United States v. Southern Colorado Coal & Town Co.

CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado
CitationUnited States v. Southern Colorado Coal & Town Co., 18 F. 273 (D. Colo. 1883)
Decision Date01 November 1883
PartiesUNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN COLORADO COAL & TOWN CO. and others. [1]

W. S Decker, Special Assistant United States Attorney, for complainant.

Lyman K. Bass, Wolcott & Milburn, and John M. Waldron, for respondents.

McCRARY J.

The important allegation of the bill is that the patentees named in the patents sought to be set aside,-- 61 in number,-- as well as the witnesses by whom proof of pre-emption purports to have been made, were all fictitious persons, having no existence in fact. It is averred that the pre-emption papers together with the signatures thereto, were fraudulently manufactured by certain conspirators named, or other persons unknown, for the purpose of cheating and defrauding the complainant out of its title to the lands in question. In other words, the contention of the complainant is that the officers of the general land-office were by fraud induced to execute patents to fictitious persons, so that there were in fact no grantees capable of taking title. We will first inquire whether the proof sufficiently shows that is true as matter of fact. The bill sets out the names of the supposed pre-emptors and patentees, to the number of 61, and charges that they are myths and fictitious persons, and that the names are fictitious names; that no persons by such names have ever lived or been known in the county of Las Animas, Colorado, where said lands are situated. It also sets out the names of persons purporting to have appeared as witnesses in these several cases, and makes the same averments as to them.

Although these averments are negative in character, yet as the complainant has made them the basis of its suit, the burden is upon it to show that they are, at least prima facie, true. Greenl. Ev. Sec. 78; Whart. Ev. c. 7.

The complainant has accordingly called 14 witnesses, who have resided in Las Animas county for a number of years, and who testify that they were well acquainted there, at, before, and since the dates of the several patents, and that during the years from 1870 to 1874 none of the persons named as patentees, with the exception of Juan B. Martine, were known in the county; and as to Martine, the proof is that a common laborer was known in Trinidad of that name, but that he never occupied any of the land in question. It is not probable that he was an actual pre-emptor, if all the other 60 were myths. It clearly appears by the evidence that none of the lands were occupied, or in any way improved, prior to the issuing of the patents, although in each case what purports to be an affidavit of the claimant is filed, setting forth that he is a citizen of Las Animas county, and has made settlement on and improved the land in good faith, etc., describing the improvements.

The proof is very clear that, with the possible exception of Martine, no such persons as those named as patentees either occupied the land or resided within the county at the time that the pretended entries were made. It was then a very new country, but sparsely populated, and it is incredible that so large a number of persons could have lived in the community and that all could have been unknown to the leading citizens. At all events, the proof produced by the complainant is sufficient to shift the burden and make it necessary for respondents to come forward with proof to show that these supposed patentees were real persons. If such be the fact, it would have been easy for respondents to show it, although quite difficult for complainant to prove the negative. If 61 persons bearing the names of these patentees ever existed and actually appeared before the land-officers at Pueblo as applicants for pre-emption, and if they produced living witnesses to testify for them, it certainly would not be difficult for respondent to identify them, or at least some of them; but if they never existed, it must, in the nature of the case, be difficult, if not impossible, to prove the fact of their non-existence by clear and positive evidence. All that is possible in such a case is to call as witnesses those who would probably have known them, if they had lived at the time and place in question. The fact of their non-existence could be shown in no other way.

