United States v. Sponenbarger
Citation | 84 L.Ed. 230,308 U.S. 256,60 S.Ct. 225 |
Decision Date | 04 December 1939 |
Docket Number | No. 72,72 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. SPONENBARGER et al |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Messrs. Frank Murphy, Atty. Gen., and Warner W. Gardner, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 257-258 intentionally omitted] Mr. Lamar Williamson, of Monticello, Ark., for respondents.
[Argument of Counsel from Page 259 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent sued the United States under the Tucker Act,1 alleging that the Mississippi Flood Control Act of 19282 and construction contemplated by that Act involved an 'intentional, additional, occasional flooding, damaging and destroying' of her land located in Desha County, Arkansas. She maintained that her property had thus been taken for a public use for which the Government is required to pay just compensation by the Fifth Amendment, U.S.C.A. Const. 3. In addition, she asserted a statutory right of recovery under the Act itself. After full hearing, judgment for the Government was entered in the District Court.4 The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.5 Because of the importance of both the legislation and the principles involved, we granted certiorari.6
A summary of the history behind the Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928 clarifies the issues here. Respondent's land is in the alluvial valley of the Mississippi River. Alluvial soil, rich in fertility, results from deposits of mud and accumulations produced by floods or flowing water. Thus, floods have generously contributed to the fertility of the valley. However, the floods that have given fertility have with relentless certainty undermined the security of life and property. And occupation of the alluvial valley of the Mississippi has always been subject to this constant hazard.
To enjoy the promise of its fertile soil in safety has, for generations, been the ambition of the valley's occupants. As early as 1717, small levees were erected in the vicinity of New Orleans. Until 1883, piecemeal flood protection for separate areas was attempted through uncoordinated efforts of individuals, communities, counties, districts and States. Experience demonstrated that these disconnected levees were utterly incapable of safeguarding an ever increasing people drawn to the fertile valley. Under what was called the Eads plan, the United States about 1883 undertook to cooperate with, and to coordinate the efforts of the people and authorities of the various river localities in order to effect a continuous line of levees along both banks of the Mississippi for roughly nine hundred and fifty miles—from Cape Girardeau, Missouri, to the Gulf of Mexico.7 Recurrent floods, even after the eventual completion of this tremendous undertaking, led to the conclusion that levees alone, though continuous, would not protect the valley from floods. And in 1927 there occurred the most disastrous of all recorded floods. In congressional discussion of the 1928 Act, it was said—as the evidence here discloses—that 8 Respondent's land, under fifteen to twenty feet of water, was left bare of buildings of any kind in this 1927 flood.
The 1928 Act here involved accepted the conception—underlying the plan of General Jadwin of the Army Engineers—that levees alone would not protect the valley from floods. Upon the assumption that there might be floods of such proportions as to overtop the river's banks and levees despite all the Government could do, this plan was designed to limit to predetermined points such escapes of floodwaters from the main channel. The height of thelevees at these predetermined points was not to be raised to the general height of the levees along the river. These lower points for possible flood spillways were designated 'fuse plug levees.' Flood waters diverted over these lower 'fuse plug levees' were intended to relieve the main river channel and thereby prevent general flooding over the higher levees along the banks. Additional 'guide levees' were to be constructed to confine the diverted flood waters within limited floodway channels leading from the fuse plugs. The suggested fuse plug which respondent claims would damage her property was to be at Cypress Creek, within two to two and one-half miles of her land, and her land lies in the path of the proposed floodway to stem from this particular fuse plug.
The 1928 Act provided for a comprehensive ten-year program for the entire valley, embodying a general bank protection scheme, channel stabilization and river regulation, all involving vast expenditures of public funds. However, before any part of this program was actually to be carried out, the Act required extensive surveys 'to ascertain the best method of securing flood relief in addition to levees, before any flood-control works other than levees and revetments are undertaken.' 33 U.S.C.A. § 702a. Lands intended for floodways were, pending completion of the floodways, to enjoy the protection already afforded by levees.
The District Court found—
10
From these findings the District Court concluded as a matter of law that—
(1) Respondent's property had not been taken within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against taking without compensation;
(2) Under the facts of this case, respondent had no statutory right of recovery under the 1928 Act itself.
In reversing the District Court's judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Boeuf floodway had not been abandoned by the Government, but was in operative existence notwithstanding that the proposed guide levees along the floodway had not been built and levees on the Mississippi both immediately above and below the proposed fuse plug had not been raised above the height of what would have been the fuse plug levee. The Circuit Court of Appeals said that (101 F.2d 513) Upon these conclusions, the Circuit Court held that there was a taking of respondent's property.
First. This record amply supports the District Court's finding that the program of improvement under the 1928 Act had not increased the immemorial danger of unpredictable major floods to which respondent's land had always been subject. Therefore, to hold the Government responsible for such floods would be to say that the Fifth Amendment requires the Government to pay a landowner for damages which may result from conjectural major floods, even though the same floods and the same damages would occur had the Government undertaken no work of any kind. So to hold would far exceed even the 'extremest'11 conception of a 'taking' by flooding within the meaning of that Amendment. For the Government would thereby be required to compensate a private property owner for flood damages which it in no way caused.
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