United States v. Snarr

• Decision Date: 08 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10–40525.,10–40525.
• Citation: 704 F.3d 368
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Mark Isaac SNARR; Edgar Baltazar Garcia, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

704 F.3d 368

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Mark Isaac SNARR; Edgar Baltazar Garcia, Defendants–Appellants.

No. 10–40525.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 8, 2013.

Traci Lynne Kenner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Tyler, TX, Joseph Robert Batte, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kerry M. Klintworth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Douglas Milton Barlow, Attorney, Barlow Law Firm, Beaumont, TX, George Patrick Black, Federal Public Defender, Tyler, TX, Gerald E. Bourque, Robert A. Morrow, III, The Woodlands, TX, Jani Jo Maselli, Houston, TX, for Defendants–Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Following their joint trial, a jury found Defendants–Appellants Mark Snarr and Edgar Garcia guilty of murdering Gabriel Rhone, a fellow inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Beaumont, Texas. After the jury unanimously recommended capital punishment for each defendant, the district court sentenced them to death. Defendants appeal their convictions and sentences. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Mark Snarr and Edgar Garcia (“Defendants”), charging them with murdering Gabriel Rhone in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 2. The indictment provided notice of special findings for both Snarr and Garcia, and on February 9, 2009, the government filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty against both defendants.

The evidence adduced at trial showed that, on November 28, 2007, Rhone, Snarr, and Garcia were incarcerated at the federal penitentiary in Beaumont, Texas. That day, as prison guards escorted Snarr and Garcia from outdoor recreation areas to their respective cells, Defendants escaped from their handcuffs and produced handmade weapons known as “shanks.” Unaware that Garcia had a shank, and believing that Snarr was preparing to attack Garcia, correctional officer Dewight Baloney positioned himself between the two men, with his back toward Garcia. Garcia then stabbed Baloney in the back, as Snarr attacked him from the front. Defendants continued assaulting Baloney as he struggled to reach a secure location, ultimately stabbing him twenty-three times in approximately fifteen seconds. After Baloney escaped, Defendants turned their attention to correctional officer Josh McQueen. Snarr stabbed McQueen while demanding from him keys to the inmates' cells. When McQueen refused to surrender his keys, Garcia stabbed him, at which point Snarr was able to rip McQueen's keys from his duty belt.

Defendants then ran down a corridor to Rhone's cell. Snarr attempted for almost a full minute to unlock the cell door, while Garcia—who, according to one witness, appeared “to be taunting the inmates” in the cell with his shank—yelled either “I'm going to kill you,” or “We going to kill you.” When Defendants finally opened the door, Rhone fled from his cell and Defendants began stabbing him. One witness to the events testified that, in the midst of the attack, Defendants “were in a frenzy ... repeatedly stabbing [Rhone] over and over.” Despite officers' commands that they stop, Defendants continued their assault on Rhone until they saw that officers were preparing to use riot control equipment to clear the area. As Defendants retreated, one of them yelled, “That's how you get your enemy,” and Snarr exclaimed, “Dude disrespected us, and that's what he got.”

Only then were officers able to attend to Rhone, who by that time already appeared to be dead. Prison officials attempted to resuscitate him, but shortly after the attack, Rhone was pronounced dead at a Beaumont hospital. An autopsy revealed that he had sustained fifty stab wounds: eighteen to the front of his body, and thirty-two to the back. The cause of Rhone's death was listed as “multiple stab wounds of the heart, lung, and liver,” with the injury to his heart being the fatal wound.

On May 7, 2010, jurors deliberated for just over one hour before returning guilty verdicts against both Snarr and Garcia for Rhone's murder. During the eligibility phase of the trial, the government submitted several statutory aggravating factors to establish Defendants' eligibility for the death penalty.¹ These included, for both defendants, that the offense had been committed: (1) “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim,” and (2) “after substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6), (9). To substantiate these factors, the government introduced a number of exhibits and presented several witnesses over a two-day period.

On May 12, 2010, the jury unanimously concluded that Defendants were eligible for the death penalty. That same day, the district court began the selection phase of Defendants' trial. In support of its position that Defendants' crime warranted the death penalty, the government alleged the existence of multiple non-statutory aggravating factors, including, as relevant here, that each defendant “poses a continuing and serious threat to the lives and safety of others because it is likely that he will commit criminal acts of violence in the future.” On May 21, 2010, the jury unanimously selected the death penalty for both Snarr and Garcia. The district court subsequently sentenced Defendants to death in accordance with the jury's recommendation. Defendants now appeal their convictions and sentences.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Defendants raise a host of challenges, which broadly may be characterized as follows: (1) given numerous errors committed during the jury selection process, Defendants were denied their constitutional rights to an impartial jury, due process, and equal protection; (2) the district court improperly denied Defendants' request for a lesser-included-offense instruction; (3) the government presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion regarding the applicability of three aggravating factors; (4) the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendants' motion for severance; (5) the Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”) is unconstitutional; (6) the district court improperly excluded character evidence related to the victim; (7) the district court abused its discretion in excluding Garcia's “execution impact” evidence; and (8) this court's chief judge denied Defendants due process by overruling the district court and issuing an order partially reducing and partially denying funds Garcia requested for the retention of certain investigators and experts. We consider each of these claims in turn.

A. Jury Selection Challenges

Defendants assign three errors to the district court in connection with the jury selection process. First, Defendants argue that the court improperly excluded for cause five prospective jurors who expressed reservations about imposing the death penalty. Second, Defendants contend that the court erred in dismissing a venire person who indicated that he had a physical infirmity that would impair his ability to render effective jury service. ² Finally, Defendants submit that the court improperly denied their for cause challenges to three prospective jurors.

(1) Prospective Jurors Dismissed for Death Penalty Objections

(a) Standard of Review

A district court's dismissal of a prospective juror for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 474 (5th Cir.2002). “Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.” Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007). We thus give “considerable deference” to a district court's decision to dismiss a juror based on his or her opposition to the death penalty. United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 357 (5th Cir.2007).

(b) Applicable Law

In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a capital defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury is violated when a court universally excuses for cause all members of the venire who express conscientious objections to the death penalty. 391 U.S. 510, 521–22, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Nevertheless, “[a] court may excuse a prospective juror for cause because of his views on capital punishment if those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions and oath.” United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 340 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). A prospective juror, therefore, properly is dismissed if, regardless of the facts and circumstances of a case, he indicates that he personally could not impose the death penalty. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 357. Additionally, because “many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear,’ ” dismissal for cause is also appropriate if the court “is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 425–26, 105 S.Ct. 844. Accordingly, this court repeatedly has deemed proper a lower court's dismissal for cause of a prospective juror who has wavered or given conflicting or ambiguous signals as to whether he or she could sentence a defendant to death. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 973 (5th Cir.2008); Ortiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 492, 502–03 (5th Cir.2007); Bernard, 299 F.3d at 474–75;Webster, ...