United States v. Spayd
| Docket Number | 3:19-cr-0111-JMK |
| Decision Date | 20 September 2022 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JESSICA JOYCE SPAYD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
In anticipation of trial, the United States of America (“the Government”) filed seven motions in limine (“MIL”).[1] Defendant Jessica Spayd filed limited or full oppositions to three of the Government's MILs.[2] Ms. Spayd also filed seven MILs.[3] The Government filed limited or full oppositions to five of Ms. Spayd's MILs.[4] This Order addresses five of the Government's MILs and all seven of Ms. Spayd's MILs. The remainder of the Government's MILs will be addressed in a separate Order or at the Final Pretrial Conference, currently scheduled for Wednesday September 21, 2022, at 12:00 p.m. in Anchorage Courtroom 3.
Motions in limine are a “procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence in a particular area.”[5] District courts have the power to rule on motions in limine pursuant to their “inherent authority to manage the course of trials.”[6] However, “a ruling on a motion in limine is essentially a preliminary opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court.”[7] A ruling on a motion in limine therefore is not binding on the district court, which may “change its ruling at trial because testimony may bring facts to the district court's attention that it did not anticipate at the time of its initial ruling.”[8]To exclude evidence on a motion in limine, the evidence must be “clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.”[9] “Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.”[10] Further, motions in limine that seek the exclusion or inclusion of “broad and unspecific categories of evidence . . . are generally disfavored.”[11]
Below, the Court lays out the Federal Rules of Evidence that are most relevant to the parties' pending MILs.
(1) Rule 403
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, a district court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”[12] “Unfair prejudice' is an ‘undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.'”[13]
(2) Rule 404
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides: “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, under Rule 404(b)(2) “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” “Other act” evidence will be admitted under Rule 404(b)(2) if:
(1) the evidence tends to prove a material point; (2) the other act is not too remote in time; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed the other act; and (4) in cases where knowledge or intent are at issue, the act is similar to the offense charged.[14]
Where the “other act” evidence a party seeks to introduce is “inextricably intertwined” with the crime charged in the indictment, the evidence is admissible irrespective of Rule 404(b).[15] Evidence is “inextricably intertwined” when it is (1) “part of the transaction that serves as the basis for the criminal charge” or (2) when it is “necessary to permit the prosecutor to offer a coherent and comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime.”[16]
At Docket 186, the Government moves to preclude Ms. Spayd from offering any evidence at trial “of specific acts of her own good conduct, including any legitimate medical services she may have performed at Eagle River Wellness . . . or other legitimate medical jobs she may have held.”[17] The Government argues this evidence constitutes inadmissible character evidence and its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.[18] Ms. Spayd opposes the Government's MIL, arguing that specific acts of Ms. Spayd providing legitimate medical care is not character evidence prohibited by Rules 404(a) and 405, and is evidence that is directly relevant to her state of mind.[19]
Generally, “[a] defendant cannot establish his [or her] innocence of crime by showing that he [or she] did not commit similar crimes on other occasions.”[20] Therefore, if Ms. Spayd seeks to introduce evidence of specific acts of good conduct for propensity purposes, the Court will exclude it.[21] However, there are several non-propensity grounds upon which this evidence may be admissible. Ms. Spayd's legitimate medical services or related “good acts” may be admissible under a reverse Rule 404(b)(2) theory, as they are relevant to Ms. Spayd's intent and knowledge.[22] Further, evidence of a defendant's prior “good acts” may be relevant where it is alleged that the defendant engaged in continuing “bad acts,” “or where such ‘good acts' would undermine the underlying theory of prosecution.”[23] The Government has acknowledged in its MILs that Count 10 of the Superseding Indictment, which charges Ms. Spayd with maintaining a drug-involved premises in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), alleges continuous criminal conduct during the relevant timeframe.[24] Specific acts of Ms. Spayd's good conduct therefore is relevant to rebut the proposition that Ms. Spayd maintained her practice for the purpose of illegally distributing drugs. The Government may not seek to introduce prior bad act evidence with the argument that it tends to prove the continuous nature of Count 10, while simultaneously seeking to preclude Ms. Spayd from offering prior good act evidence to undermine this theory of guilt.
Notwithstanding, the defense has not proffered any specific “good acts” evidence it intends to present at trial. Without knowing the form this evidence will take, or the purpose for which it is offered, the Court cannot definitively rule on its admissibility. The Court declines to preclude a broad category of potentially probative evidence in a vacuum. Accordingly, the Government's MIL at Docket 186 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renew at trial.
At Docket 193, the Government moves for an order permitting it to admit photographs of the deceased patients listed in Counts 1-5 of the Superseding Indictment.[25]The Government contends these photographs, which include “several clinical photographs taken where the victims were found, and of the victims at the coroner's office, where they are lying flat on an examination table” are highly probative of the patients' cause of death.[26]The Government asserts that the pictures will allow the Government to “present to the jury a more complete, visual picture of events as opposed to relatively vague testimony” and the jury may expect to see photographs of the deceased and could hold the absence of such photographs against the Government.[27] Ms. Spayd did not respond to the Government's motion.
First, the Court is not convinced that a jury will expect to see photographs of the deceased in this case-alleging illegal overprescribing-to the same extent they might in a case involving a violent crime.[28] Second, the Court cannot assess the probative value of the photographs outside the context of trial. It is not clear to the Court at this time whether the photographs will add anything to anticipated testimony regarding the patients' cause of death and the physical indicators of an overdose. Further, the photographs have a high potential for unfair prejudice, as they are likely to evoke an emotional reaction from the jury. The Court will not rule on this issue until it can conduct a Rule 403 balancing analysis in the context of the trial and the evidence already presented therein.[29]Accordingly, the Government's MIL at Docket 193 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renew at trial outside the presence of the jury. Finally, the Court notes that the photographs depict widely divergent scenes and, if they have probative value, that probative value will not be consistent across all of the photographs. Should the Government renew this request during trial, the Court will expect it to argue that the Rule 403 balancing analysis favors admission for each photograph.[30]
(3) Motion in limine to admit patient files and prescription drug monitoring program (“PDMP”) data
At Docket 200, the Government seeks an order to admit (1) Ms Spayd's patient files, including for those patients not identified in the Superseding Indictment, and (2) PDMP data from 2014 to 2019 and summaries of that data.[31] The Government argues (1) that the entire patient files for the patients identified in the Superseding Indictment are relevant to the issue of whether Ms. Spayd's was prescribing controlled substances outside the course of usual professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose; (2) the patient files of patients not identified in the Superseding Indictment are relevant to Count 10; and (3) the PDMP data is highly probative of each count in the Superseding Indictment.[32] The Government provided the Court with a signed declaration from the PDMP Program Manager for the State of...
To continue reading
Request your trial