United States v. Sotelo

• Citation: 56 L.Ed.2d 275,98 S.Ct. 1795,436 U.S. 268
• Decision Date: 22 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-1800,76-1800
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. Onofre J. SOTELO and Naomi Sotelo
• Court: United States Supreme Court

56 L.Ed.2d 275

98 S.Ct. 1795

436 U.S. 268

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v Onofre J. SOTELO and Naomi Sotelo.

No. 76-1800.

Argued Feb. 22, 1978.

Decided May 22, 978.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1978.

See 438 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 3126.

Syllabus

Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that "[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" federal taxes who "willfully fails" to do so, shall be liable to a "penalty" equal to the amount of the taxes in question. Section 17a(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act makes nondischargeable in bankruptcy "taxes . . . which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others . . . but has not paid over." Respondents, husband and wife, were adjudicated bankrupt, as was a corporation in which he was the principal officer and majority stockholder. The bankruptcy court found respondent husband (hereafter respondent) personally liable to the Government under § 6672 for his failure to pay over taxes withheld from employees of the corporation. Subsequently, in proceedings by the Government to collect from respondent on his § 6672 liability, the bankruptcy judge, rejecting respondent's contention that such liability was a "penalty" and as such had been discharged, reasoned that although § 6672 liability was denominated a "penalty," it was in substance a tax, and thus was nondischargeable under § 17a(1), and more particularly § 17a(1)(e). The District Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Though recognizing respondent's § 6672 liability, the court held that § 17a(1)(e) was inapplicable because it was not respondent himself but his corporation that was obligated to collect and withhold the taxes, and because in any event the money involved constituted a "penalty," whereas § 17a(1)(e) renders only "taxes" nondischargeable. Held : Respondent's liability under § 6672 is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under § 17a(1)(e). Pp. 273-282.

(a) That respondent was found liable under § 6672 necessarily means that he was "required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" the withholding taxes, and that he willfully failed to meet one or more of these obligations. P. 274.

(b) Since the taxes in question were "collected or withheld" from the corporation's employees and have not been "paid over" to the Government, respondent's § 6672 liability was imposed not for his failure to collect taxes but for his failure to pay over taxes that he was required both to collect and to pay over, and therefore he "collected or withheld" the taxes within the meaning of § 17a(1)(e). P. 275. (c) The "penalty" language of § 6672 is not dispositive of the status of respondent's debt under § 17a(1)(e), since the funds involved were unquestionably "taxes" at the time they were "collected or withheld from others," and it is this time period that § 17a(1)(e), with its modification of "taxes" by the phrase "collected or withheld," treats as the relevant one. That the funds due are referred to as a "penalty" when the Government later seeks to recover them does not alter their essential character as taxes for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, at least where, as here, the § 6672 liability is predicated on a failure to pay over, rather than a failure initially to collect, the taxes. P. 275.

(d) The legislative history of § 17a(1)(e) indicates not only that Congress intended to make nondischargeable the withholding tax obligations of persons in respondent's situation, but also that it meant to ensure post-bankruptcy liability for such taxes in corporate bankruptcy situations (where a corporation's tax liabilities are rendered uncollectable because of its dissolution). Pp. 275-279.

(e) The overall policy of the Bankruptcy Act of giving a bankrupt a "fresh start" cannot override Congre s' specific intent in § 17a(1)(e) to make a liability like respondent's nondischargeable, especially since the contrary result would create an inequity between corporate officers and individual entrepreneurs. Pp. 279-281.

551 F.2d 1090, reversed and remanded.

Stuart A. Smith, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Bruce L. Balch, Rock Island, Ill., for respondents.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves the interaction of sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the Bankruptcy Act. Respondent Onofre J. Sotelo was found personally liable to the Govern- ment for his failure to pay over taxes withheld from employees of the corporation in which he was the principal officer. The question presented is whether this liability is dischargeable in bankruptcy.

