United States v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., 15-cv-371-wmc
| Decision Date | 29 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | 15-cv-371-wmc |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SPECTRUM BRANDS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
In an earlier opinion and order, this court granted partial summary judgment on plaintiff United States of America's claim that defendant Spectrum Brands, Inc., failed to report timely to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (the "Commission" or "CPSC") information that carafes distributed as part of its Black & Decker SpaceMaker line of coffeemakers were suddenly cracking, separating and breaking at the handle in violation of Section 15(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act (the "Act" or "CPSA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)(3). The court then held an evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriate amount of civil penalties and injunctive relief, if any, for that violation, as well as for Spectrum's related sale and distribution of those coffeemakers after their recall in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2068(a)(2)(B). In advance of that hearing, the court also invited the parties to file briefs on those subjects. Based on the undisputed facts described in the court's summary judgment opinion and order (dkt. #196), as well as the parties' list of joint stipulated facts filed before the hearing (dkt. #224), deposition designations and designated expert reports, and additional evidence admitted at the hearing, the court will now impose a substantial civil penalty and permanent injunctive relief as set forth below.1
OPINIONAs a preliminary matter, the parties disagree about possible civil penalties that may be imposed for violations of the CPSA. In its current version, the Act provides for a "civil penalty not to exceed $100,000" for each violation of § 2068, including violations of the requirement in § 2064(b) to report "information which reasonably supports the conclusion that [a] product . . . contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard" and the prohibition in § 2068(a)(2)(B) against selling recalled products.2 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a)(1). The penalty cannot exceed $15,000,000, however, for "any related series of violations." 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a)(1). Defendant does not dispute that its belated reporting and its sale of recalled products constitute two, distinct "related series of violations" under § 2069.
Given that there is no dispute that defendant sold tens of thousands more coffeemakers than would be required to reach this maximum penalty amount, see UnitedStates v. Mirama Enterprises, Inc., 387 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2004) (), the government asserts that the applicable maximum penalty is $30.30 million, or $15.15 million for each series of defendant's § 2068 violations, after applying statutorily-prescribed inflation adjustments on the maximum penalty. 76 Fed. Reg. 71554-02, 2011 WL 5592923 (Nov. 18, 2011) (adjusted amounts effective January 1, 2012). In contrast, defendant argues that the maximum penalty for its reporting violation is not $15,150,000, but rather $1,825,000.3 This $1,825 million maximum is derived from the $1.25 million amount provided by § 2069(a)(1) () before it was amended by the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 ("CPSIA"), Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008).4
At its core, defendant's argument that the pre-CPSIA amounts should apply to its reporting conduct is a thinly recast version of its unsuccessful argument at summary judgment that the government's lawsuit is time-barred. Defendant maintains that even though Spectrum did not finally report until April 2012, the substantially lower, pre-CPSIA penalty caps should still apply because the government contended that Spectrum's reporting obligation arose as early as May 2009, three months before the amended penalty amounts went into effect in August 2009. More specifically, defendantemphasizes that "Congress did not indicate any intent that the new penalty cap for CPSA violations should apply retroactively," citing a handful of cases for the purported proposition that amended penalties or damages amounts can neither be applied to conduct that took place before those amendments became effective, nor to conduct that "straddled" the old and new amounts, unless Congress expresses a contrary intent. (Def.'s Opp'n Br. (dkt. #207) at 7-10.)
As the government correctly points out, however, the cases defendant cites are wholly inapposite since defendant's argument is premised on an egregious misreading of the court's summary judgment opinion. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the court did not "agree[] that Spectrum's obligation to file a Section 15(b) report arose in May 2009." (Def.'s Opp'n Br. (dkt. #207) at 7.) Far from it, the court acknowledged in its summary judgment opinion that both plaintiff and defendant were likely "entitled to a jury trial on the limited issue of determining the specific date Spectrum's reporting obligation arose." United States v. Spectrum Brands, No. 15-cv-371-wmc, 2016 WL 6835371, at *21 n.23 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 17, 2016).
Given that neither party was likely to "want to undertake the expense of trying that single, narrow issue to a jury" as part of a separate liability trial, the court instead offered to account for the parties' arguments regarding the date the reporting obligation arose during the civil penalty phase of the case. Id. Having failed to seek a jury trial on the issue of when its obligation to report first arose, the court finds defendant's argument now for the earliest possible date to be transparently self-serving. Indeed, the court remains strongly disinclined, for reasons first explained in its summary judgment opinion,to endorse the "perverse situation where Spectrum would insist its duty to report was non-existent, but if it existed should be found to have dated back to the date the CPSC asserts."5 Id. at *18 n.18. Moreover, even if Spectrum were obligated to report before the amended penalties became effective, it failed to actually report (and thus did not end its illegal conduct) until long after the new penalties applied.6 Regardless, the court here has little trouble considering only Spectrum's violations, which continued long after the CPSIA took effect. Accordingly, the court agrees with plaintiff that the maximum civil penalty that can be assessed against defendant is $30.30 million.
Although offered as guidance to the Commission, the court will consider the statutory factors Congress set forth by the CPSA to arrive at an appropriate civil penalty for defendant's violations:
In determining the amount of any penalty to be sought upon commencing an action seeking to assess a penalty for a violation of section 2068(a) of this title, the Commission shall consider the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, including the nature of the product defect,the severity of the risk of injury, the occurrence or absence of injury, the number of defective products distributed, the appropriateness of such penalty in relation to the size of the business of the person charged, including how to mitigate undue adverse economic impacts on small businesses, and such other factors as appropriate.
15 U.S.C. § 2069(b); see also United States v. Shelton Wholesale, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1165-66 (W.D.Mo. 1999) ().
The court further looks for guidance to the regulations adopted under the CPSA, in particular that "[t]he policies behind, and purposes of, civil penalties include the following: [d]eterring violations; providing just punishment; promoting respect for the law; promoting full compliance with the law; reflecting the seriousness of the violation; and protecting the public." 16 C.F.R. § 1119.1. Similarly, the court considers four specific, "other factors" identified in the CPSA regulations: (1) "Safety/compliance program and/or system relating to a violation"; (2) "History of noncompliance"; (3) "Economic gain from noncompliance"; and (4) "Failure to respond in a timely and complete fashion to the Commission's requests for information or remedial action."7 16C.F.R. § 1119.4. With this as framework, the court applies these factors to Spectrum's reporting and recall violations below.
As to the first of the § 2069(b) factors -- the nature of the product defect -- the record here establishes that the carafe handles were defective, particularly given the dozens of reports of broken handles received directly from customers and similar modes of failure identified by defendant's engineers in two of the broken carafes returned by customers.8 As defendant rightly points out, however, the severity of any defect remains unclear, as plaintiff failed to establish the extent to which broken handles separated completely from the carafe, rather than partially, leaving uncertain the risk of a catastrophic failure with multiple shards of sharp glass and most or all of the hot coffee being spilled on a consumer. That said, defendant was in the best position to investigate additional details about reported handle failures through its call center employees, and it, therefore, shares some of the responsibility for those missing facts. Ultimately, the court finds this factor weighs in favor of defendant, although not to a large degree.
The second and third factors under § 2069(b) -- the severity of the risk of injury and the occurrence or absence of injury -- weigh more strongly in defendant's favor. As to evidence of injury, defendant correctly points out that plaintiff introduced noadmissible evidence regarding any injuries that a customer actually sustained by virtue of a failed handle (as opposed to those self-reported by customers)...
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