United States v. Speed, 12882.

• Decision Date: 10 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 12882.,12882.
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Eric R. SPEED, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

388 A.2d 892

UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Eric R. SPEED, Appellee.

No. 12882.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted May 25, 1978.

Decided July 10, 1978.

Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom John A. Terry and David S. Krakoff, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Peter G. Kuh, Washington, D. C., appointed by this court, for appellee.

Before NEBEKER, YEAGLEY and FERREN, Associate Judges.

NEBEKER, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal by the United States from a trial court order granting a motion by Speed to suppress physical evidence. Upon determining that the seizure was not a violation of Speed's Fourth Amendment protections, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A vice detective received an evening telephone call from an informant, who stated that he had seen a man wearing a green print shirt and green jeans selling phenmetrazine¹ at a described location. The detective had no personal working experience with the informant, but was aware that the informant had provided two other vice detectives with reliable information on three or four occasions.

The detective, along with two other detectives, proceeded to the location in an unmarked car and arrived within five minutes of the telephone call. They observed a man, later identified as appellee Eric Speed, fitting the informant's stated description. As the detectives alighted from their car, one of them saw Speed throw something under the cruiser. A search of the area under the auto resulted in the finding of a tablet which was immediately identified as phenmetrazine. Speed was then searched, but no additional drugs or significant amounts of money were found. Speed was charged with possession of phenmetrazine,² the tablet found under the police cruiser.

Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Speed's motion to suppress the tablet. The transcript of the hearing reveals the trial court's chief concern regarding the seizure and arrest was the informant's lack of specificity regarding the informant's location and the number of sales observed. Prior to ruling on the motion, the trial judge stated, "I am basically also troubled, perhaps that is my most basic trouble, . . . that we have only the statement, `I saw him selling.' We don't have the number of times. We don't have where he was with relationship to the parties when the [sale] took place. Or maybe it was just the one [sale], I don't know." The trial judge also expressed concern regarding the lack of money or additional contraband on Speed's person. He also deemed it significant that the area where the incident occurred was "a narcotic area, and [it] would not be unusual for there to be a tablet on the street." The trial judge remarked at the close of the hearing, "I have no question about the integrity of [anyone's] testimony in making my ruling. So please understand that."

On appeal, the government argues, inter alia, that Speed had no standing to complain about the recovery of the contraband from the street beneath the cruiser. We agree.

This is a case where the sufficiency of an informant's tip³ and the existence of probable cause need not be determined. The only seizure of evidence occurred when the detective recovered the tablet...