I

In mid-1973, respondents Onofre J. and Naomi Sotelo were adjudicated bankrupts, as was their corporation, O. J. Sotelo and Sons Masonry, Inc. The individual bankruptcy proceedings of the two Sotelos were consolidated. In November 1973, the Internal Revenue Service filed against respondents' estate a claim in the amount of $40,751.16 "for internal revenue taxes" that had been collected from the corporation's employees but not paid over to the Government. Respondents were alleged to be personally liable for these taxes under Internal Revenue Code § 6672, 26 U.S.C. § 6672, as corporate officers who had a duty "to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" the taxes and who had "willfully fail[ed]" to make the requisite payments.¹ Respondents objected to the Government's claim, arguing that they should not be held personally liable for "taxes of the corporation." Memorandum Opinion of Bankruptcy Court (Nov. 29, 1974).

In upholding the Government's claim to the extent of $32,840.71, the bankruptcy court found that Onofre Sotelo had formerly operated the masonry business as a sole proprietorship and that, since the formation of the corporation, he had been its president, director, majority stockholder, and chief executive officer. Naomi Sotelo, on the other hand, though named the corporation's secretary, "did not take an active part in the business." Id. at 1. The court concluded that Onofre Sotelo was personally liable to the Government under Internal Revenue Code § 6672, since he "was charged with the duty and responsibility to see that the [withheld] taxes were paid." Memorandum Opinion, supra, at 3.² The record does not reflect any appeal of this ruling.

In October 1975 the Government, seeking to collect part of the money owed by Onofre Sotelo under § 6672, served a notice of levy on respondents' trustee with regard to $10,000 that belonged to respondents and was not available for general distribution to creditors in bankruptcy.³ Respondents objected to the levy, in part on the ground that the liability is described i § 6672 itself as a "penalty" and as such had been discharged in bankruptcy.⁴ The Government argued that, to the contrary, the liability was for "taxes," which § 17a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 550, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1976 ed.), makes nondischargeable. The bankruptcy judge agreed with the Government, reasoning that, "[t]hough denominated a 'penalty,' [the § 6672 liability] is in substance a tax." 76-1 USTC ¶ 9435, p. 84,157 (SD Ill. 1976). The judge also noted, ibid., that subdivision (e) of Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1) makes specifically nondischargeable "taxes . . . which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others . . . but has not paid over." 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1)(e) (1976 ed.). Respondents appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, which affirmed on the opinion of the bankruptcy court.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. In re Sotelo, 551 F.2d 1090 (1977). It first noted that "Sotelo does not challenge his liability under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 . . . [but] only argues that the liability should have been discharged by his personal bankruptcy petition." Id., at 1091. The court then held that the liability had been discharged, finding persuasive the fact that § 6672 terms the liability a "penalty" and rejecting the Government's argument with respect to the specific language referring to withholding taxes in Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1)(e). 551 F.2d, at 1092.⁵ The court recognized that its ruling was in conflict with "an uncontroverted line of cases." Id., at 1091.⁶

We granted certiorari, 434 U.S. 816, 98 S.Ct. 54, 54 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), and we now reverse.

II

Section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, 80 Stat. 270, provides in pertinent part:

"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, . . . except such as

"(1) are taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State . . . within three years preceding bankruptcy: Provided, however, That a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes . . . (e) which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or any State . . . but has not paid over . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976 ed.).

Relying on this statutory language, the Government presents what it views as two independent grounds for holding the § 6672 liability of Onofre Sotelo (hereinafter respondent) to be nondischargeable. The Government's primary argument is based on the specific language relating to withholding in § 17a(1)(e); alternatively, it argues that respondent's liability, although called a "penalty," IRC § 6672, is in fact a "tax" as that term is used in § 17a(1).⁷

Regardless of whether these two grounds are in fact independent,⁸ § 17a(1)(e) leaves no doubt as to the nondischargeability of "taxes . . . which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or any State . . . but has not paid over." The Court of Appeals viewed this provision as inapplicable here for two reasons: first, because "it was not Sotelo himself, but his employer-corporation, that was obligated by law to collect and withhold the taxes"; and second, because in any event the money involved constituted a "penalty," w...