United States v. Spruill
| Decision Date | 16 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 13–4069–cr. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jeff SPRUILL, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Sarala V. Nagala, Assistant United States Attorney (Marc H. Silverman, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Deirdre M. Daly, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT, for Appellee.
Harry Sandick (Andrew D. Cohen, on the brief), Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler L.L.P., New York, N.Y., for Defendant–Appellant.
Before: POOLER, RAGGI, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
Judge POOLER dissents in a separate opinion.
Defendant Jeff Spruill appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on July 12, 2013, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Robert N. Chatigny, J. ), after a jury trial at which he was found guilty of two counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and cocaine base (Counts One and Two), one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (Count Three), and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count Four). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) ; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Spruill argues that the district court erred in dismissing a "holdout" juror for cause during the course of jury deliberations, in violation of principles enunciated in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir.1997). He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions on Counts One, Two, and Four; the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, in particular the district court's application of a career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 ; and the effectiveness of former counsel's representation in failing to challenge the § 4B1.1 enhancement. In a supplemental pro se brief, Spruill further argues that knowledge of "drug type" is a here-unproved predicate element of the drug offenses for which he was convicted.1
As we explain herein, Spruill's juror removal challenge fails for two reasons. First, the challenged removal is not subject to Thomas's "any possibility" rule, see 116 F.3d at 621–22, because the concern underlying Thomas, juror nullification, was not here at issue. Rather, removal was based on extrinsic bias, a matter about which the district court could—and did—inquire without intruding on jury deliberations. See id. at 621. Second, Spruill waived any challenge to dismissal of the juror in question by specifically telling the district court that he did not object either to its colloquy with the juror or to the juror's removal, and by in fact recommending the very disposition he now challenges.
For reasons explained in a summary order issued this same day, we reject Spruill's remaining counseled and pro se arguments.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
In the summer of 2012, two confidential informants under the direction of Middletown, Connecticut police purchased cocaine and cocaine base from defendant Spruill. The second purchase was made at 18 Glover Place, home of Spruill's girlfriend, Chanelle McCalla.
Soon thereafter, police applied for and were granted a warrant to search 18 Glover Place and Spruill's person. Upon executing the warrant, police found Spruill to be carrying on his person two small plastic bags, one containing marijuana and the other containing cocaine.2
At 18 Glover Place, they discovered men's clothing and toiletries in the master bedroom, as well as a bullet, which McCalla claimed was a souvenir from a date at a shooting range. An unlocked door near the entrance to the master bedroom led to the attic, where police found plastic bags containing Spruill's clothing, as well as garbage bags containing a bulletproof vest and two leather bags, from which police seized a .357–caliber handgun, a .40–caliber handgun with three boxes of ammunition, and a .380–caliber pistol with one box of ammunition.
Jury selection in Spruill's case took place on July 9, 2013. The focus of our attention on this appeal is Juror 11.3 During voir dire, this juror identified herself as a "clinician in the State of Connecticut ... do [ing] outreach in the prison systems in Hartford." App. 51. Juror 11 explained that "it's not a reason not to serve ... I'm just thinking like if somebody's found guilty, I could also see this person in the prison system." Id.4 In response to a follow-up question from Judge Chatigny asking whether any jurors had "experiences or connections ... involving law enforcement," Juror 11 explained that she worked in the Connecticut Offender Reentry Program, and that the Program's mission is to help inmates with mental health issues receive treatment and to "represent them in the prison and [to] work on their ... life goals." Id. at 53, 56.
Spruill's counsel initially applied, but then withdrew, a peremptory challenge to Juror 11. The record reflects the following exchange:
Id. at 116–17. Juror 11 ultimately served on the jury.
After the close of evidence, during deliberations, the court received two jury notes in close succession. The first revealed that the jury was divided, apparently 11 to 1, and sought clarification as to the law of constructive possession:
Id. at 521. The second note indicated one juror's concern about a conflict of interest:
Invited to comment on the first note, both the prosecutor and Spruill's counsel stated that the jury did not appear deadlocked and should be instructed to continue deliberations. As to the second note, counsel agreed that it was not clear whether the "holdout" juror in the first note and the "conflicted" juror in the second note were one and the same. With counsel's agreement, the court decided to give the jury further instruction.
In response to the first note, the court reminded the jurors that "[e]ach of you must decide the case for yourself" and "if after carefully considering all the evidence and the arguments of your fellow jurors you entertain a conscientious view that differs from the others, you are not to yield your conviction simply because you are outnumbered." Id. at 530–31. This immediately prompted a third note, requesting a definition of "conscientious view." The court explained, "the term refers to a view of the case based on fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence and full and fair discussion of the issues in the case with the other jurors." Id. at 532. The court then asked counsel whether they agreed with the stated definition, and both responded with approval.
Addressing the second note, the district court instructed the jury on "conflict of interest" as follows:
Id. at 533–34. When the jury resumed its deliberations, the court confirmed that counsel had no objections to any part of the instruction given: "Not from the government, Your Honor"; and "No, Your Honor, thank you," from Spruill's counsel. Id. at 535.
Shortly thereafter, the court received a fourth note, this time from Juror 11, which stated as follows:
Id. at 536. The court shared the note with counsel and solicited guidance on how to proceed. Agreeing with the Government, Spruill's counsel urged further inquiry:
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