales and also used violence or threats of violence to further and to protect the conspiracy. Id.

Mr. Smith was involved in the Pray Drug Conspiracy from some time in 2009 until March 11, 2010. Id. ¶ 27. His role was to sell PCP to customers and users in the Barry Farms neighborhood of Washington, D.C. Id. Mr. Smith was not alleged to have been involved in any violence committed by the Pray Drug Conspiracy and was not alleged to have possessed a gun during his sales of PCP.

On March 25, 2011, Mr. Smith pleaded guilty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C)1 to Count 2 of the Superseding Indictment, which charged him with Conspiracy to Participate in a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Plea Agreement [Dkt. 151]. Mr. Smith admitted that his relevant conduct involved at least one but less than three kilograms of PCP. Id. ¶ 2; see also Factual Proffer [Dkt. 152] at ¶ 9. The parties agreed on a sentence of 156 months. Plea Agreement at ¶ 5. The plea was "wired to," i.e. conditioned upon, pleas by co-defendants Charles Wade, Robert McMillan, and Herman Williams, who were scheduled to go to trial with Mr. Smith. Id. ¶ 4.

"With respect to drug-trafficking offenses, the [United States] Sentencing Guidelines establish a defendant's base offense level according to the type and weight of the drug." Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010) (citing USSG § 2D1.1(a), (c)). Mr. Smith's relevant conduct included at least one kilogram of PCP, which resulted in a base offense level of 32 under United States Sentencing Guideline (USSG) § 2D1.1. After a three-level reduction for early acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1, Mr. Smith's total offenselevel was 29. PSR ¶¶ 49-58. Mr. Smith's criminal record placed him in Criminal History Category V, id. ¶ 67, and thus his Guideline range was 140 to 175 months. Id. ¶ 111. The Court accepted the Rule 11(c)(1)(c) plea and, on August 9, 2011 and sentenced Mr. Smith accordingly to a term of imprisonment of 156 months and 60 months of supervised release. Judgment [Dkt. 285].

B. Procedural Posture

Thereafter, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines and "reduced the base offense level by two levels for most drug offenses." Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1774 (citing USSG App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 2012-Nov. 2016)). Amendment 782 was later made retroactive "for defendants who . . . already had been sentenced under the higher offense levels." Id. (citing USSG, Amdt. 788). Mr. Smith moved for a reduction in his sentence under Amendments 782 and 788 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).2 First Mot. to Reduce Sentence [Dkt. 541]; FPD Mot. to Reduce Sentence [Dkt. 542].3 This Court denied his motion, finding that Mr. Smith's sentence was based on an agreed-upon plea under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), in the nature of a contract, and not on a sentencing range from the Guidelines so that he was not eligible for a sentence reduction. Order [Dkt. 560]. Mr. Smith appealed. In the meantime, the Supreme Court had issued its decision in Hughes, affirmatively answering the question of whether "a defendantwho enters into a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is generally eligible for a sentence reduction if there is a later, retroactive amendment to the relevant Sentencing Guidelines range." Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772. On Mr. Smith's appeal, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the Guidelines are the "starting point for every sentencing calculation in the federal system," including most sentences in accord with Rule 11(c)(1)(C) pleas. United States v. Smith, 896 F.3d 466, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1775); but see Koons v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1783, 1789 (2018) (no reduction when sentences are not based on Guidelines, but instead dictated by statutory mandatory minimum sentences). The Circuit remanded for "an individually tailored determination of whether resentencing is warranted in this case." Smith, 896 F.3d at 475 (citing Dillon, 560 U.S. at 825).

On remand, Mr. Smith renewed his Motion for a Reduced Sentence and both the government and counsel for Mr. Smith submitted memoranda in aid of sentencing. See Second Mot. to Reduce Sentence [Dkt. 600]; Mem. in Opp'n (Gov't Mem.) [Dkt. 601]; Mem. in Supp. (Smith Mem.) [Dkt. 602]; Reply [Dkt. 603]. The matter is ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts may not revise or modify a sentence once it has been imposed unless one of a limited number of exceptions applies. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As indicated above, one of those circumstances is when the Sentencing Commission has retroactively lowered the applicable Guidelines range. Id. § 3582(c)(2); see also Dillon, 560 U.S. at 824. Under this exception, a district court has discretion to reduce the sentence it originally imposed after considering the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. See Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827-30. Section 3582(c)(2) "unambiguously grants discretionary authority to the district court" when determining if a sentence reduction iswarranted. United States v. Lafayette, 585 F.3d 435, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Reconsideration of a sentence due to a change in the Guidelines does not constitute a full resentencing and, therefore, "the defendant's presence is not required." United States v. Galaviz, 183 F. Supp. 3d 103, 106 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(4)). Notably, Dillon instructed that "§ 3583(c)(2) does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding. Instead, it provides for the 'modification of a term of imprisonment' by giving courts the power to 'reduce' an otherwise final sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission." Dillon, 560 U.S. at 825. Further, Dillon outlined a two-step inquiry under §3583(c)(2): "[a] court must first determine that a reduction is consistent with [USSG] § 1B1.10 before it may consider whether the authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part, according to the factors set forth in § 3553(a)." Id. at 826.

Under § 3553(a), a court must "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to accomplish the goals of sentencing, which include "to reflect the seriousness of the offense," "to promote respect for the law," "to provide just punishment for the offense," "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct," and "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In determining a sentence, the court considers "the nature and circumstances of the offense," "the history and characteristics of the defendant," the sentencing range established by the Guidelines, "any pertinent policy statement" from the Sentencing Commission, and "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants...

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