United States v. Southern Pac. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1909
• Docket Number: 2,892.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

169 F. 407

UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO.

No. 2,892.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

April 3, 1909

Hiram E. Booth (William M. McCrea and Luther M. Walter, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

George H. Smith (P. L. Williams and John G. Willis, on the brief) for defendant in error.

Before VAN DEVANTER, HOOK, and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.

ADAMS Circuit Judge.

This was a civil action in eight counts to recover penalties for that number of violations of the safety appliance laws of the United States. Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174); Act April 1, 1896, c. 87 29 Stat. 85; Act March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943 (U.S Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 885).

These statutes make unlawful the use of any locomotive engine in moving interstate traffic unless it is equipped with a power-driving wheel brake and an appliance for operating the train brake system, and render unlawful the hauling or using of any car in moving interstate traffic when not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of a man going between the ends of the cars. Two counts of the complaint are founded upon the use of engines, and the other six upon the use of cars, not equipped, the former with brakes, and the latter with couplers, as required by law. A verdict was found and judgment rendered in favor of the United States on the two counts relating to the engines, and in favor of the defendant on the other six counts. This writ of error, prosecuted by the United States, challenges the judgments rendered against it on these last-mentioned counts.

The evidence tended to show that at the several times stated in the complaint the couplings on each of the six cars in question were defective, that all but one of them carried interstate traffic, and that one formed a part of a train of other cars which were being used in that traffic. There was evidence tending to show that these cars, in their defective condition and loaded as just stated, were hauled by the defendant carrier from a repair track to an interchange track, or vice versa, and otherwise in and about the yard of the defendant company in Ogden, Utah; that this yard was much congested; that the scarcity of repair men, who ordinarily made repairs on the repair track, made an unusual amount of switching necessary; that the system of handling bad-order cars in the Ogden yard was to move them only so far as was necessary in order to get them out of the way of cars which were in good order; that the movement of such cars was limited to the Ogden yard, and made only for the purpose of separating the bad-order cars from the good-order cars, or to place them where they could be conveniently repaired. In view of this and other like evidence the trial court charged the jury as follows:

'It is immaterial as to the distance over which the car is used, unless it was used simply for the purpose of repairing the defect, and used only when necessary for that purpose. There is no mechanism, no device, that may not get out of repair; and an interpretation must not be placed on the statute that will impose a liability for the failure to perform a duty impossible of discharge. So that a movement of these cars after the coupler is out of repair, that is simply for the purpose of having it repaired, and is reasonably necessary for that purpose, under the conditions then confronting the defendant, would not be a violation of this act. But any greater movement than is reasonably necessary for that purpose, under the existing conditions then confronting the defendant,

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