United States v. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co., 3114.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1942
• Docket Number: No. 3114.,3114.
• Citation: 44 F. Supp. 31
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. ST. JOSEPH STOCK YARDS CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

44 F. Supp. 31

UNITED STATES v. ST. JOSEPH STOCK YARDS CO. et al.

No. 3114.

District Court, W. D. Missouri, St. Joseph Division.

April 3, 1942.

St. Joseph Stock Yards Company and others were indicted for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. On defendants' demurrers to the indictment.

Demurrers overruled in accordance with opinion.

Thomas M. Daly, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., of Chicago, Ill., and James C. Wilson, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

John J. Kelly, of Chicago, Ill., and H. Templeton Brown, of St. Joseph, Mo., for defendant St. Joseph Stock Yards Co.

R. E. Culver, of St. Joseph, Mo., for St. Joseph Live Stock Exchange, St. Joseph Joint Marketing Committee, and Hog Yards Sub-Committee of St. Joseph Joint Marketing Committee.

John Potts Barnes, of Chicago, Ill., and Paul V. Barnett and Henry Ess, both of Kansas City, Mo., for Armour & Co.

C. B. Shaw, of Chicago, Ill., and E. R. Morrison and James E. Nugent, both of Kansas City, Mo., for Swift & Co.

OTIS, District Judge.

We suppose the feeling is a natural one that the specialists in the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice ought to be able to draw an indictment good against demurrers. They have had much experience — almost a plethora of experience since the ascendancy of Honorable Thurman Arnold — and they are learned in the law. But this indictment has been attacked by lawyers of such outstanding capacity and character that the indictment must be studied carefully in the light of their criticism.

The indictment is bottomed on Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Title 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, which reads: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal * * *. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by this section to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor * * *."

The contention of defendants presented in their demurrers and urged in oral and written arguments is that the indictment does not charge the offense denounced by the statute. We must therefore lay the indictment, reduced to briefest compass, alongside the statute. We have — From paragraph 29 of the Indictment: "* * * immediately preceding the date of the return of this indictment the defendants * * * have engaged knowingly and continuously in a conspiracy to fix prices for the sale on the St. Joseph livestock market of hogs shipped from points in Missouri and other states to the said market for sale thereon * * * in restraint of interstate trade and commerce. * * *" From paragraph 30 of the Indictment: "The aforesaid conspiracy has consisted in a continuing agreement and concert of action among the defendants, the substantial terms of which have been that the defendants Armour and Swift purchase equal numbers of hogs each year and each month in the aforesaid livestock market; that the defendants at the opening of the aforesaid market each day appropriate for the defendant Swift a small portion of the hog receipts to be bought at prices to be determined at the close of the said market; that the defendant Armour refuse to offer bids on the hogs so appropriated for the defendant Swift; that the defendant Exchange refuse to accept any bids on the hogs so appropriated for the defendant Swift; that the defendant Swift buy the hogs so appropriated at a factitious price; that the defendants Armour and Swift purchase hogs each Saturday on the aforesaid livestock market at the prices paid by the said defendants on the preceding Friday on the aforesaid market; that the defendant Exchange sells hogs each Saturday on the aforesaid livestock market at the prices paid by the defendants Armour and Swift on the preceding Friday; that the defendants announce by radio that Saturday's hog prices on the aforesaid livestock market would be the same as the preceding Friday's hog prices on the said market; that the defendants induce meat packer buyers, independent buyers, and producers to refrain from buying and selling hogs in the St. Joseph trade territory except on the aforesaid livestock market; that the defendants Swift and Armour from time to time meet with one another and with members of the defendant Exchange and arbitrarily change the terms of hog sales previously made on the St. Joseph livestock market by substituting other prices for those agreed upon between the buyer and seller at the time of sale on the aforesaid livestock market." From paragraph 31 of the Indictment: "* * * the defendants, by agreement and concerted action, have done the things which * * * they conspired to do. * * *

What Defendants Say

The essence of the argument for defendants is:

(1) It is insufficient to attempt to charge the offense aimed at in the statute in the words of the statue alone;

(2) If paragraph 29, standing by itself, might be sufficient to charge an offense (which defendants deny, but not vigorously), it does not stand by itself, its general allegation is particularized in paragraph 30, and the question is: Does the general allegation in 29 as particularized and limited by particulars charge a crime?

(3) The general allegation in 29, as limited in 30, does not charge a crime, whether any particular alone is considered or all particulars are considered.

For the purposes of this memorandum only, we accept at once steps 1 and 2 of defendants' argument, pointing out, however, that paragraph 29 does not undertake to charge an offense in the words of the statute alone and that while paragraph 30 does particularize paragraph 29, nevertheless paragraph 29 enters into each of the...