United States v. St Anthony Railroad Company
Decision Date | 23 February 1904 |
Docket Number | No. 147,147 |
Citation | 24 S.Ct. 333,192 U.S. 524,48 L.Ed. 548 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err. , v. ST. ANTHONY RAILROAD COMPANY |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
This action was brought by the United States against the railroad company to recover damages for the unlawful cutting down and conversion by the company, in the year 1899, of certain timber on the public lands belonging to the United States in the state of Idaho. The value of the timber thus cut was, as alleged, over $20,000. The trial was had in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Idaho, southern division, and resulted in a judgment dismissing the complaint, which was affirmed, upon appeal, by the circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit (52 C. C. A. 354, 114 Fed. 722), and the government has appealed to this court.
The defendant answered the complaint and denied its averments as to unlawfully entering upon the lands and cutting the timber. As a further and separate defense the defendant averred that it was duly incorporated on May 18, 1899, under and pursuant to the laws of the state of Idaho, for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad from the town of Idaho Falls in Bingham county, Idaho, to St. Anthony, in Fremont county, in that state, a distance of approximately 40 miles. On or about July 7, 1899, the board of directors duly adopted the route for the railway, which was practically a straight line between the town of Idaho Falls and the town of St. Anthony, and passed through and over the public lands of the United States. The defendant fully performed all things required by railroad companies by the act of Congress granting to railroads the right of way through the public lands of the United States, approved March 3, 1875, and it thereby became entitled to the benefit of the privileges therein granted to railroad companies. For the purpose of procuring the necessary material with which to construct its railroad, the defendant, through its authorized agents, entered upon the lands described in the complaint, which were, as defendant alleged, adjacent to the line of the railroad, for the purpose of procuring ties and timbers for the construction of the road, and did, during the summer and fall of 1899, cut and remove timber growing on the lands, not to exceed 1,682,975 feet; that the ties and timbers were cut from the nearest public lands to said line of road, and were, as the defendant averred, adjacent thereto; that all the ties and timbers were necessary for the original construction of the road, and were used for that purpose, and the defendant cut and removed the timber in good faith, with no intention of violating any law or committing any trespass, but believing that it had the right to enter upon the lands and take the timber.
For the purpose of the trial there was an agreed statement of facts made, and therein it was stated that the cutting of the timber was upon the lands of the government and the amount thereof was correctly stated in the answer, and its value upon delivery to the defendant was as alleged in the complaint.
The defendant did not act under any mistake of fact in regard to the status of the timber and the lands upon which it grew, and did what was done, believing it had the legal right so to do. It is not disputed that the lands were unoccupied, unentered public lands of the United States.
Upon the question whether the lands where the timber was cut were or were not adjacent, it was agreed:
The statute under which the cutting is justified is § 1 of 'An Act Granting to Railroads the Right of Way Through the Public Lands of the United States,' approved March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. at L. 482, chap. 152, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1568), and is set forth in the margin.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of way through the public lands of the United States is hereby granted to any railroad company duly organized under the laws of any state or territory, except the District of Columbia, or by the Congress of the United States, which shall have filed with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporaion, and due proofs of its organization under the same, to the extent of one hundred feet on each side of the central line of said road; also the right to take, from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road, material, earth, stone, and timber necessary for the construction of said railroad; also ground adjacent to such right of way for station buildings, depots, machine shops, sidetracks, turnouts, and water stations, not to exceed in amount twenty acres for each station, to the extent of one station for each ten miles of its road.
Assistant Attorney General Purdy for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 527-529 intentionally omitted] Mr. Parley L. Williams for defendant in error.
Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham:
Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:
The important question in this case is as to the meaning of the term 'adjacent' when used in the 1st section of the statute of 1875. The act is a general one, and is therefore applicable to no particular road, except as the facts in each case may bring the road within its language. It grants the right of way through the public lands in the United States upon conditions named, to the extent of 100 feet on each side of the central line of the road. The lands from which materials for the construction of the railroad may be taken must be adjacent to this piece of land but 200 feet wide. The term is a somewhat relative and uncertain one, and in one aspect the case may be determined with at least some reference to the size of the strip or right of way granted, and to which the land must be adjacent. It may also be remembered that the whole length of the road is but 40 miles. In some views of the case the narrowness and shortness of the line might have some effect upon the question of the distance to which the word adjacent might carry one in the search for timber. As the word is frequently uncertain and relative as to its meaning, it might naturally, perhaps, be regarded as more extended when used with reference to a large object than with reference to a comparatively small one. In other words, it must be defined with reference to the context, at least to some extent.
We are not disposed to unduly limit the meaning of the word as used in the statute so as to exclude lands which might other- wise fairly be regarded as within its purpose, and thereby defeat the intent of Congress. The act is not to be construed in an unnecessarily narrow manner, nor, at the same time, should the construction of its language by extraordinarily enlarged in order to attain some special and particular end. In United States v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 150 U. S. 1, 37 L. ed. 975, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 11, another question arose under this same section, and the construction of the act in that regard was certainly as liberal as its language would warrant. It was there held that a railroad company had the right to cut and take the timber or material from public lands adjacent to the line of the road and use the same on portions of its line remote from the place from which it was taken.
In speaking of the proper construction of the act, it was said by Mr. Justice Jackson, for the court:
'It is undoubtedly, as urged by the plaintiffs in error, the well-settled rule of this court that public grants are construed strictly against the grantees, but they are not to be so construed as to defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is given either expressly or by necessary or fair implication. In Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U. S. 618, 625, 28 L. ed. 1109, 1111, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, thus states the rule upon this subject:
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