It is suggested in the argument that the proof is insufficient, because it only goes to show that none of the patentees or witnesses ever lived in Las Animas county, and does not tend to prove that they did not exist elsewhere. It would, however, be manifestly impossible for complainant to call witnesses to testify as to all localities; and besides, each of the supposed patentees must have resided in Las Animas county, and actually occupied and improved the land patented to him, in order to be entitled to a patent at all, and each was required to swear to such residence, occupancy, and improvement. If none of them were ever in the county, and no improvements were ever made upon the land, then the proofs upon which the patents issued were false, and the inference that the papers were manufactured without the presence of any persons bearing or assuming the names of the patentees is not more unreasonable than would be the inference that 61 actual persons committed perjury themselves, and suborned as many others to perjure themselves as witnesses, in order to acquire the title. At all events, I am clearly of the opinion that complainant can be required to do no more than to show that the supposed patentees did not live in Las Animas county, and that the lands in question had neither been occupied nor improved. If this is not sufficient to shift the burden, then it must follow that we should require the complainant to make the same showing with respect to every other community in the United States, and this can scarcely be seriously insisted upon. It would be very difficult to prove that these supposed persons did not exist in all space. 'But jurisprudence has to do with no such vague domains. Its territory is limited. It inquires whether in a particular spot, at a particular time, open to human observation, a particular thing existed. * * * It is possible within such limited range to call all witnesses who were likely to have been at the given spot or observed the given persons at the particular time, and so to approach the negative by generally exhausting the affirmative. ' Whart. Ev. Sec. 356.

The amount of proof requisite to support the negative proposition, and to shift the burden, will vary according to the circumstances of the case; and very slender evidence will often be sufficient to shift the burden to the party having the greatest opportunities of knowledge concerning the fact to be inquired into. Stephen, Dig. Law of Ev. art. 96. In the present case, to hold the respondents bound to produce evidence in support of the affirmative of the proposition-- that these supposed patentees were actual persons-- is, under the circumstances, both reasonable and just, because the proof of that fact, if it be a fact, is within their reach. The papers could not have been fabricated, as alleged, in the names of fictitious persons, without the knowledge of the register and receiver of the land-office at Pueblo, and the bill distinctly charges that both these officers were parties to the fraud and conspiracy. What purport to be transfers from each of the supposed patentees to one Jackson, as trustee for the Colorado Coal & Town Company, are shown in evidence. Jackson, however, swears that he dealt only with one A. C. Hunt, who brought him the receiver's certificates properly assigned, and he never saw or knew any of the pre-emptors or patentees. He bought the lands from Hunt and paid him for them, receiving what appeared to be the usual evidence of title. It is fair to presume that Hunt dealt with the actual pre-emptors, if any existed, or, if he did not, he could state with whom he did deal, and thus put the inquirer on the road which would lead him to the original parties, if any such actually existed. It is conceded that the receiver is dead, but no reason appears for not calling either the register or Hunt; and the failure to do so is a circumstance, the significance of which the court is not at liberty to overlook. If the court could suppose that an innocent official, thus accused by a bill filed by the attorney general of the United States, would fail to demand or at least request opportunity to vindicate himself under oath, it would be impossible to doubt that the respondents would have called him if the truth had been otherwise than as the bill alleges. It is insisted that it was the duty of the complainant to call these witnesses; but the court does not think so. The complainant having charged these persons with fraud and conspiracy, should not be driven to the necessity of calling them as its witnesses if it is possible for it to make out a prima facie case without doing so. The respondents, whose defense rests, at least in part, upon a denial of the charge of fraud and conspiracy made against these persons, could with perfect safety have called them if the charge is false.

Thus far no notice has been taken of the testimony of experts upon the question whether the signatures to the papers in question appear to be genuine signatures of different persons. The opinions of the expert witnesses differ, as is usual in such cases, but in my judgment this testimony, considered as a whole, confirms the theory that the papers were fabricated.

Having thus reached...

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
13 cases
  • Shooters Island Shipyard Co. v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 1 Noviembre 1923
    ... ... Nos. 3006, 3008. United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. November ... 804; United States v ... Southern Colorado C. & T. Co. (C.C.) 18 F. 273; ... ...
  • Compton v. Benham
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 1 Julio 1908
    ... ... Viles (1851), 23 Vt ... 494; United States v. Southern Colo. Coal, etc., ... Co ... ...
  • Scanlan v. Grimmer
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 26 Enero 1898
    ... ... Wyatt, 31 Mo. 188; U.S. v ... Southern, 18 F. 273; Bailey v. Gilliland, 2 ... Kan.App ... ...
  • Green v. Barker
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • 10 Abril 1896
    ... ... Mattis v. Boggs, 19 Neb. 698; United States v ... Southern Colorado Coal & Town Co., ... ...
  • Get Started for Free