United States v. Smith
| Decision Date | 29 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil ELH-20-2609,Criminal ELH-18-017 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. PATRICK SMITH, Petitioner. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
This Memorandum Opinion considers a post-conviction petition filed by the selfrepresented Petitioner, Patrick Smith, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2855. ECF 756; ECF 847; ECF 891.[1] Smith, one of 18 defendants in the underlying case, entered a plea of guilty in May 2019 to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. ECF 562. Pursuant to Smith's Plea Agreement (ECF 563), tendered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(C) Smith was sentenced to the agreed upon term of ten years' imprisonment. ECF 645. That sentence corresponds to the congressionally mandated minimum sentence. Smith asserts a wide variety of complaints concerning his case.
The government opposes the petition. ECF 809 (the “Opposition”); ECF 921 (the “First Supplemental Opposition”). Smith has replied. ECF 843; ECF 938; ECF 939.
In addition, Smith has moved six times to amend the petition. ECF 919; ECF 978; ECF 1003; ECF 1008; ECF 1020; ECF 1022. With one exception, the government opposes these amendments ECF 921; ECF 1031 (the “Second Supplemental Opposition”). Because I shall grant the motions to amend, I shall refer to ECF 756; ECF 847; ECF 891; ECF 919; ECF 978; ECF 1003; ECF 1008; ECF 1020; and ECF 1022 collectively as the “Petition.” Smith has submitted various exhibits in connection with the Petition.
Much of Smith's argument relates to a codefendant, whom Smith asserts has cooperated with the government. For that reason the government moved to seal certain documents filed by Smith. See ECF 934; see also ECF 935 (). But, the government did not move to seal all documents in which Smith identifies the asserted cooperating defendant. I will refer to this individual as “Coconspirator 1, ” which corresponds to the terminology used in Smith's Plea Agreement. See ECF 563 at 10.
Smith has also filed several other motions. These include a motion to subpoena certain witnesses for an evidentiary hearing (ECF 930); a “Motion for Oral Argument at 2255 Hearing” (ECF 931); a “Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Smith's 2255 Motion” (ECF 932); and a motion seeking this Court's recusal regarding the Petition. ECF 933 (the “Recusal Motion”).[2]
No hearing is required to resolve the Petition or the motions. For the reasons that follow, I shall deny the Petition. And, I shall deny the Recusal Motion (ECF 933) as well as the hearing requests (ECF 931; ECF 932).
Smith's Recusal Motion is premised on 28 U.SC. § 455 and, in particular, § 455(a). Under § 455, the judge whose objectivity is being challenged by a motion to recuse is the one who first reviews the matter concerning disqualification. Indeed, under Rule 4(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, “the judge who conducted the trial and imposed sentence” is generally the “appropriate judge” to consider the merits of any post-conviction complaints. Assigning the matter to the original judge is “highly desirable” because she is the one “who is familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the trial, and is consequently not likely to be misled by false allegations as to what occurred.” Id., Rule 4, Advisory Committee Note.
Section 455(a) of 28 U.S.C. focuses on the appearance of impropriety. It states: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify [herself] in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The term “proceeding” in § 455 includes the usual stages of a criminal trial and appellate review, as well as “other stages of litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(1). The test “embodies an objective standard” and asks “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts ... would entertain a significant doubt about a judge's impartiality. Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988). The provision is intended to promote confidence in the judiciary. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988).
As the Supreme Court has noted, § 455(a) “deals with the objective appearance of partiality.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n.2 (1994) (emphasis in Liteky). Disqualification is required “only if it appears that [a judge] harbors an aversion, hostility or disposition of a kind that a fair minded person could not set aside when judging the dispute.” Id. at 558. This objective standard includes not only actual impartiality, but also the appearance of impartiality. See United States v. Carmichael, 726 F.2d 158, 160 (4th Cir. 1984). In other words, In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted).
Notably, a “presiding judge is not . . . required to recuse [herself] simply because of ‘unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation.'” United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998)). The decision is discretionary. Cherry, 330 F.3d at 666. “The alleged bias must derive from an extrajudicial source [and] . . . result in an opinion on the merits on a basis other than that learned by the judge from his participation in the matter.” Beard, 811 F.2d at 827 (emphasis added). Simply put, “[t]he proper test to be applied is whether another with knowledge of all of the circumstances might reasonably question the judge's impartiality.” Id.
Section 455(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code enumerates circumstances in which a federal judge “shall” disqualify herself because partiality is presumed. Under § 455(b)(1), a judge shall disqualify herself from a proceeding if she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party ” As with § 455(a), the alleged bias or prejudice referenced in § 455(b)(1) must stem from an extrajudicial source. Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 572-73 (4th Cir. 2011). But, § 455(b)(3) compels disqualification where the judge “has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy.” (Emphasis mine.)
In my view, Smith has not presented a basis for recusal. A defendant's mere dissatisfaction with a judge's rulings does not constitute a ground for recusal.
Much of the Recusal Motion is premised on this Court's effort to protect the defendant's right to appeal, because Smith claimed he wanted to pursue an appeal. See ECF 933 at 1. To that end, the Court entered an amended judgment to extend the appeal deadline and then directed Smith's former counsel to take the mechanical step of filing the appeal. Curiously, Smith asserts that this effort indicates a “deep seated favoritism” on the part of the Court towards the government. ECF 933 at 1. Far from showing favoritism towards the government, the Court's actions were undertaken to assist Smith, so as to ensure that he did not forfeit the ability to appeal.
I discuss this sequence of events as to this matter in more detail, infra. But, in essence, Smith's argument reflects an ongoing misunderstanding of what transpired. See ECF 880 (). No reasonable person would question the Court's impartiality based on its effort to provide the defendant with what he requested. See In re Beard, 811 F.2d at 827. The contention does not warrant recusal.
The Recusal Motion also argues that recusal is warranted because I have “factual knowledge” as to various contentions in defendant's Petition, including his allegation of “collusion” between his counsel and the government, and his assertion as to the effects of his medication. ECF 933 at 1. Indeed, Smith has separately moved to compel my testimony at any evidentiary hearing regarding the Petition. See ECF 930.
Again, this argument does not support recusal. The fact that I have developed knowledge regarding this case from prior proceedings is not a basis for my recusal. To the contrary, as mentioned, under the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, it is “highly desirable” that the original judge consider a § 2255 petition because she is “familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the trial.” Id., Rule 4, Advisory Committee Note.
Accordingly, I shall deny the Recusal Motion.
Petitioner was indicted on January 11, 2018, along with seventeen others. ECF 1. A Superseding Indictment was filed on March 22, 2018 (ECF 157), adding another defendant. The Superseding Indictment charged Smith, the lead defendant, with multiple offenses: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); possession of firearms by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Eight); possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count Nine); and possession of two firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Ten).
Two of the charges in the Superseding Indictment carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Specifically, both the § 846 charge (Count One) and the § 841 charge (Count Nine) involved...
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