United States v. Soto

• Decision Date: 24 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–1646.,11–1646.
• Citation: 720 F.3d 51
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Steven SOTO, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

720 F.3d 51

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Steven SOTO, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 11–1646.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

June 24, 2013.

Robert C. Andrews, Springfield, MA, for appellant.

Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

Before HOWARD, Circuit Judge, SOUTER,^* Associate Justice, and TORRESEN,^** District Judge.

TORRESEN, District Judge.

After a jury trial, the appellant, Steven Soto, was convicted on all counts of a seventeen-count indictment charging mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft.¹ On appeal, Soto argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him by admitting testimony of a forensic examiner about another examiner's prior examination. Soto also challenges the sufficiency of the government's evidence for his aggravated identity theft convictions. For the following reasons, we uphold Soto's convictions on all counts.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Aggravated Identity Theft CountsA. Factual Background

We begin with Soto's second argument because it allows us to describe the fraudulent scheme behind all of the charges. Soto contends that there was insufficient evidence that he knew that the identification he fraudulently used to purchase four motorcycles actually belonged to another person. Because Soto challenges the sufficiency of the government's proof at trial, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. United States v. Valerio, 676 F.3d 237, 240–41 (1st Cir.2012).

On March 27, 2006, Soto brought his girlfriend, Yessica Amaro, to Motorcycles of Manchester (MoM's) in New Hampshire. Soto purchased a 2003 Suzuki motorcycle for Amaro, who was posing as “Christine Escribano.” Soto told the office manager at MoM's that he would bring Escribano's license when he came to pay and retrieve the motorcycle the next day. Although Soto neglected to produce Escribano's license, MoM's completed the sale in the name of Christine Escribano on March 28, 2006. On April 1, 2006, Soto and Amaro repeated the scheme at Kelly Power Sports in Danvers, Massachusetts. This time they produced Escribano's driver's license, which a salesperson photocopied, and they purchased another 2003 Suzuki motorcycle. On April 6, 2006, Soto and Amaro continued the charade at North Reading Motor Sports in North Reading, Massachusetts, once again using Escribano's driver's license to purchase two Honda motorcycles. The manager at North Reading Motor Sports made a photocopy of Escribano's license for his records.

Soto paid for the motorcycles with counterfeit cashier's checks, and the dealerships applied for title and registration for the motorcycles with the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) in Escribano's name. Soto then sent counterfeit notarized affidavits ² to the RMV, transferring the titles to the motorcycles to either his uncle, Salvador Shower, or his friend, Abraham Dominguez. Soto intercepted the “clean” titles issued by the RMV from the mail of Shower and Dominguez. Once Soto had the titles, another friend posed as either Shower or Dominguez and sold the motorcycles to innocent third parties.

Christine Escribano testified that she had lost her driver's license, and she identified her license from the photocopy made by one of the motorcycle dealerships.

Soto also purchased three automobiles posing as Gregory Bradley, a friend of Soto's who was incarcerated at the time. Soto produced Bradley's driver's license to buy the cars and to obtain financing for the car purchases. Because Soto is not contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the charges related to the car purchases, we need not describe this scheme in detail.

At the conclusion of the government's case-in-chief, Soto moved for a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal, arguing in relevant part that there was insufficient evidence that he knew that Escribano was a real person. The district court orally denied the motion. Soto renewed the motion at the close of the evidence, and the district court again denied the motion.

B. Standard of Review and Relevant Law

We review the district court's denial of a Rule 29 motion de novo. Valerio, 676 F.3d at 243. We must uphold the denial if, taking the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a rational factfinder could find that the government proved each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 244. Soto was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, which states:

Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Under this statute, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Soto knew that the means of identification that he used belonged to another person. Flores–Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 657, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). The government need not have direct evidence of knowledge; circumstantial evidence can be sufficient. Valerio, 676 F.3d at 244.

Soto argues that the evidence proved only that he possessed the license, not that he knew that the license was that of another person. Viewed cumulatively, the government's circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Soto knew that the license belonged to another person.

First, the government introduced the photocopy of Escribano's license made by North Reading Motor Sports into evidence. The driver's license contains a banner with the word “Massachusetts” and the state's silhouette and seal. The license has a number, date of birth, vehicle classification, height, sex, address, and expiration date. The license bears Escribano's signature and contains two photographs—one larger and the second lighter and smaller, obviously some type of security feature. The license also bears the signature of the registrar running up the left-hand side of the larger photograph. The license bears a small heart, designating an organ donor. Nothing about the license suggests it is counterfeit or fake. A modern Massachusetts driver's license is a sophisticated identification document with a number of security features. Unlike social security cards or birth certificates—printed on card stock or paper—a Massachusetts driver's license cannot be easily forged. We believe that the license alone provides strong evidence of its own authenticity. Soto, himself a Massachusetts resident and driver, would have been familiar with the features of an authentic Massachusetts driver's license.

Second, Soto's willingness to use Escribano's license to purchase expensive vehicles suggests that he knew that the document was authentic. Two of the dealerships actually copied the license for their files. The fact that Soto knew that the license might be subjected to scrutiny by the dealerships supports the inference that he knew that the license belonged to a real person. See Valerio, 676 F.3d at 244–45 (defendant's willingness to subject means of identification to government scrutiny evidence of defendant's knowledge).

Finally, the government produced evidence at trial that all of the other people who Soto involved in his schemes were real people. Soto forged the notary stamp from a notary he previously used; he assignedtitles to his uncle and his friend; he purchased automobiles using his friend Gregory Bradley's identity. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Soto's modus operandi was to involve people whom he knew to be real.

The government produced evidence beyond the mere possession of Escribano's license. Cumulatively, the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Soto knew Escribano's license actually belonged to another person. We affirm the district court's denial of Soto's Rule 29 motion.

II. The Crawford ChallengeA. Procedural Background

The day before trial, Soto moved to suppress incriminating evidence found on a laptop computer seized in an inventory search of one of the automobiles Soto purchased using Bradley's identity. Soto argued in his motion that the seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held a hearing and denied the motion.

At trial, Special Agent Michael Pickett of the United States Secret Service testified about a computer forensics examination he had conducted on the seized laptop. Agent Pickett first testified generally about how a forensics examination is conducted and then identified Exhibit 30 as the hard drive removed from the laptop. Agent Pickett explained that another forensics examiner, John Murphy, had done a forensics examination before him. Agent Pickett testified: “I took the hard drive out of this laptop, I made my own image and I examined the image of the hard drive and I confirmed that everything that was in John Murphy's report was exactly the way he said it was.”

Agent Pickett identified Exhibit 20, which consisted of several documents that were found on the hard drive of the laptop,³ and he testified:

PROSECUTOR: After you made an image of the hard drive from Exhibit 30, the laptop computer, were you able to print out certain documents that appear on the hard drive?

AGENT PICKETT: I did not make a hard copy printout; however, I used the forensic program called EnCase to find this document, and it was contained in the same folder that John Murphy had said that he had found it in.

PROSECUTOR: So am I correct in understanding that each of the pieces of paper in Exhibit 20 are hard copies of stuff you confirmed were in the hard drive that was in Exhibit 30?

AGENT PICKETT: Yes. I saw this document, this file, looking in EnCase...